Groundnuts… How War and Levies Devoured One of the Country’s Key Exports

Mohannad Awad Mahmoud
Groundnuts were never merely an agricultural crop in Sudan; for decades, they stood as one of the pillars of the real economy. The crop has been tied to the livelihoods of millions of citizens in Kordofan, Darfur, Al-Gezira, the White Nile, and Omdurman. It has also served as a vital source of foreign currency, sustaining entire sectors—from farming and transport to oils, animal feed, and exports.
For many years, Sudan ranked among the largest producers of groundnuts in Africa, with output ranging between 1.5 and 2 million tonnes in strong seasons. China was one of the most important global destinations for this product.
Up to the 2022 and 2023 seasons, Sudan maintained a strong presence in the Chinese market, particularly in shelled groundnuts, benefiting from high quality and strong demand. In 2024, China imported around 660,000 tonnes of shelled groundnuts, with Sudan still leading at approximately 347,000 tonnes, followed by Senegal at around 306,000 tonnes—meaning the two countries alone accounted for roughly 98.9% of China’s imports of this commodity. Yet behind these figures, dangerous shifts were unfolding on the ground, largely unnoticed within Sudan.
The war not only disrupted production—it reshaped the entire commercial geography. With routes leading to Omdurman becoming unstable, large volumes of groundnuts from western Sudan were redirected towards the town of Al-Dabba in the Northern State, which emerged as an alternative hub for trade and export. During the 2024 season, exports to China began from Al-Dabba, even in the absence of modern sorting facilities, with groundnuts shipped in a semi-processed state. This alone highlights the scale of Chinese demand, as China was willing to accept the product even without full processing, to maintain supply.
However, the most critical turning point came later. In September 2024, following military setbacks suffered by militia forces in the Jabal Moya area of Sennar State, their commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), accused the Egyptian army of participating in air strikes against his forces and ordered his troops to block trucks heading north. As a result, transport was halted for a period, cutting off groundnut supplies to Al-Dabba and severely disrupting markets and supply chains.
Yet the deeper crisis lay not in the blockade itself, but in what followed. During the 2025 season, the fragmented nature of militia structures and the absence of institutional discipline turned checkpoints into open taxation points. Field commanders and fighters imposed heavy levies and extortion fees on every truck passing through their areas of control. Although the Sudanese army later reopened routes and facilitated flows to White Nile cities such as Rabak and Kosti, restoring some market activity, the commodity’s price had already spiralled out of control.
The crisis became even more evident in production areas. In parts of West Kordofan, trucks could no longer reach farms, and groundnuts were sometimes transported by animal carts to markets in El-Obeid—an indication of the collapse of transport and commercial infrastructure. While the price per tonne in production areas such as En-Nuhud remained around 1 million Sudanese pounds, it rose to over 5 million pounds in Rabak and reached approximately 5.3 million pounds per tonne in Omdurman.
This means that roughly 4 million pounds are added per tonne between production zones and White Nile markets—not due to intrinsic value, but to transport costs, levies, extortion, and transit fees imposed along the routes. A large portion of these are imposed by militias in their areas of control, while various government entities impose additional charges elsewhere, turning roads into a chain of collection points.
When packaging, transport to Port Sudan, quality control fees, customs clearance, zakat, taxes, and local charges are added, the cost per tonne delivered to port rises to around $1,380—while the selling price in China does not exceed $1,300 per tonne. In simple terms, Sudan has effectively been priced out of the groundnut export market for the second consecutive year. The problem is no longer quality or demand—it is cost competitiveness.
While Sudan declines, other countries are moving quickly to fill the gap. Senegal has, within just two years, become a major player in the Chinese market, with exports exceeding 300,000 tonnes in 2024 and continuing to grow into the 2025 season. At the same time, China has diversified its sources, with Brazil, Argentina, and India emerging as key suppliers in the 2025/2026 season, while Sudan’s presence has sharply declined. Even Mozambique, though active in the African groundnut trade, did not become a major competitor in China’s shelled groundnut market in 2024—meaning Sudan did not lose the market to a dominant historical rival, but rather forfeited it through its own structural failures.
The problem extends beyond exports. Rising groundnut prices have directly impacted oil mills in Omdurman and Ed Damer (River Nile State), pushing groundnut oil prices to levels that undermine export competitiveness. At the same time, the cost of groundnut cake used in animal feed has increased, raising livestock feeding costs, and ultimately driving up the prices of milk, meat, and even meat exports.
It is a fully interconnected economic chain: it begins with a truck being taxed on a dirt road in western Sudan. It ends with higher food prices for citizens and the loss of international markets.
The deeper concern is that the government appears detached from these realities. There is no accurate reading of market movements, no serious tracking of data, and no appreciation of the scale of collapse affecting one of the country’s most important agricultural commodities. What is visible instead is an increasing focus on collecting fees, levies, zakat, and taxes at every transit point, while exports erode and foreign markets disappear one by one.
Saving the groundnut export sector does not require political rhetoric or new committees—it requires a clear and urgent economic decision. All transport-related fees must be abolished, along with export-related charges such as quality certification, clearance, zakat, taxes, and local levies—even if only temporarily—until Sudanese products regain competitiveness.
Because if the current situation persists, it will not merely mean the loss of a harvest season—it will mean Sudan’s gradual exit from one of its most important historical markets.
And if Sudanese sesame has already begun to lose its global position, groundnuts are now following the same path—only faster—amid troubling official silence and a complete absence of economic vision that recognises a fundamental truth: countries do not lose markets through conflict alone… they also lose them through excessive taxation, levies, and poor management.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=13701