The Grand Losing Deal: The Sudan’s Case (6-7)

From the Lawyers’ Draft to the Framework Agreement

 

Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

The “Group of Four” wasted no time in continuing its efforts to implement the “grand deal.” Just three months after the Lawyers’ Draft Constitution was set aside, a new project emerged under the title of “the Framework Agreement” (December 2022). This time, they gathered even larger numbers of foreign experts, accompanied by a notable media frenzy. One might wonder, is there a difference between the discarded Lawyers’ Draft and the new Framework Agreement? The main difference is that the proponents of the Framework Agreement decisively eliminated the Sovereign Council and granted ultimate power in the country—without ambiguity—to what is now called the “revolutionary forces that signed the declaration,” namely some personalities within the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC). These personalities will control the four levels of power structures: they will form the Transitional Legislative Council, select the civilian sovereign leadership (which will be the supreme commander of the security forces—effectively placing the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on equal footing), and appoint the Prime Minister (who will chair the Security and Defense Council). As for General Hemedti, the document ensured him an independent constitutional status. He will not be under the leadership of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, nor under the authority of the Prime Minister. Instead, he has been put under a civilian head of state—a position with merely ceremonial and symbolic duties. As for the RSF, it was granted independent and parallel status to the Armed Forces (to be integrated later after the Armed forces would be purified of elements from the previous regime and its combat doctrine would be changed).

However, a careful observer will notice a consistent thread running through both documents. That is, there is a deliberate avoidance of any direct mention of the crime of the “sit-in dispersal” or a clear commitment to holding those criminally responsible accountable. Instead, there is only vague language about “launching a comprehensive process that achieves transitional justice, uncovers crimes (since 1989), holds perpetrators accountable, and provides justice for the victims’ families.” As for the investigative committee formed two years ago, which has images and evidence that the Quartet members have seen, there is no mention of it—exactly as agreed upon in the “Deal”. In addition to this—and perhaps even more significantly—under this agreement, General Hemedti is no longer subordinate to the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, nor is he a “deputy” to anyone. He has effectively become the “prince-in-waiting.” Hence, it is unsurprising—once again—that General Hemedti was one of the first to enthusiastically accept the agreement, declaring on February 4, 2023, his full commitment to it and affirming that he would work tirelessly to expedite its implementation. In a direct threat to the military leadership opposing him, he said: “Get on board with the Framework Agreement if you don’t want this country to fall apart and descend into chaos.” [1]Shortly after signing the agreement, General Hemedti made an unannounced visit to the UAE on February 24, 2023. According to reports, he was received by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed, who affirmed the UAE’s support for the Framework Agreement. Not surprisingly, the Forces of Freedom and Change, who represent the third pillar of the Deal, signed the agreement enthusiastically.. What is surprising, however, is that General Al-Burhan also signed onto the document that effectively sidelines the Armed Forces he commands and lays the groundwork for the RSF to replace them. So why did Al-Burhan agree to sign the Framework Agreement?[2][3]

Indeed, General Al-Burhan was well aware of the terms of the Framework Agreement and understood that its primary intent was to sideline the military institution (and its Commander-in-Chief) and transform the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into an independent and alternative military entity, with General Hemedti elevated to the position of the new Commander-in-Chief for the next decade. So, why, then, did Al-Burhan sign the agreement? There isn’t a single definitive answer, as Al-Burhan, much like General Hemedti, often takes contradictory positions—making statements only to later backtrack on them. However, Al-Burhan was likely facing pressures—perhaps even threats—from multiple directions: from within the military establishment (internal pressures), from his rival General Hemedti (on his right), and from external regional and international forces (from above).[4] To navigate this existential dilemma, Al-Burhan seemingly opted for the following strategy: He signed the general framework of the agreement, viewing it as a set of broad principles. This allowed him to ease the pressures from regional and international forces and perhaps even gain some of their favour. He then deferred the “contentious issues” (chief among them the new status of the RSF) to the military’s representatives at the security and military reform workshop. If the military representatives agreed to this new status, their agreement would effectively validate his prior signature. However, if they disagreed—which he believed was the most likely outcome—he would then be absolved from the agreement, arguing that the military institution did not endorse it. In any case, Al-Burhan had repeatedly said that he had no intention of relinquishing power to an unelected political entity.[5] What is remarkable is that events unfolded precisely according to this scenario, demonstrating that Al-Burhan’s political manoeuvring abilities are on par with other key players in the Sudanese political arena.

However, the proponents of the agreement and the conference organizers miscalculated when they assumed that signing the general principles of the agreement would pave the way for the signing of the technical and procedural details still under dispute. These details were then delegated to what became known as the workshops. Among the most contentious of these issues (and one of the most critical) was the item concerning the integration of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the national army, which was deferred to the military and security reform workshop scheduled for 26–29 March 2023. The disagreement centered around the timeline for the integration.  The RSF insisted on remaining a parallel military force for ten years, while the national army argued that the integration should not exceed two years. This dispute led to the failure of the workshop to reach any agreed-upon recommendations, and accordingly the representatives of the national army withdrew from the discussions. As a result, one of the key pillars on which the Framework Agreement had been based suddenly collapsed.

On the external front, representatives of the Group of Four was not oblivious to the discussions within the military institution, nor did they expect the army to easily sign off on a document that would essentially dismantle its structure. In response, the Group intensified their meetings with General Hemedti to ensure his readiness to activate Plan B—e.i., his willingness to implement the terms of the Framework Agreement by force in case that the negotiations with the military leadership failed. In this context, General Hemedti’s repeated visits to the UAE during the weeks when the Framework Agreement was being discussed can be understood. It was reported that on 24 March, he made an unannounced visit to the UAE, where he held talks in Abu Dhabi with UAE Deputy Prime Minister Mansour bin Zayed[6], who reaffirmed the UAE’s support for the Framework Agreement.[7] On 4 March 2023, he announced that he had returned to Khartoum after a visit to the United Arab Emirates lasting more than a week. This visit came amidst speculations about potential military confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the army, against the backdrop of sharp disagreements and media exchanges between their leaders.

So, General Hemedti returned from the UAE fully prepared—by 15 April 2023—to implement Plan B, which did not fundamentally differ from traditional military coup strategies. He planned to move his heavy military units from North Darfur to Khartoum, deploy forces to seize Merowe Airport to secure external supplies, send troops to the General Army Headquarters to take control (with the associated aim of either killing or arresting the Commander-in-Chief), and dispatch forces to the state-run radio and television stations to announce the coup and the formation of a new government.[8]

To be sure, most of these actions were in line with a familiar pattern of coup measures that need no further explanation. However, what requires explanation is the RSF’s movement to the Merowe Military Airport, 350 km north of Khartoum. Why was this step taken, and does this airport hold any special significance?

Available information indicates that Merowe Airport is one of the largest airports in Africa, spanning 18 km. It is designed to handle large aircraft, with a runway that is 4 km long, capable of accommodating up to 10 planes at once. The airport also houses a supporting airbase and serves as an alternative to other military bases in Sudan. Moreover, the 19th Division, responsible for protecting strategic facilities, is stationed there.[9]

It’s clear that Lieutenant General Hemeti was well aware of the strategic value of the Merowe Airport. His calculated move to seize control of this airport was a tactical masterstroke. Had he managed to capture this airport he would have, firstly: neutralized the Sudanese Air Force early on; he would have, secondly, secured aerial military support from the country backing the coup- without relying on remote airports in Uganda or Chad, and, thirdly, he would have gained the ability to swiftly move his forces, equipment, and supplies to all regions of Sudan. So, by moving his forces and equipment swiftly and decisively to Merowe before 15 April without permission or notification to the Sudanese Armed Forces,[10] he clearly demonstrated his strategic planning. The RSF then deployed around the airport, stormed it, and captured several Egyptian soldiers (who were conducting military exercises under a protocol with the Sudanese army). The RSF even released video footage of their soldiers inside Merowe Air Base, including a clip of their commander delivering a victory speech.[11]

As expected, the Sudanese Armed Forces responded by surrounding the RSF forces and ordering them to leave the site. However, the RSF’s refusal to withdraw led to unexpected clashes. After fierce fighting, the Sudanese Armed Forces regained control of Merowe Airport. Therefore, it is important to note that the first shot of the war was not fired in Khartoum but in the unexpected location of Merowe, and the war did not begin on 15 April but three days earlier.[12]

However, despite all the resources and preparations, the coup did not unfold as expected. Hemedti’s forces failed to seize Merowe Airport and its military base, nor did they manage to kill or arrest the Commander-in-Chief. Consequently, from April 15, 2023, the coup attempt escalated into a prolonged war between the national army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Hemedti then disappeared from the military and political operations stage, becoming something of a legend, blending reality with artificial intelligence.

Some proponents of the Framework Agreement, eager to absolve Hemedti of responsibility, argue that neither Hemedti nor the national army initiated the war, but rather a “third party” opposed to the Framework Agreement. Although no substantial evidence supports this claim, let’s assume for a moment that it is true. Logical reasoning would prompt us to ask: Was this thirdparty acting in coordination with the army, or was it acting independently? If we assume that the third party was working with the knowledge and coordination of the army (due to their shared objectives), then the first shot must be attributed to both parties. However, if we claim that the third party acted independently, firing the first shot without the army’s knowledge or coordination (as some supporters of this view argue), then this third party would have effectively dealt a “backstab” to the army. Simultaneously, it would have rendered a significant “favour” to the RSF, allowing it to launch a surprise attack on the army when it was not fully prepared while also allowing the RSF to position itself as the victim of an assault. This suggests that if such a “third force” existed, it must have been either clumsy and working against its own interests or it was one of the sleeper cells operating in coordination with the RSF rather than against it. This scenario is plausible, given that the RSF had infiltrated elements within the military and security institutions.

 

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[1] Hemeti, TV interview, Sudanese 24, 7 February 2023. Sudania24TV.com

[2] Tag Press, 4 February 2023

[3] Al-Ittihad newspaper, UAE, 24 February 2023.

[4] Al Jazeera reported that the Chairman of the Sovereign Council received a phone call from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Molly Phee, who confirmed U.S. support for the political process. (Aljazeera.net/news/2023/3/31.

[5] It is noted that Lieutenant General Al-Burhan, while renewing the armed forces’ commitment to moving forward with the Framework Agreement, at the same time points to two serious issues, the first of which is: Security and military reform is a complex process that cannot be easily overcome. It requires a close look at the military doctrine and laying the correct foundations for building professional armed forces, without involving them in political conflicts. Second: The armed forces are unwilling to empower any “unelected” political party. It is strange that everyone rushes to the first part of his statement regarding approval of the Framework Agreement, while completely ignoring the conditions he ended his statement with. These conditions, in their essence, indicate a complete rejection of the foundation upon which the Framework Agreement is based. This is because the political forces signing the framework agreement, and which will assume power under this Agreement, are undeniably “unelected” political forces. See his statement at: Fjaj Press,26 March 2023. www.Fjajpress.net/2023/3/26

[6] Sudan Tribune, 23 February 2023

[7] Al-Ittihad newspaper, UAE, 24 February 2023.

[8]In this analysis, we align with the views of Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani (editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper), who described the events of April 15, 2023, as a failed coup that turned into a war. He stated that the coup was planned by elements from the Forces of Freedom and Change (Central Committee) in collaboration with the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces. The coup plan included a civilian cabinet and a civilian Sovereign Council. See: Tasamuh News, Khartoum, and YouTube. www.tasamuhnews.com

[9] See Aljazeera.net/politics/2023/4/14

[10] See the statement by Nabeel Abdallah, the Sudanese Army spokesperson, Sudantribune.net/article272850 13 April.2023

[11] See the YouTube.AlArabia.April.16.2023

[12] It is interesting to note that how the official narrative of the RSF stressed that its forces did not start the attack and they were taken by surprise on Saturday April 15 when the armed forces surrounded them at the Khartoum Exhibition area. In this narrative no mention was made to what the RSF forces did in Marewie a few days ago See Hemedit’s statement in Aljazeera.net/news/2023/4/15