From Material Evidence to Explicit Admission: The UAE’s Legal Responsibility for War Crimes in Sudan
Dr Al-Haytham Al-Kindi Yousif
Despite the significance of the findings presented by the British journalist Oliver Poole in the London Evening Standard regarding the United Arab Emirates’ involvement in the war in Sudan—particularly his exposure of material evidence such as weapons and ammunition crates traced back to Abu Dhabi—the issue has moved beyond the stage of seeking proof. The involvement of the Abu Dhabi authorities in the conflict is now widely recognised. In legal doctrine, confession is considered the strongest form of evidence, and a series of public statements by Emirati advisers and officials, delivered in documented interviews, have confirmed their support for the Rapid Support Forces militia against the Sudanese state. This shifts the matter from allegation to admission of wrongdoing.
Under international humanitarian law, the UAE’s intervention may be classified under several legal categories, including:
Aggression and interference in sovereign affairs: Providing military and logistical support to a rebel militia constitutes a violation of the United Nations Charter and an infringement of state sovereignty, thereby engaging the international responsibility of the aggressor state.
Complicity in war crimes and genocide: In light of the atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces—including systematic rape, sexual enslavement, abduction and enforced disappearance, ethnic cleansing in Darfur and Al-Jazirah, and the destruction of infrastructure—the supplying state may be deemed complicit under the statute of the International Criminal Court.
Under Sudanese criminal law, severe penalties are prescribed for anyone who aids or incites war against the state or seeks to undermine the constitutional order. Such offences may carry punishments up to and including the death penalty and confiscation of assets, and apply to all those proven to be involved, whether nationals or foreign actors.
A pressing question remains: why have previous efforts in this regard failed?
Many may ask why no decisive legal breakthrough has yet been achieved in international forums. In my view, this is due to several factors:
Pursuit of an incorrect legal avenue: In 2025, the Sudanese government filed a case against the UAE before the International Court of Justice, which ultimately ruled that it lacked jurisdiction. Abu Dhabi then sought to portray this decision as a form of exoneration.
Lobbying and political pressure: The UAE has utilised its financial and diplomatic influence within the United Nations Security Council to obstruct the formation of independent international investigative committees.
Governmental delay: The delay in initiating international criminal proceedings is attributable to administrative disarray and the slow collection and documentation of evidence in accordance with the standards required by competent courts.
As for the legal pathways that should now be pursued to translate these admissions and evidentiary findings into tangible accountability, Sudan must consider the following:
Activation of universal jurisdiction: Filing cases in European capitals (such as Paris or Berlin) against named Emirati officials, as the laws of these countries permit the prosecution of war crimes regardless of nationality.
Recourse to the International Criminal Court (ICC): Although the Court prosecutes individuals rather than states, this presents no obstacle; senior figures within the Abu Dhabi authorities implicated in arming the militia may be named. While neither Sudan nor the UAE is a party to the Rome Statute, Sudan may rely on the Court’s existing jurisdiction over Darfur from previous cases. However, a potential impediment lies in the Court’s concerns regarding Sudan’s prior non-cooperation in surrendering suspects in earlier Darfur-related cases.
Establishment of a special tribunal for Sudan: Similar to the tribunals established for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, to prosecute planners, financiers and perpetrators. This would require referral to the United Nations Security Council, with support from allied states and permanent members such as Russia and China.
Justice for the victims—the lives lost, the women subjected to sexual violence, and the millions displaced—cannot be achieved through political condemnation alone. Legal and moral responsibility requires that the rulers of the UAE provide fair reparations to Sudan, including the reconstruction of what has been destroyed by the weapons supplied to the militia. The imposition of international sanctions, such as asset freezes and criminal prosecutions, remains the only effective guarantee against the recurrence of proxy-driven state destruction.
The time has come for these admissions, together with the evidence presented by Oliver Poole and others before him, to be transformed into legal convictions that pursue perpetrators wherever they may be.
Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12592