Coulisse of UNSC Resolution on Darfur and Sudanese Diplomcy’s Efforts

Sudanhorizon – Mohammed Osman Adam

Some Sudanese writers and social media influencers tend to intentionally misquote statements and speeches, with the aim of serving their own vested political interests, even if this means contravening the basic of journalistic ethics. And it is sad that this takes place even within media and journalists professional groups in the social media.
Those writers and influencers thus misinform their readers and followers which tantamount to a serious ethical crime: denying people of one of their basic rights. This is the right to know and to take stance and position based on correct information, to be able to take informed decision, based on knowledge and facts not on wishful thinking and misinformation.
Just last week the UN Security Council voted on the draft resolution renewing the 2005/ 1591 Sudan sanctions regime—including targeted sanctions (assets freezes and travel bans) and an arms embargo—until 12 September 2025. This was a big event. There were two options to be considered: technical renewal of the resolution or expanding the ban to cover the entire country.
As expected the supporters of, and sympathizers with, the rebel Rapid Support Forces Militias, did their level best during deliberations prior to the vote, to frustrate the movements of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), by pushing for expanding the ban to cover the whole country. This was aimed to inhibit SAF capability to obtain and secure arms, therefore incapacitate the army from carrying out its national duty of defending Sudanese citizens. This would be coupled with opening the doors wide from within neighboring countries, lured by money, to allow sneaking of weapons and arms to those they favour inside the Sudan.

The council’s website has specifically stated that although some members appeared willing to discuss this proposal, the members of the “three plus one” group, China and Russia, strongly objected to it. The three plus one are: Algeria + Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Guyana.
The choice of the Sudanese mission, the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomacy was to work on the lesser of two evils, which was the technical renewal of the existing sanctions on the Darfur area. This is a procedure the UNSC has been doing every year, as there is nothing new in it. This resolution was in fact surpassed by events and UN resolutions on Darfur and Al-Fashir in particular, but its renewal remains a political event exploited by the smart parties among countries and diplomats. This was what the Sudanese representative, Ambassador Al-Harith Idris, did, exposing the supporters of the rebellion and revealing their faults. As expected this brought him criticism from the haters who do not want to see the state’s victory over the rebellion and at the same time brought him praise from those who did not shy to express their love for their country, even though henchmen from inside and outside Sudan ganged up on it.   Regrettably those were Sudan’s kin in blood and its neighbors, geographically.

But it is noticeable that some writers and those known as the influencers have gone to extremes, if not lies, claiming that the decision was a victory for them and a rebuke to Sudan and Burhan’s government, and that it dumped the mission’s demand. They claimed that the mission had initially sought to cancel the decision, while the reality is that the Sudan UN mission had sought to spoil the plans of those who wanted to expand the scope of the resolution.  They further claimed that the friends of Sudan, specifically China and Russia, have turned their backs on Sudan. But one of the platforms of the UN Security Council published what is known as “what’s in Blue”, which is “contexts and backgrounds” published before any session in which the council discusses a topic or country. This platform provides an explanation and contexts about it so that those interested understand what decision will be issued in its context and leaves it to the people and followers to interpret the outcomes as they wish.
In this regard, the platform published the background of what happened before the vote, from which any independent reader comes to an obvious conclusion, which is that the mission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did a tremendous job. The supporters of the militias and the militia itself did not like such a success, scored by the mission and the diplomats.
The following quotes are taken from the UN Security Council website on the “what’s In Blue” page, which is a summary of a lengthy report on all the events and initiatives that preceded the session, including the position of the two teams on the Switzerland and Geneva talks, reactions and field developments, and the subsequent report of the fact-finding committee and its recommendations, and the reactions and positions of all parties regarding the committee’s recommendations report.
The UN web report focused on the Security Council’s vote on a draft resolution renewing the sanctions regime imposed on Sudan under Resolution 1591 – including targeted sanctions (asset freeze and travel ban) and an arms embargo – until September 12, 2025.
The short draft resolution in blue confirms that the extension is a technical matter for one year, extending the sanctions measures imposed on Darfur, which were last renewed under Resolution 2676 on March 8, 2023.

what is new in this resolution??
Security Council diplomats typically use the term “technical renewal” to describe a brief resolution that extends the mandate of a peace operation without changing its core mandate or tasks. The term traditionally refers to a shorter-than-usual extension, but members increasingly use the term to describe routine mandate extensions where the content remains largely unchanged.

The US introduce language change several times
The Security Council website said that debate appeared to have been relatively smooth, indicating that there had been diplomatic work prior to the session. The United States, which penholder on sanctions against Sudan, proposed a draft text based on resolution 2676, with provisions that were outdated or had been addressed in subsequent Council resolutions, including resolution 2725. Although Council members generally agreed with the drafter’s approach to seeking to extend the sanctions regime on a technical basis, there were some disagreements on certain elements of the resolution. On 30 August, the United States circulated an initial draft of the text to all Council members after it had been discussed first with the other permanent members. The first round of negotiations was held on 3 September. After receiving written comments from several members, the United States submitted a revised draft text on 5 September and placed it under silence = that is, for consideration by those concerned before or without comment = until 9 a.m. the following day (6 September). The silence procedure was extended until 1 p.m. and then until 4 p.m., at the request of the “3+1” members (Algeria Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana). But these members and China broke the silence, with additional comments from Russia.
The United States then engaged bilaterally with some members before placing a revised draft under silence until 10 a.m. (September 9). This draft passed under silence and was blueprinted later that day.
The initial draft proposed by the penholder appeared to include language similar to resolution 2676, expressing the Council’s intention to review the sanctions measures imposed on Sudan, in light of the progress made by the Sudanese authorities on the benchmarks for transitional security arrangements in Darfur and the national action plan for the protection of civilians, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s report of 31 July 2021. It also requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Panel of Experts, to undertake an assessment of progress on these benchmarks by 1 December.
However, the language on benchmarks was removed from subsequent revised drafts in response to concerns raised by the 3+1 members (supported by China, Russia and Switzerland). These members appeared to have argued that the benchmarks were outdated, given the outbreak of conflict in April 2023. They also appeared to have referred to the Secretary-General’s letter of 24 November 2023, which said that the political and security landscape in Sudan had changed significantly and that the conflict had disrupted the implementation of the benchmarks and the ability of the United Nations to assess progress on them. Similar views were expressed by some Council members during the negotiations on resolution 2725.
The Council’s website explaining the developments related to the sanctions stated that on 19 August, the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee met with its Panel of Experts to receive a briefing on the Committee’s midterm update, which was transmitted to Council members on 7 August. During the meeting, the United States appears to have proposed two names for targeted sanctions.

Justifications for approving the resolution without altering the mandate
The update report, which is not a public document, appears to have analyzed the ongoing conflict in Al-Fashir, North Darfur, including patterns of violence, war tactics used by the warring parties, and the impact on civilians and the region. The report appears to have confirmed that all parties failed to distinguish between civilians and combatants in the hostilities in El Fashir. It noted that indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure by all warring parties violate international humanitarian law and constitute war crimes. The report also confirmed the presence and use of heavy artillery by both sides, as well as over flights by the Sudanese Armed Forces, in violation of the sanctions regime in place. The report described how the ongoing conflict has contributed to the destabilization of the region, “particularly through ongoing recruitment campaigns in neighboring countries such as Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic.”
Regarding human rights developments, the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council in October 2023, visited Chad from 30 June to 18 July, travelling to several areas in eastern Chad along the border with Sudan, including Adré, Farchana and Abeche. The mission met with victims and survivors of the conflict in Sudan, as well as members of Sudanese civil society and the UN team in the country.
In its press release following the visit, the mission reported that the Sudanese refugee community had provided first-hand accounts of horrific acts, including killings, sexual violence, arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances, looting, burning of homes and the use of child soldiers. It noted that many of these violations appeared to particularly target professionals such as lawyers, human rights defenders, teachers and doctors.
The extension of the sanctions regime on Sudan (targeted sanctions and an arms embargo) is a key immediate issue facing the Council. One option before Council members is to extend the mandate of the Commission for one year. Some members may also propose extending the sanctions regime until March 2025, in line with the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting with the Sudan sanctions regime under resolution 1591, which was recently renewed by resolution 2725.

What is France’s position and how did Russia respond to it?
The idea of expanding the geographical scope of the sanctions measures beyond Darfur to other parts of the country was also raised during the negotiations. Fighting has swept through several parts of the country since hostilities broke out in April 2023, with reports suggesting that several external actors are supplying weapons to the warring parties. In its report issued on September 5, in light of these security challenges, the Fact-Finding Mission on the Sudan, established by the Human Rights Council in October 2023, recommended expanding the current arms embargo in Darfur to cover the whole country so as “to stop the supply of weapons, ammunition and other logistical or financial support to the warring parties and prevent further escalation.”
During the negotiations, France appeared to propose language expressing the Council’s intention to consider the appropriateness of expanding the sanctions measures to include other areas of Sudan.
“Although some members appeared willing to discuss this proposal, the members of the “3+1”, China and Russia, strongly objected to it.”
In this regard, Russia said during the Council’s June 18 meeting on Sudan that: “any new restrictions imposed by the Council, including the possible expansion of the sanctions regime beyond Darfur, will not help bring peace to the region.”
The blue draft resolution maintains the status quo: the sanctions regime will remain on Darfur only.

Central authority and government in Port Sudan
Members disagreed on some provisions in the preamble paragraphs. One major area of disagreement was the reference to the central authorities of Sudan. In the initial draft, the author apparently amended the term “the Government of Sudan,” as reflected in resolution 2676, to “the Sudanese authorities.” Some Council members strongly supported the author’s approach, noting that it remained consistent with recent resolutions on Sudan, including resolution 2724 of 8 March (calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Sudan during the month of Ramadan) and resolution 2736 of 13 June (demanding that the Rapid Support Forces cease their siege of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur state). However, the 3+1, China and Russia, opposed the amendment. This issue also appears to have been discussed during the negotiations on resolution 2736. In a joint explanation of the vote on behalf of the  3+1 members following the adoption of that resolution, Sierra Leone stressed that references to the Sudanese authorities in the resolution referred “solely and exclusively to the Government of Sudan.”
Russia considers Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces, to be the highest legitimate authority in Sudan. However, some members argued during the negotiations that the Sudanese Armed Forces had lost territorial control over parts of the country and that the term “authorities” included branches of the government body. As a compromise, the 3+1 members and China apparently proposed merging two introductory paragraphs, thereby deleting one of the two references to the term “Sudanese authorities” in the first revised draft.

Protection of civilians is a priority
The blue draft resolution emphasizes the importance of ensuring the protection of civilians and promoting accountability for human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law. By contrast, the initial draft resolution emphasized the primary responsibility of the Sudanese authorities to protect civilians on their territory and, in a separate paragraph, stressed the need for the Sudanese authorities to ensure accountability for human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law. The blue draft text also contains language emphasizing that the renewed measures responding to the situation in Darfur do not target “the Sudanese authorities.”
The blue draft resolution also includes language recognizing the need to protect due process and ensure fair and clear procedures for delisting individuals and entities and welcoming the adoption of resolution 2744 of 19 July, which strengthened the mandate and procedures of the Focal Point for Delisting. This language was proposed by Switzerland and supported by several other members.
Ensuring strict compliance with the sanctions regime is another important issue for Council members. On several occasions, most recently in resolution 2736 of 13 June, the Council reiterated its call on all Member States to refrain from “external interference that seeks to fuel conflict and instability and to support efforts to achieve a lasting peace.”
The resolution reminded all parties to the conflict and Member States facilitating the transfer of arms and military material to Darfur of their obligations to comply with the arms embargo measures and that those who violate the arms embargo may be designated for targeted measures.
During a briefing to the Council on 13 June on the work of the Sudan Sanctions Committee under resolution 1591, Sudan called on the Council to identify and hold accountable States that support and arm the Rapid Support Forces.
Sudan stressed that “there is no reason to maintain the Darfur sanctions if they do not include the countries involved in violating the relevant Council resolutions, namely the United Arab Emirates and Chad.”

Most Council members share similar concerns about the political, security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Sudan. Members have had mixed views on the effectiveness of the sanctions regime on Sudan. Several members stressed the importance of the reports of the Panel of Experts on the humanitarian and security situation and in identifying violations of the sanctions regime.