The Grand Losing Deal: The Sudan’s Case (7-7)

Conclusion:‎‎ Disengagement from the Rapid Support Forces

 

Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

 

Just as there is sometimes a “story within a story” in literature, so too can there be a “story within a story” in politics and a war within a war. As has become clear from previous sections, there is a larger regional and international war taking place in Sudan, and within this war, other wars are unfolding. On the broader front, Sudan has become one of the battlegrounds of the Cold War between Russia and the United States. According to some observers, this war has shifted from the realm of ideology and geopolitics to the realm of geo-economics.[1] That is, Russia’s deepening involvement in Africa—seeking gold and minerals in exchange for wheat, fuel, and weapons—and its strategic positioning on the Red Sea coast to the east and the Libyan desert to the west is being countered by the United States and its regional allies, along with some European countries, particularly Britain and France. The reliance on General Hemeti and the insistence on transforming the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a governing military power in Sudan is part of this counter-offensive. It is undoubtedly a war within the larger war.

However, the previous narrative of events also shows that the Group of Four t (the international mediators) bet on Hemeti, and the RSF has not achieved its goals. Although General Hemeti managed to play the role of a “situational” figure, steering events according to the planned strategy, and despite the military strength and regional and international support he enjoyed, his attempts ultimately failed due to four unexpected reasons. The first of these reasons is Hemeti’s early exit from the battlefield and the leadership scene (to the point that representatives of the major supporting powers could not even reach him). The second reason is General Burhan’s effective military and political leadership presence. The third reason is the cohesion of the Sudanese Armed Forces, which did not experience the expected internal divisions. The final reason is the Armed Forces’ recapture of Merowe Airport, cutting off the RSF’s anticipated ability to receive urgent military supplies via air from its supporting nations.

This early military failure of the rapid coup attempt led to a greater failure when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) sought to shift the issue from a limited battle against the military leadership and remnants of the previous regime to a full-scale war against the Sudanese people—occupying their homes, looting their property, and forcibly displacing them. In response to this situation, some members of the quartet began to adjust their initial plan and rhetoric, replacing it with what can be called a “gradual disengagement” strategy. This strategy involved creating a distance between themselves and the atrocities committed by the RSF, promoting the protection of civilians, and delivering aid to refugees through dialogue between the generals. In this context, the exceptional Jeddah Conference (3 May 2023) emerged, sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the United States (with the UAE and the UK receding). The conference’s final statement chose not to condemn the atrocities committed by the RSF. Still, it emphasised that the conflict in Sudan is an internal matter, warned against external interventions, and stressed the need to maintain state institutions and the inevitability of political dialogue.[2] It is noteworthy that the commitments outlined in the conference’s declaration largely concern matters falling under the RSF’s responsibility, such as distinguishing between civilians and fighters, allowing civilians to leave combat areas, refraining from seizing private and public facilities, and avoiding looting.[3] The conference did not establish practical mechanisms to compel either side to adhere to these commitments. The UAE and the UK showed little interest in the outcomes or implementation mechanisms, indicating emerging disagreements within the quartet.

As the atrocities of the RSF intensified and protests grew louder, the quartet was forced to reiterate the importance of dialogue. Since dialogue required an alternative counterpart to the military, there was a need to find another “situational ” figure more acceptable than General Hemeti, whose political and military value was diminishing rapidly. In this context, the sudden appearance (on 26 October 2023) of the Progressive Democratic Forces Coordination (Taqaddum) to replace the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), which had also lost its political value, can be understood. It was not surprising that the new “situational ” figure was Dr Hamdok, who was presented by Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper as the saviour leading a Sudanese civilian front to stop the war[4] (after the failure of the military front led by General Hemeti).

The Group of Four did not resort to the “gradual disengagement” strategy out of compassion for the Sudanese people or a desire for democratic transition, nor did they abandon their primary goals. Several other factors led them to this strategy.

One of these factors was the rising condemnation of the severe violations committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) wherever they advanced and the damage inflicted on civilians. The RSF displaced at least six million people and killed at least 15,000. Their acts of killing, looting, and destruction reached a level that the media and international human rights organizations could no longer ignore. The assassination of Governor Khamees Abdullah Abakar of West Darfur on 14 June 2023 and the mutilation of his body, gave the world a grim picture and marked the beginning of a global wave of discontent.[5] The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the crime, the United Nations called for an investigation, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that, based on a thorough review of the facts and legal analysis, he had concluded that members of both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF had committed war crimes.[6]

The second factor that led to the plan of “gradual disengagement’ was the military advance of the RSF and its seizure of several states, combined with the relative weakness of the armed forces, which led to the emergence of a popular movement opposing the RSF’s brutality and willingness to mobilize and fight alongside the armed forces. The strength of this movement grew with the engagement of youth (both Islamist and others) and segments of the angry public who had been displaced from their homes, stripped of their possessions, and forced to migrate and flee. This movement could form a civilian-military front that would make it difficult to establish an alternative regime led by General Hemeti, as was initially hoped.

The third r factor was that the military support received by the RSF, which enabled it to seize several states in Sudan, along with the political and legal cover provided by the Group of Four, might lead the Sudanese Armed Forces to seek rapprochement with the Russian-Iranian-Turkish axis. This was a rapprochement that General Hemeti had previously pursued and which the Quartet had made significant efforts to thwart. Subsequent events proved that this concern was well-founded. Despite all the Quartet’s efforts to widen the rift between Sudan and Russia, the Deputy Foreign Minister and Russian President’s envoy to the Middle East (Mikhail Bogdanov) arrived in Port Sudan on April 29, 2024, leading a delegation from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense for a two-day visit. He concluded his visit by affirming that the Sudanese Sovereignty Council is the authority representing the Sudanese people and their republic.[7] Additionally, Malik Agar, Deputy Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, visited Russia on June 3, 2023, leading a delegation from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Minerals.[8]

The fourth factor is that the rift among the Group of Four has begun to widen concerning the overall situation in Sudan. The United States and Britain have begun to disagree with the UAE over the course of the war in Sudan, urging it to contribute to ending the war by halting arms supplies to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Some members of the U.S. Congress have started pressing the Biden administration to take strict measures against the RSF. The Conservative government in Britain fell, replaced by a Labour government that was not part of the deal made with General Hemeti, and it is uncertain whether it will adhere to it or not. As for Saudi Arabia, it has moved closer to the Russian-Iranian-Chinese axis and is no longer as enthusiastic about supporting the RSF as the UAE has been. So, it is not far-fetched to suppose that the military position of the RSF will eventually diminish (with the absence of its leader and the death of many of its field commanders), and the views and positions among the Group of Four would diverge. In that case, calls may rise to open files on the crimes committed by the RSF during the recent war (particularly the massacres in Geneina and the Gezira). There may also be scrutiny of the military support provided by the UAE to the RSF in clear violation of the previous Security Council resolution.[9] The UAE would find itself isolated in the accusation, which would force it into one of two choices: retreat and agree to a gradual withdrawal from the “grand losing deal,” as others have done, or harden its positions—relying on its ample financial resources, bringing in mercenaries from neighbouring African countries, and revitalizing the RSF. If it chooses this path and some of its international allies follow suit, it is expected that we will witness the emergence of a “revised new deal”—a deal in which General Hemeti disappears and one of his RSF subordinates takes his place. General Burhan (or one of his deputies) from the armed forces will be invited. In this scenario, General Burhan would find himself in the same “closed room” that General Hemeti was previously placed in, facing files and offered the same carrot and stick that were previously provided to Hemeti, with added embellishments to make the new revised deal more palatable. The difference between a true leader and a “situational” one would then become evident in such a situation.[10]

Prospects of the Solution

Having said all this prompted some readers to ask me: After this long exploration, do you have a solution or outline for resolving this crisis? My answer is that I am not affiliated —as is well known—to any direct executive (political or military) position where I could uncover the hidden details and see the full picture. All I have is published and accessible information, and I aim to provide an interpretation of this information that might help others—as it has helped me—to gain a deeper understanding of the events. However, let me venture into proposing a solution. In that case, I believe it is appropriate first to examine the solutions that the general Sudanese population has resorted to in facing the assault launched against them by the Rapid Support Forces (April 2023 onwards) and to engage in a dialogue with them to address any mistakes and whether there are better alternatives.

What is immediately noticeable in this regard is that the solutions adopted by the general public do not differ significantly from the approach they took during the “COVID-19 pandemic”— attempting to coexist/then fleeing/then steadfast resistance. Evidently, in all these stages, they have resorted to the option of “individual salvation”—whether they chose coexistence, fleeing, or resistance. Let us then consider these options.

Coexistence Option:

When the situation erupted on April 15, the general public perceived it as a kind of internal military conflict between the Rapid Support Forces and the armed forces or as a conflict within the inner circles between two foolish generals. It seemed to concern the public only regarding the general national losses resulting from military coups—whether successful or failed. To these citizens, the solution seemed to be the theory of “coexistence”—that is, we must observe and wait to see who will prevail.

As the Rapid Support Forces began entering civilians’ homes in the early weeks of the war, establishing “positions” in alleyways and on rooftops, proponents of the coexistence theory believed this to be a form of temporary “preventive” tactic employed by the Rapid Support Forces due to fear of air raids conducted by the armed forces. Some even began sharing food and drink with them. When the Rapid Support Forces started tracking and detaining civilians in unknown locations, the proponents of this theory thought that the forces were only targeting former regime elements or military and security personnel. However, it soon became clear that this perspective was incorrect when the Rapid Support Forces showed their true nature. They forced women to surrender gold (or exposed them to capture and raping ) and men to hand over car keys and leave their homes. Those who refused were threatened with weapons, beaten with whips, slapped in the face, and abused in front of their children. It became evident that the Rapid Support Forces were not only waging a war against the armed forces but were also fighting against civilians, employing a scorched-earth policy by occupying homes, looting property, committing rape, and killing indiscriminately. This brutal war made no distinction between the weak elderly or women and supporters or opponents of the old regime. At this point, the option of “coexistence” completely collapsed, and ordinary citizens resorted to fleeing and escaping. Was this a viable option?

Escape Option:

As the intensity of the war increased and state institutions began to collapse, unarmed civilian citizens realized that coexistence with the Rapid Support Forces was impossible, as previously mentioned. Most of them resorted to a policy of “every man for himself”—that is, individual salvation from the grip of the Rapid Support Forces. Sudanese people fled in groups and individually in what resembled death marches. Consequently, the total number of Sudanese fleeing the war reached about ten million (some within safe Sudanese states and others in neighbouring countries). In this large wave of escape, fortunes varied. For instance, those who fled to Egypt—most of whom were from the middle class—had financial reserves or remittances from expatriate children that allowed them to live with dignity. However, those who fled to Chad (about 900,000) were less fortunate, as most of them were women and children who ended up in the Adré and Ardimi camps, suffering from shortages of water, food, and medicine and enduring humiliation and distress. Those who fled to Ethiopia found themselves in an even worse situation. They sought protection in a United Nations camp, only to be attacked by armed local Ethiopian militias that looted, killed, and drove them into forests and jungles. The bitter conclusion of these experiences is that the option of individual salvation by fleeing to neighbouring country camps is a last resort, and its advocates may find that returning to Sudan and dying there with honour is preferable to a humiliating death in Ethiopian and Chadian camps. If coexistence is impossible and escaping is not viable, could we think of a better solution ? What about the legitimate option of civilian collective defense ?

Community Defense – The viable Option:

The idea of community collective defense is not a new invention but rather an old concept that many societies facing devastating and oppressive wars have resorted to. Essentially, this idea requires:

1. A) an Awareness of the Nature of the War: The targeted community must recognize that the war waged above their heads is not merely a limited political-military struggle at the leadership level but a comprehensive grassroots war aimed at all of them, regardless of their ethnic components or political affiliations.
2. B) Rejection of Individual Salvation: The community must understand that individual salvation is not the path to survival. No matter how strong or brave an individual may be, he cannot single-handedly confront armed forces that do not hesitate to kill. Everyone must realize that the war will not stop by surrendering to an aggressor who raises his guns but will cease when the aggressor learns that their adversaries also have guns and ready to resist, as poet Hajal bin Nadhla al-Bahili from ancient times stated. C: Ownership of the struggle : It must be deeply ingrained in everyone mind that the war is their war, and no soldier will fight it alone on their behalf and no international envoy will end it out of pity. In such circumstances, the slogan “the first-order of the day is defending the nation” should be raised, the will of civilians and military personnel, the right and left wings, should be united into a single war/and or peace effort. No option other than defeat is available..

If these general principles are confirmed and most Sudanese choose to move in this direction, it means they are beginning to set foot on the path to a kind of a solution, notwithstanding its bitterness and difficulty. This may be the first time the Sudanese people face a test of patriotism and manhood. The representatives of major international powers can, of course, mobilize the Quartet and the African group,organize conference after conference, send or withhold humanitarian aid, oppose any condemnation of the Rapid Support Forces or suggestions to list them as terrorist organization or impose sanctions on countries supplying them with weapons. However, in the final analysis, they will not be able to break the will of the Sudanese people.

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Sources:

• Text of the Lawyers’ Document (Draft Transitional Constitution for 2022), 11/19/2022 aljazeera.net
• Text of the Framework Political Agreement Document, Khartoum, Sudan News Agency (SUNA), December 5, 2022, www.https://suna-sd.net/posts/%C2
• Text of the letter of the Sudanese Armed Forces addressed to the UN Security Council regarding the Rapid Support Forces, dated May 31, 2023, alrakoba.net/31834286. On June 1, 2023, a lengthy letter was submitted to the Security Council about a month and a half after the outbreak of the war. The purpose of the letter appeared to be to inform the Council about the background leading to the war. It included information on the origins of the Sudanese Armed Forces, their contributions to maintaining international security and peace, as well as the conditions under which the Rapid Support Forces were established and evolved. Additionally, the letter covered the Sudanese Armed Forces’ perspective on the issue of integrating these forces into the national army and the circumstances that led to the conflict.
• Sudanese Communist Party – Central Committee, Political Paper on Developments in the Political Situation, January 24, 2024, Alrakoba Electronic Newspaper: www.alrakoba.net
• Text of Sudan’s complaint against the UAE to the UN Security Council, Sudan News Agency, March 31, 2024. www.suna-sd.net/posts
• Ariel Cohen, Russian Fingerprints in Sudan’s Coup, 18 April 2023. thehill.com/opinion/international/3955933-russians-fingerprints, Ariel Cohen is an expert on global security and energy policy and a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations—the publication of the prestigious Foreign Affairs magazine. The American newspaper “The Hill” wrote that a military coup took place in Khartoum on 15 April 2023, when the Rapid Support Forces launched surprise attacks against the Sudanese Armed Forces. It went on to say that Russia had direct involvement in the coup, and had a motive to stand by Hemeti. The analysis correctly points out certain aspects, but it errs in its assessment of the Russian stance. The coup described aligns with the plans of the United States and its regional allies, while the actual Russian intervention occurred on October 15, 2021, led by Hemeti and Burhan.

[1] See for example: Ariel Cohen, The Hill, 04/18/2023.thehill.com/opinion/international/3955933-russiasfingerprints-are-0n-sudan-coup-attempt/

[2] Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, 3 May 2023. www.aawsat.com/home/article/4309301

[3] For the main points of the Jeddah Declaration (11 May 2023), see Aljazeera.net, Aljazeera.net/news/2023/5/12

[4] Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, 26 October 2023. www.aawsat.com

[5] For more details about the events in Geneina and the killing of Governor Khamees, see: Reuters report, reuters.com/investigates/special-report/sudan-politics-darfur-violence,Dec.,28,2023

[6] See the press interview with Beth Van Schaak (U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice) www.state.gov/digital-press-briefing-war-crimes.Dec 14, 2023

[7] See Anadol Agnancy: www.aa.com.tr/ar/3204736/28/4/2024

[8] About Malik Aqar’s visit to Russia see: sudantribune.et.article286526.3/6/2024

[9]  Regarding the direct role of the UAE in supporting the Rapid Support Forces in their war effort, see: www.theguardian.com, 24 May2025. See: American Foreign Affairs magazine: www.foreignaffairs.com.The UAE’s Secret War in Sudan, 31 July 2024

[10] Ibrahim Shaker, Al-Khaleej Online, 5 May 2024. www.alkhaleejonline.net