Bold Economic Decisions in Port Sudan… Will They Curb the Dollar’s Rise?

By: Muhannad Awad Mahmoud
The Economic Emergency Committee of the Council of Ministers, chaired by Dr Kamal Idris, has approved a package of economic measures described as the boldest since the outbreak of the war. Their overarching aim is to stabilise the economy and protect the value of the Sudanese pound from collapse.
The measures include: banning imports that fail to meet banking and trade requirements, as well as blocking the entry of shipments that do not comply with quality standards; strengthening anti-smuggling forces and equipping them with modern technology and logistics; classifying the possession or storage of undocumented gold as smuggling – subject to legal penalties – with strict monitoring from production to export; restricting gold purchasing and marketing to a single government entity, which would also provide foreign currency to importers; establishing a national digital platform to track imports and exports from their country of origin to Sudanese ports; reviewing regulations on car imports; tightening control over informal trade in ports and crossings; revising state-level emergency decrees that impose unlawful levies to ease the burden on citizens; and finally, reassessing export policies to remove obstacles hindering the flow of exports and increasing foreign currency inflows through official channels.
In principle, this package appears comprehensive. However, its success depends on effective implementation and its alignment with Sudan’s complex economic reality. For example, restricting imports to official banking channels reduces fraud and fake invoices. Still, given the scarcity of foreign exchange and weak correspondent banking relations, it could paralyse formal trade and push businesses into the parallel market – thereby increasing pressure on the exchange rate.
On gold, treating undocumented possession as smuggling is sound in principle, yet it risks burdening traditional miners unless official purchasing channels are made accessible and priced close to global levels. Past experience shows that artificial administrative pricing encourages smuggling and reduces revenues through official systems. The proposed digital platform is perhaps the most promising reform, as it could shut down avenues of corruption at ports and crossings, increase revenue, shorten clearance times, and build market confidence – thereby supporting the pound against the dollar. Likewise, revising vehicle import rules and cracking down on informal import channels could curb long-standing distortions that drained foreign reserves. If enforced firmly, this could provide the state with significant revenues that had been leaking for years.
Yet, the most damaging obstacle to Sudanese exports remains the arbitrary levies imposed by states, which have become an overwhelming burden on trade flows. For instance, in Gedaref last season, additional charges were imposed on sesame exports without any study of their impact. This raised Sudanese export costs above world market prices – competitiveness was only restored after the pound’s collapse against the dollar. This is unsustainable, as it means export profitability came not from efficiency or competitiveness, but merely from currency devaluation. In effect, export revenues became a substitute for lost currency value, rather than a driver of genuine economic development.
In this context, high-level officials have repeatedly called for economic revival centred on Khartoum after its liberation. The Governor of Khartoum, Ahmed Osman Hamza, along with Sovereignty Council Chairman General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Ibrahim Jaber, urged Sudanese businesses to return to the capital and resume operations, describing Khartoum’s economy as the backbone of the nation. Yet reality has unfolded differently: local authorities quickly imposed new levies on businesses as soon as activity resumed, shocking traders and investors. Instead of finding an encouraging environment, they encountered financial obstacles and security risks. This drove many to reconsider their return – some even warning others against coming back under such conditions.
Here lies the central dilemma: the central government calls for reform, while local authorities undermine it on the ground. This gap is not a mere administrative detail; it determines the fate of the economy. Investors – domestic or foreign – trust only in consistent policy across all levels of governance. Suppose the centre says “no levies” but localities impose new fees. In that case, the outcome is inevitable: businesses turn to the parallel market and avoid official channels, fuelling dollar demand and further weakening the pound.
Other countries emerging from war and crisis offer instructive lessons. After its civil war, Lebanon faced similar problems of illegal levies and multiple taxation centres. The government resolved this by abolishing local levies and centralising revenues in the national treasury, gradually restoring commercial activity in Beirut and reviving services. Post-genocide Rwanda also abolished provincial and municipal levies, while centralising coffee and tea exports under a national agency. Over time, Rwanda became one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. Iraq after 2003 faced chaotic multi-centre levies at ports; stability only came once a central customs authority took direct control. Post-war West Germany adopted the “social market economy”, abolishing multiple trade taxes and linking revenues to the central budget, paving the way for the “economic miracle” and restoring confidence in the currency.
The message for Sudan is clear: central directives alone are not enough. Without unified political will on the ground, reforms will collapse. Arbitrary levies and gold monopoly remain the gravest threats to recovery. The dollar will not respond to paper decrees, but only when markets are convinced the environment is truly conducive to growth and investment.
A practical roadmap, therefore, requires three essential steps:
Reviving the Ministry of Trade’s role in assessing the country’s precise import needs. Leaving the door wide open under the guise of “economic liberalisation” wastes scarce foreign exchange on luxury or non-essential goods, encourages dumping that destroys local industries, drives unemployment, and creates unproductive inventory. Proper oversight ensures resources go to actual priorities: food, medicine, and production inputs. Above all, it restores the state’s capacity to plan and budget, instead of remaining hostage to the whims of the parallel market.
Dismantling state and local levies through strict legislation forbidding any subnational authority from imposing fees without federal approval, and centralising all revenues in a single treasury. This would restore trust among traders and investors, while reducing transport and distribution costs.
Controlled liberalisation of the gold sector, allowing regulated private competition under clear rules and government supervision, instead of monopoly-driven smuggling. Companies should be obliged to channel a share of their proceeds through the formal banking system.
In conclusion, the recent measures in Port Sudan are a step in the right direction. But they will not curb the dollar’s surge unless supported by deeper reforms – above all, the restoration of the Ministry of Trade’s central role, the elimination of arbitrary levies, coherent gold policies, and a disciplined chain linking central government to local authorities. Only then can the pound regain stability, and only then will citizens feel these reforms are more than slogans – that they are genuine steps towards restoring Sudan’s economic standing.

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