Beyond Bara: How the North Kordofan Operations Have Redrawn the Operational Centre of Gravity in the War

Al-Musalmi Al-Bashir Al-Kabbashi

The large-scale military operations conducted yesterday in North Kordofan State, which culminated in the Sudanese Armed Forces securing control of the strategic triangle extending from Jabra Al-Sheikh in the north to Umm Sayala in the south and Bara in the west, should not be viewed merely as the recapture of well-known towns in the ebb and flow of the War of Dignity. Rather, they represent an operational shift that redraws the military centre of gravity in west-central Sudan.
The significance of the fighting in this region extends far beyond control of individual towns. It is fundamentally about controlling a network of roads, axes of movement, and strategic corridors that have, throughout the conflict, determined the movement of forces, the flow of supplies, the tempo of military operations, and, ultimately, the broader tactical situation.
Bara occupies a pivotal position within the triangle linking Omdurman to the east, El Obeid to the south, and Darfur to the west. Control of the town therefore largely equates to control over the movement of troops and supplies between central and western Sudan. It also compels the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to withdraw their supply lines towards Umm Badr and Humrat Al-Sheikh in the far north-west of North Kordofan State.
This development assumes even greater significance because control of the Export Road, stretching from El Obeid through Bara and Jabra Al-Sheikh to Omdurman, effectively enhances El Obeid’s security while reopening a direct, stable supply route between the city and the capital. This substantially reduces the threat that had surrounded El Obeid in recent weeks, when it appeared to be under pressure from almost every direction, with only its eastern access through White Nile State remaining open.
Conversely, the RSF’s losses extend well beyond the loss of these towns. They include the loss of its principal rear operating bases in North Kordofan. These areas had served as assembly points for forces arriving from Darfur, storage sites for ammunition and military vehicles, and major launch points for offensives directed southwards towards El Obeid or eastwards along the Export Road towards Omdurman. With the loss of these locations, the RSF has forfeited one of its most important operational platforms in this sector.
Jabra Al-Sheikh, forming the northern point of the triangle, derives its importance from being a key communications hub linking North Kordofan with East Darfur. Control of the town obstructs any attempt to outflank Bara from the north-east while strengthening the army’s ability to dominate RSF supply routes extending from Humrat Al-Sheikh and Umm Badr, and beyond them as far as the Karbat Al-Hitan area.
Since the outbreak of the war, this axis has remained one of the most active and strategically important supply corridors. It has therefore long been argued that securing control over it is essential to degrading the RSF’s logistical capabilities. Nevertheless, the durability of this advantage depends upon maintaining the momentum of the advance rather than settling for the current gains, particularly as these areas have hosted an advanced logistical infrastructure, including airstrips, fuel and ammunition depots, and training facilities, some of which were connected to the Al-Zurug axis and the territory extending towards the Chadian border.
Measured in terms of gains and losses, three principal conclusions emerge:
First, the RSF has lost its most important logistical depth in North Kordofan.
Second, freedom of movement between Darfur and central Sudan has been significantly reduced following the loss of the principal connecting routes in the region.
Third, the threat previously directed against El Obeid from the north and north-east has diminished substantially as a result of the RSF losing its principal staging areas for operations against the city.
Viewed in the aftermath of these operations, several important observations can also be made:
El Obeid is now considerably more secure than during the preceding period.
Supply lines reaching the city from the north and east have become significantly more stable.
In this sector, the army has shifted from a defensive posture to offensive initiative, increasing pressure on the remaining RSF positions across western and southern Kordofan.
Consolidating these gains, however, requires maintaining full control over the recaptured towns while sustaining operational pressure along two parallel axes. The first extends northwards and westwards towards Humrat Al-Sheikh, Umm Badr, and Karbat Al-Hitan. The second runs towards Al-Mazrub, Umm Sumaymah, Al-Nuhud, and Al-Fulah, ultimately reaching Babanusa in West Kordofan.
Should the army succeed in doing so, it will effectively have secured the principal supply routes upon which the RSF has depended since the outbreak of the conflict. Before this objective can be realised, however, it will be essential to repel any counter-offensives aimed at recapturing recently liberated positions or disrupting the new supply lines established through yesterday’s operations.
If these battlefield gains are successfully consolidated, military operations are likely to shift progressively towards West Kordofan and the fringes of Darfur. At that stage, priority will be less about controlling towns than about securing movement corridors, road junctions, and supply networks—the true lifelines sustaining military operations.
Politically, consolidating these gains is likely to strengthen the position of the Sudanese Government and expand its room for manoeuvre in any future negotiations or in responding to external pressure. It is noteworthy that every significant military advance by the army has been followed by increased international political and diplomatic activity aimed, to varying degrees, at limiting the impact of those gains on the overall balance of power.
In the author’s assessment, this reflects two principal objectives pursued by those supporting the RSF. The first is to preserve the force’s military capability so that it remains an influential participant in any future peace negotiations. The second is to maintain a degree of battlefield equilibrium that preserves political leverage. The more decisively the balance of power shifts in favour of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the less influence external actors are likely to wield over the course of the conflict.
The real challenge facing the Sudanese Armed Forces, therefore, lies not merely in achieving battlefield victories, but in exploiting the operational momentum generated by those successes and transforming it into enduring strategic gains. Only then can those achievements contribute to shortening the war and establishing new realities both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.

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