An Article from the Facebook Archives: Is Sudan Threatened by Partition or Paralysis?

Obaid Ahmed Murawih

Today, Facebook’s algorithms reminded me of a post I published on my personal page on 29 October 2023, approximately six and a half months after the outbreak of the war.
What caught my attention was not the reminder itself—that is perfectly normal behaviour for this creature called Facebook—but rather the timing of its selection. The date of the reminder does not coincide with the post’s anniversary, nor does it correspond to a religious occasion such as the Islamic New Year. The only explanation, it seems, is that Facebook may gain no profit from it!—has begun reading our concerns and peering into the thoughts occupying our minds.
In any case, I shall leave it to the reader to judge what was written in that article and draw whatever conclusions they see fit.
Here is the article:
Three days before the outbreak of the current war, the Editor-in-Chief of Al-Intibaha newspaper invited us to a discussion on the likely trajectory of events. He wanted to hear, together with the newspaper’s core editorial team, the views of a carefully selected group whom he believed capable of analysing future developments.
We were a small gathering of opinion writers and political analysts. The central question before us was straightforward: given the escalating tensions at the time, would war break out or not, and what would be the likely consequences in either scenario?
In my intervention, I focused primarily on the external dimension of the crisis. I argued that foreign actors had played a decisive role in the political change that took place in April 2019 and that these same external forces remained determined to shape developments in Sudan in a manner that served their own interests. This was a theme I had explored in numerous articles since 2020.
Although I considered the outbreak of war less likely, based on an assessment that the external actors exercising significant influence over Sudan’s political decision-making had no interest in seeing the situation explode—given their good relations with both heads of authority at the time—I nevertheless argued in a subsequent contribution that Sudan was moving towards one of two possible models: the Libyan model or the Yemeni model.
Both represent examples of paralysed states in which the central government exercises only limited authority over national territory, while multiple armed groups, each backed by external sponsors who provide funding, training and support, compete for influence and protect foreign interests in the country’s resources.
One participant agreed with my argument about external influence on national decision-making but suggested that the model envisioned for Sudan was closer to Iraq’s than to Libya’s or Yemen’s. He reasoned that foreign powers appeared intent on empowering civilian political forces loyal to them within state institutions while constructing a form of procedural democracy lacking genuine sovereignty.
That evening’s discussion eventually came to an end, and shortly thereafter, the war erupted.
Yet the question of outcomes remains without a satisfactory answer.
Some argue that a plan to partition Sudan is steadily advancing, citing recent developments in the capital of South Darfur State and warning that similar events may unfold elsewhere. Others maintain that the ultimate objective remains Khartoum and, consequently, control of the entire state apparatus—if not in the current round of conflict, then in future rounds.
In either case, our country continues to face an existential threat.
The current state of political and executive fragmentation is insufficient to confront such a danger. Political forces that recognise the gravity of this challenge must remember that the longer it remains unaddressed, the more deeply it will spread and entrench itself.
There is no alternative but to mobilise the efforts and determination of all Sudanese to confront this threat before we find ourselves without a homeland over which to argue about who should govern it.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=14882