Abu Dhabi and the War in Sudan: No Beating Around the Bush

Dr Al-Haitham Al-Kindi Yousif
Observers of the situation in Sudan realise that the war is not merely an internal conflict between two armed factions. In reality, it is a proxy war whose strings are pulled from beyond the country’s borders. While attention is often directed towards the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as the instrument of direct destruction, another actor stands behind the scenes providing the political, financial and logistical cover for this project.
This role, the author argues, is being played by the Abu Dhabi authorities, whose relationship with the RSF goes beyond a temporary alliance and has developed into a strategic sponsorship aimed at achieving several objectives: control over Sudan’s resources—particularly gold and ports—and weakening the Sudanese central state in order to advance regional agendas. In this context, the local proxy becomes merely a façade for a foreign project seeking to weaken and fragment the country.
The key question, however, is: what has the Sudanese state done so far to confront this situation?
Sudan’s Response So Far
The actions taken by the Sudanese state—both the armed forces and official diplomacy—have followed two main tracks.
The Military Track
The Sudanese Armed Forces have sought to withstand the large-scale assault, break the militia’s momentum, and push it back militarily towards Kordofan and the outskirts of Darfur, despite immense pressure and extensive media disinformation campaigns which, according to the author, were supported by Abu Dhabi and its affiliated media outlets and political allies.
This has occurred in the face of advanced weaponry allegedly supplied to the militia, weaponry that in some cases exceeds what is available to many national armies.
The Diplomatic Track
At the diplomatic level, the Sudanese government has attempted to expose foreign interference through international platforms, such as the United Nations and the UN Security Council, presenting evidence of alleged Emirati involvement in supplying weapons to the rebellion via airports in neighbouring countries, as well as through the recruitment of foreign mercenaries from various parts of the world.
The Central Question After Three Years of War
After three years of conflict and Abu Dhabi’s continued pursuit of this path, the more pressing question is: what should be done now?
To confront what the author describes as a systematic and brutal assault, the Sudanese state must adopt a comprehensive strategy of confrontation, focusing on the following elements.
Clarity of Vision
The Sudanese state must, in the author’s view, call things by their proper names. Abu Dhabi, he argues, is effectively Sudan’s primary adversary rather than the RSF itself. Political discourse should therefore be unambiguous, allowing for the formulation of a strategy to address Abu Dhabi accordingly.
Mobilising the Internal Front
A state’s most powerful weapon is popular will. Uniting the national front behind state institutions and exposing local proxies and their external backers before domestic public opinion would strengthen the government and the armed forces in their efforts to thwart what the author describes as a conspiracy.
Transition to a Wartime Economy
Achieving this mobilisation requires efficient management of available resources in support of the war effort and the use of the state’s comprehensive capacities to confront both the militia and its external sponsors.
Legal Pursuit
All crimes committed against civilians and acts of infrastructure destruction should be documented in preparation for filing international compensation cases against the Abu Dhabi authorities in competent courts, on the grounds that they are, according to the author, a principal partner in war crimes.
A Strong Diplomatic Offensive
Sudan should shift from a defensive posture to an offensive diplomatic strategy, demanding economic and diplomatic sanctions against Abu Dhabi in international forums due to its alleged involvement in destabilising Sudan and its role in serious violations and crimes.
The Role of the Media
The author emphasises the importance of exposing Abu Dhabi’s role through the media by documenting militia crimes, publishing investigative reports supported by evidence, and revealing the border logistical networks allegedly used to supply weapons and mercenaries.
Social media platforms should also be used in multiple languages to link external financing to human rights violations and humanitarian crimes, thereby placing pressure on the international community to open transparent investigations.
Building Counter-Alliances
Sudan should strengthen relations with regional and international powers opposed to Abu Dhabi’s interventionist policies, thereby creating a balance that limits its influence. In this regard, the author suggests making greater use of the Saudi–Turkish–Egyptian axis.
Economic Counter-Measures
Since Abu Dhabi’s objectives are seen as primarily economic—particularly concerning gold, ports and agricultural resources—the response should include measures targeting these interests.
These could include tightening security oversight over gold production areas to prevent smuggling to Abu Dhabi, redirecting exports to alternative markets, and ensuring that such resources are not used to finance the militia’s war effort.
In addition, Sudan should review agreements and investments in ports and agriculture, suspending or cancelling any privileges or contracts involving companies linked to Abu Dhabi and replacing them with partners from states aligned with Sudan.
Activating the Role of the Diaspora
Sudanese diaspora communities abroad should be organised to stage demonstrations in front of international parliaments and human rights organisations, with slogans linking external financing to ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
A Secure Neighbourhood Strategy
Since supplies allegedly reach the militia via airports in neighbouring countries, the Sudanese government should apply pressure on these states through security and economic bargaining, linking mutual economic and security interests to their cooperation in preventing the passage of arms shipments.
A policy of reciprocity should be activated to compel these countries to cease facilitating Abu Dhabi’s support for the militia.
Conclusion
According to the author, Sudan today is not merely fighting an armed rebellion, but rather defending its sovereignty and very existence against external ambitions that have used some of its own citizens as daggers against it.
Recognising the true adversary, he argues, is the first step towards victory, and cutting off the sources of supply remains the most effective way to end the tragedy and begin thinking about rebuilding what has been destroyed.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12096