The Future of Sudan–Europe Dialogue: Between Constants and Variables
Mahmoud Hussein Sari
Over recent weeks, Sudanese media, political circles and social platforms have been abuzz with reports and articles revealing a potential meeting in Brussels between the Sudanese army leadership and EU bodies, as well as with security and diplomatic officials in Paris and Geneva.
Many journalists criticised these meetings, describing them as secretive, which eventually led to their indefinite postponement. These meetings, however, represented a significant and historic opportunity – a major success for the Sudanese army, which managed to reach the heart of Europe after years of marginalisation, neglect and exclusion.
EU Foreign Policy: What Has Stayed the Same
The consistent feature of European foreign policy has been its view of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — a force Europe helped reshape, reorganise, and utilise to combat irregular migration from Eastern Africa — as representing the future of the Sudanese armed forces. Europe sees the RSF as a guarantee of Sudan’s transition to civilian rule, a bulwark preventing the return of Islamists to power, and a means of delivering justice and democracy by enabling marginalised Darfurians and Nubians to rule after 69 years of exclusion since independence.
But the Variables Have Changed
Three major shifts have forced Europe to rethink its approach to the RSF:
The scale of atrocities committed by the RSF, which Europe tried for years to overlook, has become impossible to ignore in light of growing public protests and social media campaigns exposing these violations.
The RSF’s failure to win the war or administer civilian life in the areas it controls. Most residents fled towards army-held areas, leaving RSF-controlled zones deserted and terrifying.
The spillover of the Sudanese conflict onto Europe’s regional allies—Chad, Ethiopia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These states are increasingly burdened by the war’s impact on their security, economies, borders and coastlines, all of which could ignite at any moment. Meanwhile, Russia, China and Iran have begun using Sudan’s conflict to recalibrate regional power balances.
All these shifts highlight a tangible shift in European attitudes towards Sudan. This explains the multiple recent European visits by envoys from Norway, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the EU. Press reports indicated that, in November, the EU Delegation to Sudan (now operating from Cairo) held meetings with like-minded countries — the 27 EU member states, along with Australia, Canada, the UK, the US, South Korea and Japan. This resulted in the EU Foreign Affairs Council decision of 20 November, which for the first time called for direct meetings between the EU, the Sudanese army and the RSF.
The Sudanese army appears to have recognised this opening and agreed to meet the EU at its headquarters — a move met, in the author’s view, with an unhelpfully emotional reaction from Sudanese public opinion.
Diplomacy is Like Prayer: Sometimes Public, Sometimes Private
Sudanese authorities at all levels have every right to meet with a divided West — ageing Europe and “new America” under Trump — to press Sudan’s national agenda, explain the nature of the conflict, present solutions, and expose the RSF’s crimes and the complicity of the states financing and supporting it, including the US and European countries themselves.
The army also has every right to go to Europe and confront Europeans with the mistakes and crimes they committed in Sudan through silence and by supporting the RSF and its political backers.
It is crucial that Sudan’s government launch a real dialogue with Europe — led by the Foreign Ministry with participation from the army and intelligence services. Such dialogue should explain the situation on the ground, shape European and international positions, and produce feasible solutions for the coming period. Since April 2023, most European embassies have left Sudan and now operate from European capitals or from neighbouring African states. Western countries have therefore lost much of their networks inside Sudan and now rely heavily on reports from international organisations and civil society groups — many of which represent the political base of the RSF and the Forces of Freedom and Change.
It is increasingly clear that Europe is reassessing its stance. Europeans now recognise that “resilience”, “democratisation” and “civil forces” projects do not represent all Sudanese; that the Sudanese army remains a formidable institution; that the Sudanese people rally around their military leadership; that the RSF has lost public sympathy through its crimes; and that the war has turned into a broader regional and international confrontation. They also acknowledge that the RSF has lost coherence between its commanders and fighters and has turned into a chaotic mix of gangs and militias threatening not only Sudan but the entire Horn of Africa.
What the West is Waiting For
The West now awaits a Sudanese military initiative proposing a moderate, reasonable and balanced political settlement — one that protects Sudan’s national interests while easing international concerns about the return of Islamists to power, opening investment opportunities for the West, and limiting Russian, Chinese and Iranian influence.
If Sudan fails to seize this moment, the West may move the Sudan file to the UN Security Council and push for international intervention under the pretext of humanitarian protection and human rights violations.
Understanding Europe’s Constants and Variables
Sudanese decision-makers in the military, security, diplomatic and political spheres must understand the fixed and shifting elements of European policy — as well as Europe’s repeated mistakes in Sudan.
The recent EU–AU summit in Angola identified more than eleven areas for Euro–African dialogue. Sudan is capable of presenting a comprehensive partnership proposal. Opportunities include cooperation on migration control, counter-terrorism, crime prevention, peacekeeping, food security, climate change, women and youth empowerment, clean energy, higher education and research, anti-corruption, governance, water management and more.
Sudanese leaders must also note that EU partnerships with regional states are substantial:
– €7 billion with Egypt
– €12 billion with South Africa
– €1.5 billion with Namibia
– €1 billion with Morocco
– €2 billion with Mozambique
Yet Sudan remains confined to about €400 million in assistance — 90% of which goes to humanitarian projects that do little to strengthen the state and mainly benefit NGOs and regional organisations aligned with anti-state narratives.
The fundamental problem in Sudan–West relations is the policy of “no dialogue and no confrontation” and the failure to capitalise on changes in the international environment to lay new, stronger foundations for Sudan’s relationship with the West.
Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=9375