Why We Mustn’t Count on Trump’s Statements

Dr al-Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed
General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan acted wisely when he phoned the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, as the latter was preparing to travel to Washington, asking him to mention Sudan to the “Master of the White House”. Prince Mohammed, in turn, did well to allocate ample space in his tightly packed schedule to raise the Sudan file with President Trump, doing so with compelling reasoning and eloquent argument. And Trump, for his part, did well to listen attentively to his guest and to devote significant time in his speech at the US-Saudi Investment Forum to Sudan. He who does not thank people does not thank God.
People have been intensely preoccupied with Trump’s remarks, interpreting them in many ways. Among those backing the army, the prevailing assumption is that what occurred in Washington was effectively an announcement of the death of the “Quad” and the birth of a new bilateral formula. Yet a closer look at the circumstances surrounding the speech and a comparison with similar precedents show that such conclusions are misplaced. What happened that day in Washington will not go far — and although that assessment will not please some, it is the only one supported by evidence and by prior examples—some of these we set out below.
The first thing to note is that this new posture taken by President Trump is the result of a sudden emotional impulse during that visit, not the product of a broad institutional process in Washington involving Congress, the State Department, the National Security Council or the intelligence community. The United States is a nation of institutions. Even when these institutions are at their weakest — as they are now — and even when the cult of personality is at its height — as in Trump’s current administration — individual impulses and momentary reactions do not produce enduring policy. The classic example of this is what happened in Gaza.
Netanyahu visited the United States on 4 February and delivered a detailed briefing to Trump on Gaza from his own perspective. Trump adopted Netanyahu’s position wholesale. In their joint press conference, Trump declared that the United States would “take over” Gaza, depopulate it, and turn it into the “Riviera of the Middle East”. He hinted at the possible deployment of US forces if necessary. The Israeli government received those remarks with great enthusiasm — no less than the enthusiasm with which the Sudanese received Trump’s recent comments. But as later became clear, Trump did not mean what he said. His talk was merely an attempt to placate Netanyahu. A few weeks later, Trump retreated entirely and presented the “Twenty-Point Plan” as the basis for his Gaza initiative. If Trump could do this with Netanyahu — Netanyahu, of all people — nothing is preventing him from doing the same with Mohammed bin Salman. And since he did it with Israel — a country whose influence in Washington is considerable — he could certainly do it with Saudi Arabia. He has done similar things with Russia.
In August last year, the world held its breath ahead of a highly symbolic meeting between Trump and Putin. Trump had already spoken of possible “territorial exchanges” between Russia and Ukraine, and security guarantees to be discussed with Putin. He welcomed Putin in Alaska on a red carpet. Friendly remarks were exchanged, and reconciliation was hinted at. But the warmth quickly dissipated. Trump returned to confrontation, with talk of sanctions on Putin rising again. In contrast, he opened his arms to Zelensky, whom he had previously expelled from the White House in the literal sense. As Russia is Russia — and antagonising it comes at a price — the air thickened with Cold War tension. In October, Trump announced he had ordered the “Department of War” to resume nuclear testing, suspended since 1992. These two examples — and others, such as his erratic behaviour toward the Iran nuclear deal — illustrate Trump’s volatility.
The reason for this inconsistency is that Trump’s decisions are not based on institutional deliberation or a policy review across Washington’s agencies. They are rooted in emotion and personal whims. Trump is unaccustomed to creating specialised teams to implement his impulses. For example, he did not establish a team to implement the Gaza-to-resort plan, nor a team to operationalise the twenty-point proposal. When Hamas realised the opportunity and accepted a handful of points, Trump applauded what he saw as a triumph. Likewise, he created no team to prepare for the Alaska summit or to follow up on its outcomes.
The same applies to his meeting with Mohammed bin Salman. Trump has no mechanism for handling African affairs, let alone Sudan. Ten months into his term, he still has not appointed an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs — the key position for shaping and implementing US Africa policy. Instead, he invented the position of Senior Adviser to the President for Africa — without a clear job description and outside the State Department and National Security Council structures — and assigned it to Massad Poulos, whose African experience consisted largely of trading tractors and heavy machinery in Nigeria. His qualification for the post is well known: he is the father-in-law of Tiffany Trump’s husband. Some believed the purpose of the role was to groom Poulos to become Assistant Secretary. But his prospects have since dimmed due to his business-minded, non-institutional approach. With the Africa post vacant, Trump’s pronouncements on African matters are mere pleasantries — “as they say in some of our rural areas, words of girls directed at other girls” — not actions followed by machinery.
This institutional void has contributed to the US’s poor performance in Africa. The Congo-Rwanda agreement — signed in Washington on 27 June and heralded as a triumph — has stalled. Rwanda has not withdrawn its troops from eastern Congo. Deadlines have slipped. Without an American focal point, US involvement has amounted to participation in a single joint oversight meeting and a few scattered statements from Poulos.
Compounding this, Trump has not appointed ambassadors to head most US embassies in Africa. As is customary when administrations change, ambassadorial posts become vacant pending new appointments — which Trump has not made. US ambassadors are not only implementers but also shapers of policy. The post of Special Envoy to Sudan has also been vacant since Tom Perriello left with the outgoing administration. When Trump said that within thirty minutes of meeting Prince Mohammed, he had ordered action on Sudan, one might have expected him to appoint a new envoy immediately. That would have been the correct first step — if Trump truly intended to prioritise Sudan. But such a thought does not occur to him. He does not know how to activate the machinery of state or how diplomacy is conducted.
As for Saudi Arabia — despite the Crown Prince’s sincerity — it is not in a position to press for follow-up on Trump’s commitments. Saudi Arabia has greater legitimacy than any other Gulf state on the Sudan file, given its proximity and its role as a counterweight to UAE involvement. Yet Riyadh cannot sideline Abu Dhabi or outrank it in Washington. The UAE would view any Saudi push on Sudan as “excessive interest”, escalating rivalry without producing practical pressure on the RSF. The simmering economic and political competition between the two Gulf states makes coordination difficult. Moreover, Saudi Arabia cannot directly counter the UAE’s narrative — which the West finds coherent — that the Sudanese army is “infiltrated by Islamists” and that empowering the RSF, with all its flaws, is the quickest way to combat extremism. Backed by Israel, this narrative still resonates in US circles accustomed to framing conflicts around “counter-terrorism”. Saudi Arabia lacks the instruments to pressure the UAE, which is not economically or militarily dependent on Riyadh. Instead, Saudi Arabia relies on delicate balances with the UAE in Yemen, in oil policy, and in the Red Sea — areas crucial to its own security. Thus, the only way Riyadh could succeed in Sudan is if Washington itself confronts the UAE. But several factors prevent Trump from doing so.
Washington has strong pressure tools against the UAE — arms sales, sanctions tied to Chinese tech concerns, financial compliance issues, intelligence cooperation and dollar-market access. Under Trump, however, wielding these tools is unlikely. Trump’s personal business interests in the UAE are significant — from the Trump Tower Dubai project to the $2 billion Binance digital-asset venture. His sons’ close ties to influential Emiratis further complicate matters. Many Trump family projects depend on Emirati financing or permits, making confrontation risky.
Thus, the United States will not act alone to pressure the UAE. Effective pressure will require escalating the current global campaign — ignited after the fall of al-Fashir — culminating in a wide international coalition: American, European, Saudi, Turkish, Egyptian, and African. Such a coalition would need to challenge the credibility of the UAE’s Sudan narrative and push for political, economic and diplomatic measures: boycotting Emirati gold markets, sanctioning arms brokers, blocking gold flows, restricting UM Jaras cargo flights, and scrutinising RSF finances and Abu Dhabi’s defence ties. With no such coalition yet emerging, reliance on a shift in US policy is misguided.
None of this diminishes the importance of Trump’s statements. They represent a culmination of global sentiment against the RSF and the UAE, expressed from the most powerful podium in today’s world. But we must not assume that these remarks mean US diplomatic doors have opened fully for Sudan or that America’s coercive tools are now at Sudan’s disposal. That remains far off. The United States — and the world — are still constrained by Emirati pressure, by Abu Dhabi’s attempts to shape any negotiation forum into a stage for re-legitimising the RSF and returning its allies to power.
God’s will ultimately prevails — though most people do not realise it.

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