The US and the RSF Militia: Documented Terrorism Not Named Yet

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud
The recent statement by the US Secretary of State, following the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Canada, revived an old question regarding Washington’s criteria for designating terrorist groups: does the United States rely on international law, or on calculations of interest? The Secretary said that his country may proceed to designate the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) “if that would help end the war.” A short sentence on the surface, but one that exposes the essence of American policy: designation is not a legal judgement, but a pressure tool—used when Washington wants it, and frozen when it does not.
The irony is that the Sudanese case requires no “feasibility study.” The RSF’s crimes are so well-documented that they would incriminate conventional armies, let alone an armed rebel militia. This group violated the Sudanese constitution and rose up against the state; broke rules of engagement; executed prisoners in cold blood; practised torture and starvation; carried out ethnic massacres in Darfur, Khartoum, Al-Jazira, and Kordofan; besieged cities and employed deliberate starvation; looted property; recruited children; used rape as a weapon; and displaced hundreds of thousands.
This is not political rhetoric, but the conclusion of official reports by:
the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
the UN Panel of Experts,
UNITAMS,
Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch,
UN reports on conflict-related sexual violence,
and humanitarian organisations working on the ground.
Yet despite this stack of evidence, the US Secretary links designation to “whether it helps end the war,” not to “whether the militia has committed terrorist crimes.” And here lies the core of the problem: Washington does not designate based on facts, but based on political interest.
This is nothing new. The United States used the terrorism designation in its dealings with Sudan before, placing it in 1993 on the list of “state sponsors of terrorism,” and keeping it there for nearly twenty-seven years—despite extensive security cooperation, intelligence sharing, and fulfilment of most technical requirements. Even then, sanctions were not lifted, nor was the designation removed, until 2020—not on the basis of counterterrorism records, but as part of a fully fledged political and economic bargain.
Sudan was made to pay USD 335 million in compensation for the USS Cole bombing—an attack it had no responsibility for—placing enormous strain on the Sudanese economy at the time. It agreed to normalise relations with Israel; provided political commitments concerning the transitional period and its foreign policy direction; and all of this took place within broader understandings aimed at securing greater American influence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
In other words, Sudan’s removal from the list was not a “risk assessment” of terrorism, but an investment in a strategic deal—confirming that US designations are applied when Washington desires, lifted when it wishes, and adjusted according to shifting interests.
For this reason, the US Secretary’s recent statement should not be viewed simply as a positive step; it must be understood as a pressure window that Khartoum can exploit. The Sudanese Foreign Minister—an experienced diplomat known for his wisdom and discipline—responded with the expected diplomatic courtesy. But such courtesy does not equal acceptance of Washington’s logic, which ties international law to American desire rather than to legal principle.
What is now required is for the Sudanese government to act firmly and turn the Secretary’s very words into a negotiating condition. If Washington implicitly acknowledges that the designation file is in its own hands, and that it will use it only when it “chooses,” then Khartoum must make the RSF designation a sovereign demand—one without which no step forward in bilateral cooperation should be taken. It is unacceptable for Khartoum to cooperate with a state that recognises the crimes, sees the evidence, reads the UN reports, yet delays designation until it deems it “useful.”
Thus, insisting on this point becomes more than a linguistic objection; it becomes a negotiating tool that strengthens Sudan’s position and broadens its political margin in any future dialogue with the United States or other international actors. The demand to designate the RSF is not merely a government stance—it is a popular demand reflecting the conscience of the Sudanese people after the visible and documented atrocities they have witnessed.
Turning this sentence into a negotiation pivot will transform it into a meaningful lever within US decision-making structures, where think tanks, research institutes, human-rights organisations, and lobbying groups play a critical role in shaping positions and orientations. The louder the voices of Khartoum—government and people—on the necessity of this designation, the more sensitive the file will become within those circles, widening the debate and turning it into a motivating factor that pushes US decision-makers to reassess their approach to the Sudan war.
In this way, the statement, understood in its proper context, becomes an effective pressure card that must not be forfeited, for it strengthens Sudan’s negotiating posture and gives it greater space to secure international recognition of the undeniable crimes committed by the militia.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=8756