UAE’s Sub-Imperialism in Sudan: Counter-Revolution, Gold, and Global Impunity!!

Review by Mohamed Osman Adam

Hussam Mahjoub is a Sudanese writer and political analyst currently residing in the United States, according to the brief summary annexed to the article he has written. This is a very novel article about Sudan, the ongoing war, and the role of the United Arab Emirates in it. While you may disagree with him politically or ideologically, still what he presents in this article is worth reading and contemplating. He not only presents it from a fresh perspective, but also presents new arguments and evidence that unequivocally demonstrate the UAE’s involvement in the current devastating war in Sudan. He presents historical, economic, and military arguments that prove—and are entirely valid—that the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces not only to serve its own interests, but also to act as a “sub-imperialist force” in the region, particularly in the Middle East and Africa.
Cameron Hudson, an American expert on developments in East Africa in general and Sudan in particular, commented on his X account, saying that this article is worth reading if one wants to understand the policies, activities, and interests of the United Arab Emirates in Sudan and their implications for all developments in the country.
The article was published on Spectre, a left-wing website that advocates a neo-Marxist view of various regional and global developments. It traces the relationship and ties between the UAE and the Rapid Support Forces back to before the outbreak of the current war on April 15, 2023.
The article bears a significant title: “UAE Sub-Imperialism in Sudan: Counter-Revolution, Gold, and Global Impunity.” It begins with a powerful introduction that grip the reader by the collar until they fully complete reading the article. The article portrays the Gulf state as an agent working its way through Sudanese political life, from the uprising that ousted President Omar al-Bashir to the October 2021 military takeover that ousted the government of Abdalla Hamdok.
The article also demonstrates the UAE’s pragmatism in dealing with both the military and civilian sides in Sudan, aligning it with the revolutionaries while simultaneously maintaining excellent relations with the Sudanese military.
It argues that as a peripheral state engaged in imperial practices within its region while remaining dependent on the United States (i.e., a primary imperial power), the UAE embodies the transformation into a sub-imperialist state that many other regional powers are undergoing.
It argues that Sudan today is not simply a battleground between two armed factions. It has been a graveyard of regional and international hypocrisy and a case study in sub-imperialism—a sub-imperial state is one that is not a major imperial power, but that acts in ways consistent with the interests of imperial powers and behaves as an imperialist within its own region. The war that has ravaged Sudan since April 2023 is not just a Sudanese tragedy; it is a manifestation of a broader global system in which financial interests, military influence, and strategic alliances are more important than human beings, people’s lives, or their democratic aspirations. At the heart of this configuration lies the United Arab Emirates. He also added that those who believe the UAE is acting alone are mistaken, claiming that the UAE’s role in Sudan is not an anomaly, as it is part of a coherent, well-funded, and regionally wide-ranging project: a sub-imperialist agenda that combines economic extraction, authoritarian alliance-building, and counter-revolutionary policies under the guise of diplomatic sophistication and global partnerships. Sudan, unfortunately, is one of its central laboratories.
The author made an inventory of factors behind the UAE’s aggressive campaign in Sudan and abroad. These factors included the Arab Spring, the threat of Islamist uprooting, and the fear of annexation as a small country constantly subjected to bullying by its neighbors, regional and international powers, and also within its own Arab neighbors.

– From the Arab Spring to the December Revolution: A Threat to the UAE Regime
Under the subtitle: “From the Arab Spring to the December Revolution: A Threat to the UAE Regime,” the author argued that the roots of the UAE’s destructive role in Sudan go back more than a decade. In 2011, the UAE (along with Saudi Arabia) viewed the Arab Spring as an existential threat to all the region’s monolithic regimes and their own model of governance: a rentier monarchy based on coercion, corruption, and the suppression of dissent. The fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, and the rise of democratic movements in Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain, represented early warning signs of a storm that must be contained at all costs by the Emirati leadership.
“This was not merely a reaction; the UAE became an active counter-revolutionary force.”
He explained that in Libya, it supported Khalifa Haftar’s war against the internationally recognized government, effectively leading to the country’s partition.
The author goes on to say, “In Sudan, the UAE established close ties with Omar al-Bashir’s government and, in subsequent years, strengthened its alliance with the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary militia that was the offspring of the Janjaweed militias, which committed atrocities against civilians and rebels.”
He added, “The Sudanese people’s revolution in December 2018, which culminated in the overthrow of Bashir in April 2019, posed a direct challenge to the UAE’s regional project.” The revolution was democratic, civilian-led, and openly anti-military. Therefore, according to the author, this presented a dilemma for the UAE: “How to maintain its influence in Sudan without appearing counter-revolutionary?”
The solution was complex and complicated.
A culmination of polarization, divide-and-rule tactics, and long-term military investment, most notably in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In the subtitle, “The Rise of the RSF: An Agent of Quasi-Imperial Influence,” the author explains that the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), became the ideal Emirati partner.
In April 2019, Hemedti (along with leaders of the official Sudanese security forces and agencies) orchestrated the overthrow of Bashir, fearing the regime’s collapse due to the revolution. Burhan and Hemedti assumed leadership of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) and later became the military commanders of the transitional government, originally tasked with governing the country for 39 months.

– The RSF’s relationship with the UAE subsequently flourished.
The author recalled that in 2015, Bashir’s regime sent RSF fighters alongside Sudanese army personnel to serve in the Saudi-led war in Yemen under Emirati command—a contractual relationship that combined military outsourcing with political legitimacy. In return, Hemedti received weapons, logistical support, and diplomatic cover.

The author then makes an interesting argument: The UAE, as a peripheral state practicing imperial practices within its region while remaining dependent on the United States (i.e., a central imperial power), embodies the transformation into a sub-imperialist state witnessed by many other regional powers. It seeks influence without governance and power without accountability.
The fragmentation, weak institutions, and global neglect of African and Middle Eastern countries such as Sudan, Libya, and Yemen have provided fertile ground for UAE interference in their affairs.
He correctly argues that Hemedti has provided two key elements for the UAE to adopt and continue to adopt since the outbreak of the uprising in April 2019: ensuring its recruitment of members of the Rapid Support Forces and nurturing their diplomatic and political power. He wrote: “These elements are the capacity for violence—that is, forces willing to suppress protests, wage wars, and eliminate rivals—and economic access, particularly to Sudan’s lucrative gold trade, which the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have increasingly controlled.”

Regarding the gold trade, the author states that between 2013 and 2023, the RSF strengthened its grip on Sudanese gold mining operations, particularly in Darfur and other peripheral areas. Much of the gold is smuggled to the United Arab Emirates, which has become the main center for Sudanese gold.
Other developments occurred in Sudan, such as the “October 2021 coup,” which enjoyed the UAE’s protection.
He states that when the Sudanese Armed Forces (led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan) and the RSF (led by Hemedti) carried out the coup on October 25, 2021, it marked the official end of Sudan’s democratic transition. The UAE’s response was not condemnation, but diplomacy. Abu Dhabi publicly called for “restraint” and “dialogue.” Behind the scenes, it maintained its relations with both Burhan and Hemedti, hedging its bets while maintaining its influence.
However, the author continues, the Rapid Support Forces remained the UAE’s primary tool, and their economic ties deepened—particularly through gold.
When the current war broke out in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, it was no surprise that Hemedti’s forces were exceptionally well-equipped, coordinated, and resilient. Their ability to seize large parts of Khartoum and other areas in central and southern Sudan, loot infrastructure, and extend their control in Darfur owed much to the external support they received in the years preceding it and, more importantly, after the outbreak of the war.

– The UAE’s Sub-Imperialism Across Africa: Ports, Gold, and Proxy Power
The author argues that Sudan is not the only arena where the UAE has exported its influence through military, economic, and political channels. Over the past fifteen years, the UAE has expanded its economic influence across Africa through investments in ports, airports, and infrastructure projects. These projects are not limited to commercial interests alone; they also serve as strategic moves to expand its influence. The UAE has extensive military cooperation agreements and massive investments in agricultural land, renewable energy, mining, and telecommunications, making it an important player in regional geopolitics.

The UAE seeks influence without governance and power without accountability, as fragmentation, weak institutions, and global neglect of African and Middle Eastern countries such as Sudan, Libya, and Yemen provide fertile ground for UAE intervention.
In Sudan, this strategy has taken a particularly violent turn due to the risks involved—gold, geopolitical location, and political influence over one of Africa’s largest countries—and because of the Sudanese revolution, which stood on a tightrope. The Rapid Support Forces, which operate as a private army with state-like functions, were the ideal local partner for the UAE.

– War of 2023: A Proxy Bloodbath Without Accountability
As the war between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces escalated in 2023, the Rapid Support Forces benefited from pre-positioned supplies, logistics chains, and regional safe havens—all hallmarks of external support. Sudanese human rights monitors, journalists, and activists repeatedly pointed to the UAE’s role in the war. Yet, no Emirati officials were sanctioned. No pressure was exerted on Abu Dhabi to halt the flow of gold or weapons.
Peace talks and conferences continued in Jeddah and
Addis Ababa, Cairo, Bahrain, Geneva, and London, often excluding prominent civilian voices while allowing military factions to reshape their image. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continued to gain political and media legitimacy from the global media, while their war crimes were downplayed or obscured.

– An Indispensable Partnership
The UAE is a strategic partner of the West. It is an arms buyer, a major collaborator with the genocidal Israeli regime, an intelligence conduit, and a financial center. It has hosted US military bases, participated in counterterrorism operations, and invested heavily in Western economies. In short, it is too useful to be punished.
In the final months of the Biden administration, some US lawmakers intensified their efforts to halt arms sales to the UAE in response to mounting evidence that, despite previous assertions to the contrary, it has continued to supply weapons to the RSF. The White House had initially agreed to monitor and verify the UAE’s compliance, but a briefing in January 2025 confirmed the UAE’s continued support for the RSF. This prompted the reinstatement of the Sudan Defense Act, which prohibits US arms exports to the UAE until it completely ceases its material support for the RSF, arguing that US influence should be used to help stop the ongoing war and genocide.
On May 5, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed Sudan’s lawsuit, accusing the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention by arming and financing the RSF. Based on the UAE’s reservation to the treaty’s jurisdiction clause, the ICJ ruled it lacked jurisdiction and did not assess the substance of Sudan’s claims.
On May 22, the US State Department accused the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) of using chemical weapons during its civil war with the RSF and announced new sanctions, including export restrictions and financial measures. However, the US government has not provided any public evidence to support this allegation, nor has it followed the proper procedures required by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a body of which Sudan is a member and on whose Executive Board it serves.
The author notes that this accusation is the latest example of Trump’s foreign policy shift toward “transactionalism and outright corruption” during his second term. This announcement followed his visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, where he reportedly sought to secure investment deals for the United States and expand his personal and family business interests in the region. Many analysts have long argued that the war in Sudan has evolved into a proxy conflict, with the UAE supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Saudi Arabia supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). With increasing public scrutiny and international pressure exposing the UAE’s role in war crimes and genocide, the Trump administration appears to be using the accusations against the SAF to deflect attention and balance the narrative. Through these attempts, the Trump administration hopes to maintain an equal distance from both the UAE—the RSF—and Saudi Arabia—the SAF.
These accusations inevitably draw parallels to previous events, particularly the Clinton administration’s 1998 missile strike on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan at the height of the Ms. Lewinsky scandal. The United States claimed the facility was producing chemical weapons linked to Osama bin Laden, but subsequent investigations found little evidence to support this claim, and many experts concluded that the facility was civilian. This also recalls the 2003 invasion of Iraq, justified by false claims of weapons of mass destruction. These claims were ultimately proven to be entirely fabricated.
The author then argues that these previous considerations should not be understood as exonerating the Sudanese Armed Forces, but rather as highlighting the Trump administration’s deceptive maneuvers to strengthen relations with the Gulf by reversing the narrative while continuing to fail to effectively address the war.

– The Price of Silence: Sudanese Civilians Pay the Price
The consequences of this international silence are not merely theoretical; they are real and terrifying. Hundreds of thousands have been killed, millions more displaced, and many forced to live in squalid camps across borders or in besieged cities. The country’s infrastructure, including universities, hospitals, and cultural institutions, has been systematically destroyed in what amounts to a deliberate war on Sudanese society. Widespread sexual violence has also been reported, with the Rapid Support Forces allegedly targeting women and girls as tools of war.
On the other hand, the Sudanese resistance has not disappeared. It has adapted, decentralized, and reconnected with its global allies. The Sudanese people, both inside and outside the country, are providing much-needed aid, health, and education services. They are also organizing, documenting, and demanding justice. What they need is solidarity, not charity; accountability, not sympathy.

– What to do: A call to action
To stop the war in Sudan and prevent future ones, we must challenge local actors and their international backers. This includes imposing sanctions on all foreign entities that finance or arm the Rapid Support Forces, including companies and individuals in the United Arab Emirates. It also requires exposing and dismantling the conflict.
– Gold trade via information and communications technology, particularly its routes through Dubai and its links to the financing of the Rapid Support Forces.
The author says: The role of the UAE in arms transfers must be investigated, and international legal mechanisms must be sought to halt this supply chain. Support for Sudanese civil society initiatives must also be supported.
Finally, we must confront the political logic of the Western-Gulf alliance, which treats the UAE and Saudi Arabia as untouchable partners; strategic relationships must not be at the expense of civilian lives.
The author concludes his article by stating that a different future is still possible. It is a call for civilian rule and social justice, a compelling alternative—one rooted in popular legitimacy, democratic principles, and transnational solidarity. Achieving this future requires more than expressing support for Sudanese civilian actors; it requires a decisive confrontation with the international political and economic frameworks that have sustained authoritarianism and foreign intervention, and a commitment that resists compromising strategic interests or geopolitical alliances.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=7075