The Future of Foreign Relations Under the “Government of Hope”: Restoring Diplomatic Standing in a Time of Transformation?

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud

With Dr. Kamil Idris assuming office as Prime Minister of the Government of Hope, the challenges before him will not be confined to Sudan’s domestic arena alone. They extend to the country’s foreign relations, which have undergone profound shifts and sharp fluctuations over the decades. At one point, specifically during the years of the National Congress Party’s rule, Sudan succeeded in building an extensive network of regional and international partnerships characterised by balance and pragmatism, allowing it to cement its position as the ruling party of a key state in both the Arab and African regions.

Today, the Government of Hope inherits this legacy—not as a past to boast about, but as a strategic opportunity awaiting renewed interpretation and activation, in line with regional and international transformations, and in service of Sudan’s aspirations for stability and revival.

Sudan once played an influential role in the Islamic world through its active presence in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its regular participation in its summits and ministerial councils. Its role was not symbolic: it was reflected in real contributions to relief and development projects in various Islamic countries, including food and medical aid to Yemen, Somalia, and Palestine, as well as effective support for disaster-affected Muslim populations.

With the Gulf states, Khartoum built close and multifaceted ties—most notably with the United Arab Emirates, which stood by Sudan through several critical economic junctures, especially following South Sudan’s secession in 2011. At that time, Abu Dhabi provided consistent oil support, deposited funds in the Central Bank, and contributed to stabilising the Sudanese pound’s exchange rate. It invested in major agricultural projects and supported the banking sector through substantial remittances from Sudanese workers in both public and private sectors. Sudanese banks also maintained key accounts and deposits in Emirati banks at a time when Sudan’s financial options were extremely limited.

As for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it played a complementary and consistent role in supporting Sudan, signing agreements for agricultural and development financing, contributing to budget support, and offering political and media backing for Khartoum in regional and international forums. Sudan’s stance during “Operation Decisive Storm” in 2015 marked a new strategic convergence between the two nations, later expressed through deep security and military coordination. The Sudanese expatriate community in the Kingdom—one of the largest in the Gulf—also played a major role in supporting the national economy through remittances amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

Qatar, meanwhile, emerged as one of Sudan’s primary sources of direct financial support over the past two decades. Doha provided substantial financial aid estimated at around $4 billion, distributed between direct Central Bank deposits and long-term investments in agriculture, tourism, and real estate. Notably, it deposited $1 billion in 2013 as part of political and economic support for the stability of Sudan’s banking system. Qatar’s “Diar” company also invested in real estate and tourism development projects in Khartoum and Suakin. Additionally, Qatar financed relief and health projects via the Qatari Red Crescent and sponsored the Darfur Peace Agreement signed in Doha in 2011, securing a central political role in Sudan’s peace file.

Within the broader Gulf context, Sudan also maintained notable cooperation with both Bahrain and the Sultanate of Oman, which included the exchange of delegations, funding of humanitarian, health, and educational programmes, and support for some infrastructure projects—particularly in remote regions.

In Asia, China stood as Sudan’s most important strategic partner. Since the mid-1990s, Beijing has played a decisive role in Sudan’s transition from a pre-oil era to a crude oil exporter, contributing to the discovery of oil fields, the construction of pipelines and the Al-Jaili refinery, and investing in energy and transportation infrastructure. At its peak, trade between the two countries reached over $8 billion annually, with approximately 69% of Sudanese oil exports heading to China. In return, China provided concessional loans for projects like the Merowe Dam and several electricity and telecommunications schemes. This relationship was led by an elite group of distinguished Sudanese diplomats, most notably Ambassador Dr. Ali Youssef Al-Sharif and Ambassador Omar Issa, who played pivotal roles in building mutual trust and expanding cooperation.

In Africa, Sudan’s leadership was undisputed. The country chaired the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) multiple times, and played an active role in mediating conflicts in South Sudan, Somalia, and the Central African Republic. Sudan hosted several mini-African summits in Khartoum, solidifying its status as a key regional power.

In Europe, despite sanctions, Sudan saw gradual openings—particularly with Germany and France. It received parliamentary and technical delegations and cooperated with major companies such as Siemens, even taking serious steps to address its debts with the Paris Club.

Relations with Russia also saw steady progress, including arms deals and cooperation in the mining sector. Discussions around establishing a Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast began in 2017 but were interrupted after the 2019 change of government, despite a preliminary agreement signed in November 2020. The project remained suspended until the agreement was formally reaffirmed in February 2025.

Sudan’s relations with the United States, despite persistent tensions, included security cooperation on counterterrorism, which eventually led to Sudan’s removal from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism and paved the way for its return to international financial institutions.

After 2019, foreign policy entered a phase of decline, reflected in the faltering of relationships with the Gulf, China, and Russia. The executive component at the time failed to manage major strategic files. The most prominent example was the “Abu Amama Port” project, which was signed in December 2022 but cancelled in November 2024 due to weak internal coordination and conflicting approaches between diplomacy and politics.

The Government of Hope is not starting from scratch. It begins on fertile ground, with a deeply rooted foundation in foreign relations that requires a coherent strategic vision—one that can confidently reposition Sudan and restore its place as an active partner in the region and the world.

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