Implications of the Potential Closure of the Strait of Hormuz on Sudan and the Bets of the Terrorist Militia

By: Muhannad Awad
Anadolu Agency reported today (Sunday) that the Iranian parliament has officially recommended closing the Strait of Hormuz in response to escalating military tensions in the region, forwarding the recommendation to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council for a final decision.
This dramatic shift does not represent a geographically confined threat limited to the Gulf. Instead, it carries wide-reaching consequences that extend beyond the economy and energy markets—it affects the balance of power and the political and military alliances across the region. These developments directly impact Sudan, which is currently engaged in a decisive war between the state, represented by its armed forces, and the terrorist Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.
With serious consideration now being given to closing the strait, the region enters its most dangerous phase in years, prompting influential states to reassess their strategic and security priorities. As risks to oil ports and trade routes intensify, the political luxury of supporting cross-border militias becomes increasingly untenable—particularly for groups like the RSF, which have relied heavily on foreign funding and a complex supply network stretching from western Sudan to Libya and from the Red Sea to distant capitals.
Against this backdrop, the Sudanese Armed Forces find themselves at a favourable juncture—akin to a strike from above—having successfully completed major battles in the capital and central regions. They are now effectively moving to eliminate remaining RSF terrorist pockets in Darfur and Kordofan states.
The pace of victories by Sudan’s military grows daily amid rapid collapses within militia ranks, the flight of their leaders, and the weakening of their combat capabilities due to severe financial and logistical constraints.
These victories are not merely rhetorical triumphs; they are grounded in field assessments of military operations led by regular army units, supported by other official forces and mobilized volunteers. Military maps now reveal the extent of progress, control, and the tight encirclement of the remaining rebels—trapped in limited areas, lacking reinforcements, cover, or support.
The RSF is not the only entity faltering under this shift. Political factions that once served as its soft cover are facing the same fate—such as the “Forces of Freedom and Change – Central Council,” the “Sumood” coalition, and activist platforms that opposed the state overtly or subtly. These actors are now visibly disoriented, as they realize they are no longer a priority to their former sponsors amid shifting regional dynamics and the retreat of backers toward their own pressing security interests.
This political isolation deepens as the legal front is exposed. Sudan’s Public Prosecution has issued formal arrest warrants for several figures associated with these factions, including Abdalla Hamdok, Yasir Arman, Khalid Omar Yousif, Siddiq Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Shawgi Abdelazim, and others. The charges against them include incitement to war against the state, conspiracy against the constitutional order, espionage, and providing political and media support to the RSF terrorist militia.
If these entities lose their financial and media shields, they will enter a prolonged and draining cold war, paving the way for their political dismantling and legal prosecution. This process could be expedited through the execution of arrest warrants—especially if government forces regain control over areas these figures use for refuge, limiting their movement and rhetorical manoeuvring in the national arena.
The moment the Strait of Hormuz stands on the brink of closure is the very same moment the rebel project in Sudan begins to gasp its last breaths. As support dwindles and supply routes are strangled, the Sudanese military finds itself in the position of a victorious force—not only militarily, but also nationally and morally—poised to close a painful chapter in Sudan’s modern history and restore the state’s stature, the military’s prestige, and the people’s right to a united and secure homeland.

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