Sudan Statement Before The UNSC

New York, Sudanhorizon
(Sudanhorizon publishes full unofficial translation of the statement delivered in Arabic
Following is the Statement as delivered by the Sudan permanent representative before the UNSC Emergency Session, Ambassador Al Harith Idris
Mr. President,
I would like to begin by congratulating you on your presidency of the Security Council for the month of May, and express our readiness to work with you on issues of common interest. I also thank Ms. Martha Pobe, Assistant Under-Secretary-General for African Affairs, and Ms. Lisa Dockton, Representative of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. While we certainly respect and thank the President of the Council for the efforts he has made in coordinating the positions of the members regarding this meeting, and for the neutral role that Greece has made one of the guiding principles of its objectives during its membership in the Council, we wish to express the following to the Council:
– The UAE’s interference seeks to undermine the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security entrusted to the Security Council under Article (24).
– The UAE seeks to silence Sudan’s voice within the Council, claiming that Sudan is exploiting the Security Council’s platform to promote propaganda against it. According to the testimony of witnesses, experts, media professionals, and observers, our statements provided arguments, evidence, statistics, and a legal basis. Everything we stated at the beginning of the war of aggression about the war, its course, and its consequences was fulfilled, and what we stated about the UAE’s role was supported by international circles, human rights organizations, and others. Those who seek to silence our voice, aware of this fact, have employed all possible pressures to silence it, disregarding the conflict with the Charter and the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
-The UAE is leading efforts and exerting pressure on the Council to unfairly influence Sudan’s position within the Council during the war, with the aim of limiting its exercise of its powers and duties and limiting its positive engagement with the war of aggression in Sudan, which it is the primary party directing.
– There is no evidence that the esteemed Council, by choosing the current confidential format, will perform its functions better in the absence of the media. We also appreciate that the Council may have wanted to avoid giving the impression of division or lack of cohesion, given that the war of aggression and those seeking to exacerbate it are well known to the Council. We know that this war has remained a legitimate concern for Council members and is also a source of significant monitoring and interest from the regional and international communities.
– The Council may have wanted to conduct a constructive and serious discussion of this escalating aggression, which aims to destroy the country’s entire infrastructure, away from the public sphere. However, we also have a legitimate suspicion that the UAE is influencing the Council’s work to deprive Sudan of its legitimate right to present its case as it sees fit before the Council. – We do not see any exceptional circumstances that could be relied upon to deviate from the usual practice of discussing developments in Sudan in the usual format specified in Article 48 and Articles 48-57 of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure. The Council must respect Sudan’s rights, halt the suppression of its voice, address the Council publicly, and ensure media presence, monitor public opinion, and respect the principle of sovereign equality among states.

(2) The UAE Escalation
It has become clear that, following the defeat of the Rapid Support Forces militia and mercenaries due to the broad national support for the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Joint Forces, the mobilized forces, volunteers, and Special Forces, the UAE and its intelligence agencies have undertaken a qualitative military escalation, amounting to drone piracy. They have harnessed their unlimited capabilities, along with the mercenaries and the Rapid Support Forces, and placed advanced strategic weapons, equipment, and drones at their disposal. Since May 4th, Sudan, its essential infrastructure, oil facilities, civilian facilities, hydroelectric power stations, the ports of Port Sudan, Omdurman, Atbara, Kosti, and other cities have been subjected to a continuous attack aimed at undermining the vitality of the state and its apparatuses operating under dire conditions. This attack aims to undermine the unparalleled resilience demonstrated by the Sudanese Armed Forces and its allied forces in the face of the planned and systematic UAE aggression aimed at destroying the Sudanese state and its cultural heritage, smuggling the ancient artifacts of the Kingdoms of Kush and Meroe, looting institutions, banks, and homes, stealing women’s jewelry, gold bars, and even children’s toys, luggage, and utensils. The perpetrators of these atrocities, the Rapid Support Forces militia, appear as if they come from another planet, employing brutality, destruction, black magic, the killing of civilians, and the rape of Sudanese women. The United Arab Emirates, along with its ally, the Rapid Support Forces militia and mercenaries recruited from around the world, have been planning to attack Port Sudan for some time. This vital maritime, economic, and strategic location plays a pivotal role as Sudan’s temporary administrative capital, attracting the attention of the international community. This has resulted in a remarkable response, confirming Sudan’s ability to withstand the war of aggression. Targeting Port Sudan aims to alter the dynamics of the war and the regional balance of power on the Red Sea, disrupting economic supply and export chains, halting humanitarian operations, killing government officials, and disrupting Sudan’s influence on the future of the Red Sea, which the UAE aspires to dominate. The UAE’s alliance with the Rapid Support Forces militia and mercenaries has had significant geopolitical repercussions. The UAE has provided an arsenal and begun building a military base in Nyala as part of its plan to tighten its grip on Darfur, capture Al-Fashir, and consolidate its influence in the Red Sea, extending its reach to the Sahel region, given that these areas are vital to international shipping routes. Under the pressure of these ambitions, the UAE has adopted a Trojan strategy, using the Rapid Support Forces as its main bulwark and player in reprogramming Sudan’s military, demographic, and geographic makeup, obliterating its identity and bringing in Arab-Bedouin demographic components. History has proven that they created a civilization, but have destroyed it. Not to mention the UAE’s claim that they seek to bring democracy to Sudan, violating the right to life, respect for property rights, the killing of those who disagree with their views, and the rights of Sudanese women, all for transgressed ethnic motives, which has hindered the smooth flow of the political transition towards democracy. The militia promised the UAE that if the plan to seize control of Sudan succeeded, they would hand it over to the UAE to do with it as it pleased.
(3) Strategic Drone Attacks
The UAE provided strategic drones and its air and ground defense systems to the militia and mercenaries to target infrastructure, strategic and military sites, civilians, power and oil stations, and hotels. It also brought in technicians specialized in strategic drone operations from several countries. The militia received support and assistance from the UAE, Chad, eastern Libya, and other neighboring East African countries. Its systematic attacks, which cause significant damage to infrastructure, have become a sustained and overt act, constituting a clear violation of Security Council Resolution 2024/2736 and Resolution 2005/1591.
– These attacks resulted in a fire at the strategic fuel depots in Port Sudan, disrupting air traffic. The fire lasted for five days before it was extinguished. The militia also targeted the city of Kosti in White Nile State with four strategic drones, destroying agricultural fuel depots. The militia also targeted the city of Atbara in River Nile State with four strategic drone missiles, burning the city’s transformer station and the Saydon oil derivatives warehouse. The militia also targeted the civilian prison in El Obeid in North Kordofan State, killing 21 inmates and wounding more than 50 others. In early May, the militia targeted the Kalma camp for internally displaced persons in South Darfur State, killing 26 civilians and kidnapping 130 others. In April, the militia targeted the Abu Shouk camp with 120mm cannons, killing hundreds of displaced people and forcing them into a new wave of displacement.
-Electronic Jamming:
– The Sudanese Armed Forces attacked a UAE military aircraft at Nyala Airport on May 3, killing several foreigners, including a Kenyan pilot. This prompted the UAE to launch retaliatory attacks targeting Port Sudan and strategic infrastructure on May 4, when the UAE military base launched an armed drone that attacked Port Sudan Airport.
1-A day later, Port Sudan witnessed the most violent strategic drone attacks, causing extensive damage to civilian, oil, and strategic facilities, as well as the Flamingo Naval Base. The attacks have continued since May 4 and continue until today.
2- Reports monitored in the days preceding the strategic drone attack on Port Sudan confirmed the occurrence of severe and sudden interference with marine navigation equipment and guidance systems, which led to confusion among ship crews and possibly exposing some to the risk of deviating from safe maritime routes. It is likely that the aforementioned interference resulted from the use of electronic jamming techniques coinciding with the launch of the attacks, or the intervention of an intelligence agency from a Red Sea state hostile to Sudan. These interference involved naval vessels or submarines. Therefore, we suspect that another state participated with the UAE in the electronic interference in preparation for the drone attacks. On the same day, several OPS agents have complained of occurrence of GPS spoofing operations, identifying hotspots in the Red Sea. Eight cruise missiles or drones were also detected launching across the Red Sea, targeting Sudan. These missiles penetrated and used international airspace and waters in the Red Sea for five hours, targeting Port Sudan Airport. The jamming operation we mentioned was intended to circumvent the violation of the terms of use of the aforementioned aircraft. It encompassed a wide circle over which the missile-carrying aircraft crossed, exposing naval vessels to systematic jamming targeting satellite navigation systems (GPS). The attacks escalated significantly from late April 2024 to early May, the period during which Port Sudan was attacked specifically on May 6. Accordingly, the attack plan included jamming to prevent detection devices from identifying the source, target, and launch location. This is what Port Sudan has experienced since May 4, and modern technology and satellite devices can detect such incidents.
(4) Launching Point of the Suicide Drones
– The drone likely arrived from a site housing an UAE military base, which launched the attack at the request of the Rapid Support Forces militia. The attack was coordinated with justifications from UAE intelligence related to the Sudanese Armed Forces’ attack on Nyala Airport on May 3, aimed at undermining the UAE’s regional interventions. Available information indicates that several countries are seeking exceptional explanations and justifications to identify those responsible for carrying out the attack and their motives. We would like to clarify the following facts:
1/ These attacks, coordinated by the UAE with external circles, the Rapid Support Forces militia, the intelligence service of a country allied with the UAE, and its political arms abroad, contravene international law and the Charter of the United Nations, which stipulates in Article (2), Paragraph (4) that all Member States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

(5) The Plan to Assassinate the President
Under the shadow of the failure of the UAE’s armed invasion campaign, it resorted to the assassination scenario to plunge the country into a dark tunnel. The goal was to redraw the map of Sudan, dismantle the armed forces, and displace its population. However, “they were prevented from achieving their desires.”
– The UAE drone strike on Port Sudan on its second day, May 6, not only targeted the destruction of oil depots, but also launched a high-precision missile at President Burhan’s headquarters near the Coral (Marina) Hotel, causing significant damage. The assassination of the head of the Transitional Sovereign Council, for the third time since the war, is still active. He escaped assassination on April 15, 2023, after his headquarters was attacked with dozens of armored vehicles, resulting in the deaths of 35 members of the Presidential Guard. He was then targeted on July 31, 2024, when he was attacked by a drone during a graduation ceremony at the Jebeit military base in Red Sea State.
(6) Strategic Threats
– Another hypothesis is that the UAE launched long-range MQ-9B or MQ-9 drones to strike Port Sudan from a military base housing ships for logistical operations, or perhaps the Al Dhafra base, located 2,050 km from Port Sudan.
– Some suicide drones were modified to increase fuel capacity by adding an additional fuel tank and an anti-jamming device to extend their flight range. Therefore, drones of this type provide a qualitative and aggressive footprint to support the war effort and military operations aimed at destroying the Sudanese state’s capabilities and diminishing the military victories achieved by the armed forces in confronting this destructive project.
There is evidence that the UAE continues to support the Rapid Support Forces militia, its mercenaries, and its ally and civilian political arm abroad. This was preceded by sabotaging Sudan’s relations with countries in the Horn of Africa and other neighboring countries. One hypothesis is that the attacks were caused by the use of Hunter 2 suicide drones launched from international waters southwest of the Red Sea, in conjunction with an UAE warship, an armored cruiser. These armed drones were designed to carry explosives that detonate upon reaching their target location. Some of the suicide drones came from west of Port Sudan after the radar of the air traffic interception system over northwest Port Sudan, near the city of Abu Hamad, on its eastern border, detected the drones in the possession of the Rapid Support Forces militia. Sudanese intelligence detected the presence of UAE experts at Umm Jaras and Abeche airports, accompanied by drones capable of flying long distances similar to the distance between these Chadian cities and the areas of northern Sudan recently targeted by drones. The movements of the UAE experts and the arrival of drone shipments via N’Djamena Airport were monitored several times, and they were later installed in militia locations and at Umm Jaras and Abeche airports over the previous two months. At that time, satellite images showed the presence of at least three drones at Nyala Airport, in addition to the construction of aircraft hangars at the airport, indicating the strengthening of air capabilities. Some of these drones targeted a power plant and a shelter for displaced persons in Northern and River Nile states.
(1) The militia obtained three long-range drones, with a round-trip range of 2,000–2,400 km, carrying four missiles weighing 16 kg.
(2) It obtained five drones with a range of 800 km, which are being stored in hangars at Nyala Airport, where the militia worked to establish dirt airstrips and supply platforms in several areas in Darfur and North Kordofan states.
(3) It obtained drones purchased by the UAE for its military sites under Haftar’s control in Libya, which are being transported via Chad and from there to Nyala in South Darfur State.
(4) The militia possesses six drones with a range of 250 km, along with two ground control units in Nyala.
(5) The militia is equipped with eight drones with an actual range of 820 km, along with ground communication stations in Nyala and Ed Dhaein. Eight drones with a range of 250 km, along with their ground stations, are located in Geneina, Nyala, and Ed Dhaein. There are drones, the actual number of which has not been determined, with a range of 1,000 km, located in the Abeche area.
(6) Among the technical specifications of these drones, which target infrastructure and kill civilians, are strategic drones that operate with or without satellite communications for 6–12 continuous hours. There are other strategic drones at Umm Jaras Airport with a range of 4,000 km and a flight capacity of 20 hours. There are also two strategic drones at the N’Djamena base with a flight range of up to 4,000 km.
Sudanese military intelligence confirms that the militia currently possesses thousands of drones, as follows:
– The militia has acquired 400 drones with a range of 1,000 km, approximately 550 drones with a range of 500 km, 6,000 portable multi-capacity drones with a range of 20 km, and drones with a range of 15 km carrying an unlimited number of RPG warheads. The militia possesses 80 jamming systems that engage targets from a distance of 8-10 km, and approximately 350 jamming rifles that engage targets from a distance of 3-4 km. This is in addition to a Pechora air defense system currently in Nyala that can detect targets from a range of 70 km.
Types of Strategic Drones
– The Rapid Support Forces militia uses three types of drones:
1. The first type, obtained by the UAE, has a range of 4,000 and is valued at between one and two million dollars. It carries missiles and laser-guided bombs, which the UAE transferred to the Rapid Support Forces.
2. The second type: A humanitarian Research laboratory confirmed in a report issued on April 25, 2025, that three of these drones were seen at Nyala Airport between December 2024 and January 2025. They have a range of up to 2,500 km and can carry laser-guided bombs and anti-radiation missiles.
3. The third type is a quad copter drone, and their country of origin has not yet been identified. They are used for monitoring purposes.
It is worth noting that Amnesty International accused the UAE in a recently published report of supplying weapons to the Rapid Support Forces militia.

(7) The Role of Neighboring Countries in Bringing in Drones and Fighters
Information and intelligence monitoring proved that on April 26, 2025, nine containers of gasoline and diesel fuel moved from a neighboring country to the city of El Dhaein, accompanied by 12 large Scania vehicles carrying 2,000 silenced drones and a quantity of drone ammunition. The shipment, weapons, and drones were transported immediately upon arrival in Land Cruisers to El Dhaein.
– Weapon shipments arrived via a neighboring African country, destined for the militia. The first arrived on April 21, 2025, via a cargo plane from Sharjah (UAE). It was transported to North Darfur via Chad and then Nyala. It contained 500 drones, as the Rapid Support Forces militia requested that the Quad copter drones be replaced with more advanced models.
– There is a second shipment of a defense system. Anti-aircraft missiles were transported in 15 trucks on April 20, 2025, supplying the Rapid Support Forces with large quantities of drones, including long-range ones.
– UAE aircraft were observed landing at Nyala Airport carrying shipments of long-range drones between January 17 and 19, 2025. The drones were stored at University in Nyala and in a house in the city’s industrial district. They were fortified with jamming devices and radars at Nyala Airport to protect them from airstrikes.
Saleh Zabadi, the former commander-in-chief of the Central African Army and a leader of the Seleka opposition movement, who collaborated with the Chadian government in the Sido region on the border with the Central African Republic, was killed in the battle of Al-Khuwai on May 14. He joined the Rapid Support Forces’ war effort from the beginning of the war of aggression and participated in the Khartoum War.
The Threat of Multi-Targeted Aggression:
In summary, Sudan is facing well-planned UAE airstrikes that exceed the capabilities of the Rapid Support Forces militia. Some drones have been launched across the Red Sea, posing a threat to the safety of international maritime navigation.
– This treacherous attack and the UAE’s continued supply of weapons and drones to the terrorist militia, which has committed war crimes and genocide, constitute a violation of Protocol I and II of the Geneva Conventions, specifically Article (56) and Article (14), which prohibit targeting vital infrastructure essential to the survival of the civilian population. This is a criminal act that constitutes a war crime aimed at disrupting the lives of civilians, terrorizing them, and halting the functioning of the state, in accordance with Article (13) of Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions.
This violation also falls within the scope of acts of aggression, which constitute the use of armed force against Sudan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence. This direct aggression constitutes a flagrant violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and Security Council Resolution 2024/2736. It also violates the 1977 Organization of African Unity Convention for the Eradication of Mercenarism in Africa and the 1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. It also violates treaties, agreements, and protocols related to counter-terrorism.
– The aforementioned aggression, with its multiple objectives and stages, undermines international peace and security and threatens Sudanese national security, regional security, and the security of the Red Sea. It exacerbates the war of aggression for which the UAE has recruited and continues to recruit mercenaries and has amassed various types of advanced weapons that are killing our people, exacerbating displacement and displacing families, disrupting the flow of life, obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid, and preventing the return of refugees who have begun to return to the capital and other cities liberated by the armed forces.
(8) Severing Diplomatic Relations with the UAE
Following this ongoing UAE aggression, the Sudanese government decided on Tuesday, May 6, 2025, the following:
1. Declare the UAE an aggressor state.
2. Sever diplomatic relations with it.
3. Withdraw the Sudanese embassy accredited to the UAE.
The Security Council’s failure to take action regarding its primary responsibility under the Charter encourages the rogue UAE to commit further attacks against the people of Sudan and their sovereignty. This is encouraged by the International Court of Justice’s decision that it lacks legal jurisdiction to hear Sudan’s complaint. The UAE considered this decision to be an acquittal of the charges contained in the complaint, knowing that the court did not fail to do so, but rather affirmed the responsibility of states that have ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, taking into account their responsibilities under the Convention.
In an escalating move, the UAE authorities expelled nine members of the Sudanese consulate staff in Dubai, and they were detained for hours for interrogation as they left the UAE, a clear violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(9) In conclusion
We call on the Council to take the following steps:
– Send a clear message in its conclusions condemning the suicide drone attacks, which destroy infrastructure, exacerbate the war, and increase the level of escalation. We call on the Council to unify efforts to restore peace through preventive diplomacy, mediation, and national ownership by the Sudanese people. We for naming the Rapid Support Forces militia a brutal terrorist group. Sudan will continue to cooperate with the United Nations, the Secretary-General, and his Special Envoy in exploring a path to peacemaking, while remaining firmly determined to defeat the Rapid Support Forces militia.
– Demand that the UAE cease its support for the terrorist Rapid Support Forces militia’s military force and its sponsorship of mercenaries, cease its funding, media, propaganda, diplomatic, and logistical support, and cease direct and indirect interference in Sudan’s internal affairs. The African Union has reiterated its categorical rejection of any state’s interference in Sudan’s internal affairs, including foreign intervention planned by the militia by various means.
– We call on the Council to use the powers granted by the Charter under Articles (41) and (42) to curb the blatant UAE aggression against Sudan.
– Designate the UAE-sponsored Rapid Support Militia as a terrorist group and disarm it. The Council’s hesitation in doing so will escalate the war to new levels.
– Designate the UAE as a rogue state that sponsors terrorism, violates the Charter and international law, and recruits mercenaries to undermine Sudan’s sovereignty.
– Sudan calls on the Security Council to assume its responsibilities, condemn the United Arab Emirates, and urge it to halt its heinous aggression and immediately cease its support for the terrorist Rapid Support Militia and mercenaries.

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