Depoliticising Sudan’s Food Security Debate

By: Dr Mohamed Elmunir Ahmed Safieldin

I recently wrote in both Arabic and English about the risk of a widening grain deficit in Sudan during the 2026/27 season unless timely preventive measures are taken. The purpose was not to declare that the whole country is facing famine, nor to assign political blame. It was to raise an early-warning flag based on available agricultural data and straightforward calculations of production, consumption and potential shortfalls.

Unfortunately, the broader discussion of food insecurity in Sudan is increasingly caught in political crossfire. Opposition figures and other commentators have spoken extensively about famine, while European diplomats have highlighted the ongoing war and the need for a humanitarian ceasefire to facilitate relief. On the other side, Sudanese authorities have challenged claims that famine characterises the situation in Sudan.

Food security is too important to become another battlefield in Sudan’s political conflict. The debate should distinguish between what is known, what remains uncertain, and what Sudan should do now to prevent a serious food-security risk from becoming a deeper humanitarian crisis.

The evidence already justifies concern. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization’s 2025 Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission, Sudan produced approximately 4.046 million tonnes of sorghum and 768,000 tonnes of millet, while wheat production for harvest in March 2026 was forecast at about 433,500 tonnes. Combined production of the three cereals was approximately 5.2 million tonnes, 22 percent below the previous year.[1]

Conditions during the 2026 agricultural season raise further concerns. FAO reported in September that rainfall was below average across most cropping areas. In Sennar and Gedaref, which together normally account for about a quarter of national sorghum production, rainfall was approximately 20 and 30 percent below the long-term average, respectively.[2]

The climatic warning subsequently became more serious. Reuters reported on 23 October, citing US Geological Survey data, that rainfall in Sudan during July-September 2026 was the lowest nationwide in more than three decades. In North Darfur it was the lowest since 1984, in North Kordofan since 1990, and in Gedaref since 1991.[3]

These are serious warning signals, but they are not a national production estimate. Reliable final figures for the 2026 harvest are still awaited. That distinction matters.

Rather than presenting uncertain figures as forecasts, Sudan should plan against plausible scenarios. Using 2025 as the last available national production benchmark, an indicative cereal balance shows the scale of the potential challenge. If 2026 sorghum and millet production proves 20 percent below the 2025 baseline, while wheat production reaches one million tonnes (i.e. more than double the March 2026 harvest forecast of 433,500 tonnes), the gap for the three cereals could be around 3.08 million tonnes. If sorghum and millet fall by 30 percent, the gap could approach 3.56 million tonnes.[4]

These are risk scenarios, not forecasts. They do not predict agricultural production in 2027. Rather, they illustrate the cereal-balance problem Sudan could face entering 2027 if the adverse conditions of 2026 translate into substantial production losses.

The economic implications could also be considerable. Using indicative international grain prices and allowing 15 percent for freight, insurance and handling, covering such gaps through imports could cost approximately $1.35 billion under the first scenario and $1.58 billion under the second.[4] Actual costs would depend on international prices, sources of supply and contracting and transport conditions.

This is where the food-security debate needs to move beyond arguments over terminology and political adversary. A national cereal deficit cannot be addressed simply by declaring or disputing its existence or naming. It requires grain, financing, functioning markets, transport, foreign exchange and household purchasing power.

Humanitarian access is essential, but access without adequate financing is insufficient. According to OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service, Sudan’s 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan required $2.87 billion but, as of 8 November, had received approximately $1.40 billion. It was only 48.7 percent funded, leaving about $1.47 billion unmet.[5]

The appropriate response is preparedness, not political argument. Sudan should maximise winter wheat production, support farmers ahead of the next sorghum and millet season, prepare contingency import arrangements, strengthen strategically located grain reserves, and continuously update the national cereal balance as harvest information becomes available. Government, humanitarian organisations and the private sector should work from a common technical assessment of production, imports, stocks and humanitarian supplies.

Above all, uncertainty should encourage action rather than complacency. If the 2026 harvest proves better than feared, little will have been lost by preparing. If production losses prove severe, early action could save lives, preserve scarce foreign exchange and reduce the eventual cost of intervention.

Neither invoking famine for political advantage nor dismissing legitimate early-warning signals will put food on anyone’s table. Sudan needs a food-security debate based on credible data, transparent assumptions and practical preparedness.

Depoliticising food security does not mean minimising the danger. It means taking the danger seriously enough to distinguish evidence from projection and to act before a preventable food-security risk becomes a humanitarian crisis.

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Sources and methodological notes

[1] Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Special Report: 2025 FAO Annual Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Republic of the Sudan, March 2026. FAO estimated production of the three principal cereals at about 5.2 million tonnes, 22 percent below the previous year.

[2] FAO, GIEWS Country Brief: Sudan, 24 September 2026.

[3] Reuters, New famine risk haunts war-torn Sudan with El Niño-driven drought, 23 October 2026, citing US Geological Survey rainfall data.

[4] Author’s scenario analysis based on FAO cereal-balance data. The calculation uses a planning population of 49 million and aggregate annual requirements of approximately 7.93 million tonnes of sorghum, millet and wheat. The two scenarios assume 20 and 30 percent reductions in sorghum and millet production from the 2025 baseline and wheat production of one million tonnes. Indicative import costs use reference prices of $374/tonne for sorghum, $666 for millet and $347 for wheat, plus a 15 percent planning allowance for freight, insurance and handling. The resulting figures are analytical scenarios, not production, price or procurement forecasts.

[5] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Financial Tracking Service, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, funding position as of 8 November 2026.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=20327