Power Struggles within International Institutions and Influential States Involved in Sudan

Mahmoud Hussein Sirri
Recent months have witnessed intense struggles within international and regional institutions, as well as among the major and influential states involved in the Sudan file. The period has been marked by repeated disputes and clear internal divisions reflecting the broader lack of consensus over Sudan.
Although regional and international media frequently report positions, statements, and decisions that some interpret as positive developments in the Sudanese crisis—signalling an improvement in Sudan’s international relations and a greater willingness to engage with the realities of the war—such developments are often quickly followed by actions, reversals, and sharp, inexplicable setbacks that return international positions to a point below zero.
This article will examine several examples and attempt to understand these pronounced fluctuations in international attitudes towards Sudan.
In recent weeks, for example, the European Parliament adopted a formal resolution on 9 July 2026 calling on the European Union to designate Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a terrorist organisation and, for the first time, to impose sanctions on Emirati entities accused of facilitating arms supplies to the group.
The resolution was approved by an overwhelming majority of 476 votes in favour, 28 against, and 96 abstentions. Among its most important provisions was a call for the EU’s executive institutions, including the Council of the European Union, formally to place the RSF on the Union’s terrorist lists.
The European Parliament based its decision on atrocities and grave violations committed against civilians, particularly what it described as the recent siege and systematic bombardment of El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan State.
The proposed designation is intended to freeze the RSF’s assets throughout Europe and criminalise all financial or logistical support provided to it.
During the same session, the European Parliament also called for the United Arab Emirates to be named explicitly and for sanctions to be imposed on Emirati companies. The direct reference to the UAE marked a striking diplomatic shift in the European position. The Parliament named the UAE in an official document and called upon it, together with all other states, immediately to cease financing or arming the RSF.
The resolution further called for sanctions against individuals and external entities facilitating violations of the arms embargo. It specifically named an Abu Dhabi-based security company, the Global Security Services Group (GSSG), accusing it of breaching the United Nations arms embargo on Darfur.
Legally, European Parliament resolutions constitute strong political recommendations but are not binding on the EU’s 27 member states. To take effect, such measures must be adopted by the Council of the European Union, following approval by the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the EU Foreign Affairs Council. Achieving this, the author argues, would require pressure from Sudanese popular, official, and regional sources.
Despite this apparent progress in what the author regards as Europe’s previously weak and hesitant approach towards Sudan, a major reversal took place less than a week later. European forces opposed to any improvement in relations with Sudan succeeded in securing an EU announcement of a comprehensive ban on importing, purchasing, or transporting gold of Sudanese origin, together with a prohibition on exporting mining chemicals such as mercury and cyanide to Sudan.
This sectoral decision, issued by the Council of the European Union—the Union’s highest decision-making body—was presented as an effort to cut off sources of funding for the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF and to target what is commonly described as the “war economy”.
The European position prohibits the import, purchase, or transportation of Sudanese gold within EU member states, even when the trade is conducted through intermediary countries or third parties. It also bans the sale or export of cyanide and mercury used in gold extraction and refining.
Under the decision, European companies and institutions are prohibited from providing technical assistance, brokerage services, or financial or logistical support connected to these activities.
The contradictions, disparities, and inconsistencies in the European position continue.
In mid-June 2026, ambassadors from EU member states made their first joint visit to the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, and to El Fasher since the outbreak of war in April 2023. During the visit, the EU announced the opening of a new chapter in Sudanese-European dialogue.
The delegation, led by the EU Ambassador to Sudan, Wolfram Vetter, aimed to facilitate the first meeting since the start of the war between EU ambassadors accredited to Sudan and the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, along with several senior officials.
The visit also enabled European diplomats to assess conditions on the ground and examine the wider humanitarian situation. The delegation called for the protection of civilians, the opening of safe corridors, and unhindered access for humanitarian assistance.
Although this visit appeared to mark a new starting point, the office of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, Ambassador Annette Weber, was, according to the author, pursuing an agenda that undermined this progress.
Through her office’s leadership and funding of the five-party mechanism, the EU envoy is accused of seeking to derail Sudanese dialogue within Sudan, deny Sudanese ownership of that dialogue, impose external agendas, and interfere in shaping the country’s future. This, the author argues, weakens the principle of a “Sudanese-owned solution” and deprives Sudanese people of their right to determine their own destiny.
The European envoy is further accused of concealing her agenda within the Arab League, the African Union, and the United Nations—all members of the five-party mechanism—and of coordinating with certain Sudanese civilian political forces participating in the dialogue.
According to the author, these actors seek to control the selection of participants in the Sudanese dialogue by excluding influential political forces, including other controversial groups, and adopting positions that favour particular political parties at the expense of others.
The activities of the EU envoy for the Horn of Africa have, in the author’s view, created conflicting visions and interests among the organisations that constitute the five-party mechanism, thereby complicating rather than unifying the paths towards a solution.
From European contradictions, the analysis moves to inconsistencies in the American position.
While some official circles in the United States have accused factions such as the RSF of committing genocide, other centres of influence pursue contradictory positions. Congress, the US envoy, the Secretary of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House each appear to speak in a different voice.
The United States has failed, the author argues, to restrain strategic allies such as the United Arab Emirates, which has been accused of supplying weapons to the RSF in exchange for gold, as well as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which have supported the Sudanese Armed Forces.
Washington’s geopolitical responses to international crises have also differed markedly. When American officials are asked why they condemn the flow of weapons into Sudan while simultaneously supplying arms to Israel, they maintain that the two situations are fundamentally different: one is described as a “civil war” and the other as “self-defence”.
The imposition of sanctions on Sudan provides another clear example of conflict among American centres of power.
While the United States has formally declared that the continuing violence constitutes war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, journalistic and international investigations have also alleged that American contractors and companies are providing logistical services and supply chains to the RSF.
The fluctuation in US policy towards Sudan—between managing and containing the crisis without formulating a decisive vision to end the war that began in April 2023—can only be described, in the author’s view, as evident confusion.
This confusion stems from competing interests and an attempt to balance humanitarian pressure against geopolitical calculations in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region.
The struggle among American centres of influence extends to successive peace initiatives and contradictory public statements.
The lack of direct coordination was reflected when the US Senior Adviser for African Affairs, Massad Boulos, announced that the Sudanese government had accepted an American plan shortly after reports circulated that it had rejected the proposal within the Security Council. Washington subsequently denied that any final agreement had been reached and stated that negotiations were continuing.
The five-point plan and proposed truce advanced by Washington as a new peace initiative include a 90-day humanitarian ceasefire followed by a civilian political process. The author views this as little more than an acknowledgement of the Quad mechanism’s failure to reach a political solution to the war.
The American plan has stalled because Washington proposed only partial RSF withdrawals from selected areas, including parts of North Darfur and Kordofan. The Sudanese government rejected this approach, insisting on a complete and comprehensive withdrawal from all cities before any political process could begin.
American contradictions also extend to lawmakers in Congress.
The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Sudan Peace Act of 2026, which directs American representatives at international financial institutions, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to oppose loans or debt relief for the Sudanese government.
The author argues that this measure obstructs recovery efforts and represents a severe instrument of pressure.
At the same time, Washington has diplomatically escalated allegations that the Sudanese Armed Forces used chemical weapons, in what the author describes as a campaign financed by the United Arab Emirates and the Civil Democratic Alliance of Revolutionary Forces known as Sumoud.
According to the author, reopening the chemical-weapons issue at this stage is intended to generate a second round of related sanctions, place Sudan under international inspection, and pressure the Sudanese state and its institutions into negotiating with the RSF.
The Sudanese government, he argues, should recognise this as an attempt by hard-line forces in the United States and centres of power hostile to Sudan to isolate the country internationally and bypass national investigative mechanisms.
Elsewhere, American centres of influence continue to promote equivalence between Sudan’s national army and the RSF in the language of sanctions and condemnations.
A further contradiction appears in the humanitarian sphere. Although United Nations agencies have repeatedly warned of worsening famine, humanitarian catastrophe, and conflict threatening millions of lives in Darfur and Kordofan, previous American cuts to humanitarian and international relief funding have reduced the capacity of local, international, and UN organisations.
This has created a vast funding gap that increases civilian suffering and contradicts the humanitarian principles proclaimed in diplomatic statements.
Further examples of internal conflict among regional and international powers can be found even in countries regarded as friendly towards Sudan, such as Saudi Arabia.
Within the Saudi government, one current adopts a balanced view that understands Sudan’s importance and the need to safeguard its national security and the stability of the Red Sea. Yet Saudi policy fluctuates between supporting legitimate institutions, including the Sudanese Armed Forces, and attempting to contain the RSF and its regional allies in order to prevent the spread of disorder.
Riyadh treats the Sudanese Armed Forces, led by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, as the legitimate representative of the state and repeatedly affirms Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
However, Saudi concerns about the future of Islamist forces and their present role in the war have allowed some circles in Riyadh to engage pragmatically with the RSF, recognise it as a de facto force, and argue that actors controlling territory must be dealt with.
Saudi Arabia has previously hosted RSF leaders as part of its mediation efforts, angering some supporters of the Sudanese Armed Forces, who regarded this as placing “the state and the rebellion” on an equal footing.
This policy of dual pressure is sometimes interpreted as a contradiction in positions, statements, and approaches. On the one hand, Riyadh pressures the Sudanese military to negotiate with the RSF; on the other, it condemns violations committed by the RSF against civilians.
The League of Arab States’ position provides another example of inconsistency.
The Arab League’s approach towards Sudan reveals a gap between its official rhetoric supporting Sudanese sovereignty, territorial integrity, government, army, and institutions, and the weakness of its practical intervention to end the conflict.
The author also criticises what he describes as the League’s suspicious silence within the five-party mechanism, which he accuses of attempting to obstruct the government-led Sudanese dialogue.
These positions are further complicated by divergent interests among member states and by the United Arab Emirates’ role within the League. According to the author, the UAE supports parties involved in the conflict, leaving the organisation unable to take decisive action.
Internal confusion and conflict have prevented the Arab League from leading an independent and successful mediation effort to end the war. Instead, it has joined five-party mechanisms that include international and African actors such as the United Nations and the African Union.
The foregoing, the author argues, should make clear to the Sudanese government and to national and civilian political forces that conflict within regional and international centres of power does not serve Sudan’s interests.
The competing “stick” and “carrot” factions within every organisation and state will not end the war. Rather, they will prolong it and intensify its consequences.
Sudanese decision-makers must therefore identify the individuals and groups sympathetic to Sudan within each organisation and state, strengthen those camps, and support the actors attempting to help Sudan end the war on sound and appropriate terms.
The government and Sudanese political forces should deepen dialogue with centres of influence within international organisations that seek to condemn the RSF and halt its international financing.
At the same time, they should contain and restrict hostile centres of power, resist their negative interventions, and expose their activities through social media and articles in the international press.
Direct meetings with decision-makers, legislators, and government officials in influential countries are essential. Sudanese representatives should present reports and arguments supporting the state’s position, maintain media campaigns to shape public opinion through traditional and social media, and continue demonstrations in support of the Sudanese Armed Forces in major world capitals.
The Sudanese government, state institutions, political parties, and supportive political, civilian, social, cultural, and intellectual forces are required, more than ever, to organise themselves against political actors hostile to Sudan’s interests within the international organisations and influential states involved in the conflict.
There must be sustained efforts to protect the gains achieved so far and to encourage decision-makers in regional and international institutions to adopt measures that serve Sudan’s unity, territorial integrity, stability, and peace.

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