Analytical Paper Two: Proxy Wars — From Managing Conflict to Managing Influence

Hisham Yousif Abdelrahman
If transformations like war have redefined the actors and instruments of combat, they have equally reshaped how major powers manage international conflicts. In many cases, modern warfare no longer takes the form of direct confrontation between regular armies. Instead, it operates through more complex systems in which roles are distributed among international powers, regional actors, local proxies, and networks of support, financing, and logistical assistance that function with varying degrees of openness and secrecy.
This transformation is not merely a change in methods. It reflects a change in the very concept of power. As the political, economic and military costs of direct intervention increase, indirect instruments become more important, and strategic objectives can increasingly be achieved by managing the environment of a conflict rather than the battle itself.
This approach has its roots in the realist school of international relations, which views the international system as an arena of continuous competition among states, governed more by considerations of power and interest than by ethical principles.
John Mearsheimer is one of the leading theorists of offensive realism. He argues that major powers act according to the logic of maximising power and influence because, in the absence of a higher authority, the international system offers states no permanent guarantees of security. Foreign-policy instruments are therefore selected according to their capacity to advance strategic interests and preserve the balance of power, rather than based on rhetoric or moral considerations alone.
From this perspective, proxy warfare is not a departure from the logic of international relations, but an expression of it. If the same objectives can be achieved through other parties, direct intervention becomes less attractive, particularly when its costs are high or its outcomes uncertain.
Stephen Walt adds a more nuanced dimension through his theory of the balance of threat, which distinguishes between power and threat. States do not reorganise their alliances merely because a stronger power exists; they do so when their perception of the threat facing them changes. Alliances, methods of intervention and even the form of support provided in conflicts therefore remain subject to continuous reassessment as circumstances on the ground evolve.
This idea is particularly important in protracted conflicts. Repositioning does not necessarily imply a change in objectives; it may instead indicate a change in the means through which those objectives are pursued. A shift in instruments may reflect a reassessment of costs and risks rather than a revision of strategic intentions.
From a different perspective, Edward Luttwak offers an explanation based on what he calls the paradoxical logic of strategy. The greatest use of force does not always produce the best results; what matters is the most efficient use of force.
This logic may lead states to avoid direct military intervention when other instruments are more capable of producing the desired effect, whether through economic pressure, logistical support, intelligence operations, alliance management, or the coordinated use of diplomatic and media tools.
This argument reaches its fullest expression in the work of Andrew Mumford, who contends that proxy wars are no longer merely one means of managing conflict, but have become a structural feature of the contemporary international system.
In many cases, major powers do not abandon their objectives. Instead, they redistribute responsibility for implementing them, allowing other parties to bear most of the costs on the ground. At the same time, the principal decision-making centre retains considerable political and diplomatic freedom of manoeuvre.
In this context, the concept of proxy warfare is not confined to military support. It encompasses an integrated system of financing, training, logistical assistance, intelligence sharing, political backing, and media narrative management. The proxy thereby becomes part of a broader strategic network rather than simply a force fighting on behalf of another actor.
From a geopolitical perspective, Henry Kissinger explains that the international system is not founded on idealism but on the management of the balance of power. Major powers, therefore, do not always seek decisive victory; they often seek to prevent the balance from shifting in ways that harm their interests.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, meanwhile, views regions of geopolitical importance as arenas where competition among major powers intersects, making the management of influence within them part of the broader management of the international balance.
Joseph Nye adds another dimension with the concept of smart power, which integrates hard and soft power. Influence in modern conflicts is achieved not only through weapons but also through the ability to shape perceptions, gain legitimacy, direct political and media narratives, influence public opinion, and use economic and diplomatic instruments in a coordinated manner.
When these contributions are considered together, it becomes clear that influence in the twenty-first century is no longer determined by the number of troops deployed on the ground. It increasingly depends on the ability to manage a complex network of relationships, alliances, resources and instruments, enabling influence to be exercised with the least possible degree of direct involvement.
In this context, Barry Buzan offers an especially important concept: securitisation. It explains how a local issue can move from the realm of domestic politics into the sphere of regional or international security.
When an internal conflict is redefined as a threat extending beyond the borders of the state, the range of actors involved expands, the instruments of intervention multiply, and the conflict becomes part of a wider security system in which geopolitical considerations intersect with calculations of collective security.
In light of this body of literature, proxy wars appear not merely as a tactical option, but as one of the principal instruments developed within the contemporary international system for managing protracted conflicts.
Yet, however sophisticated these instruments may be, they do not by themselves explain why wars continue. They explain how conflict is managed, but they do not answer a deeper question:
Why do some wars persist even when the prospects of military victory recede?
The answer leads to the next stage in the theoretical construction of this analytical framework: the concept of the war economy, developed in the work of Paul Collier and David Keen.
Under this concept, war is no longer merely a means of achieving political objectives. In some cases, it becomes an economic system that reproduces itself, develops interests of its own, creates beneficiaries, and acquires mechanisms that sustain its continuation.
To be continued…

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