The Grand Losing Deal: The Sudan’s Case (5-7)

Pre-War Arrangements

Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

For the “deal” to be executed with atmost precision, Hemedti followed these three tactical steps: media statements, constitutional arrangements, and military-field preparations. As for the media statements—the easiest step—only a few months after the deal was struck, Hemedti began making the agreed-upon declarations. He unexpectedly announced his handover of power to civilians. Although he did not relinquish his position as “Deputy” who orchestrated the coup, the Forces of Freedom and Change—Central Council (Saturday, July 23, 2022)—were quick to praise this prearranged declaration. They said in a statement that Hemedti’s announcement contained a positive acknowledgement of some of the demands of the mass movement, the most important being the need to fully transfer power to civilians and for the military to withdraw from politics completely.[1] Hemedti followed this statement with another[2], saying that the army had failed to correct the course and that Sudan was heading for worse. When asked if he was considering running for president, he said he had no political ambitions but added, “If we see Sudan collapsing, we will be present.” He wanted to reaffirm his new stance for the third time, and this time, he chose the state of Kordofan (where some of his tribal base is located) during his address at the Administrative Conference of the Western and Southern Kordofan States. During that meeting, he fully adopted the role of a president that was allotted to him during his meeting with the Group of Four. He emphatically asserted that he “would not allow” Sudan to revert to the pre-overthrow state of the ousted president’s regime, a reference to the (Islamic and tribal) forces supporting Khalifa Jad’s initiative. Some local newspapers did not miss this significant shift, with the headline in Sudan Tribune reading: “Hemedti makes provocative statements and criticizes the allowance of protesters to reach the palace while others are suppressed.”[3] It was clear from this that Hemedti was attempting to appeal to the youth of the revolution, who were protesting against the coup he had been a key pillar of, reiterating: “I am with the change, even the youth who insult me in the streets I am with them.” Though he did not directly attack General Burhan, he made negative remarks directed at General Kabashi, a member of the Sovereign Council and a key partner in the coup, against the backdrop of the tribal conflict between the Messiria and Nuba in the town of Lagawa, where the Rapid Support Forces were accused of siding with the Messiria.

However, statements alone were not sufficient; there had to be a suitable constitutional cover that would allow the Forces of Freedom and Change to revive what had become known as the “blood partnership.”[4] That is to say, they had to join forces with those whom they previously labelled as the “military-coup component,” thereby managing to re-establish their position in the political arena. Likewise, Hemedti needed a constitutional cover to transform from a conspiratorial coup leader into a noble democrat. This cover emerged, unexpectedly from an obscure corner, drawn up by a an obscure temporary committee of the Bar Association.

 The Bar Association and Its Constitutional Arrangements:

In order for these constitutional arrangement to gain a high publicity, they were presented in a grand, celebratory manner that might serve to to give them momentum while obscuring their source and content. According to some press reports, the Bar Association building in the Al-Amarat neighbourhood witnessed an unprecedented gathering under a huge tent. Notably, the gathering was attended by ambassadors from the Quartet (the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE), as well as ambassadors from Germany, Norway, Canada, Sweden, Spain, and others. The meeting was a workshop organized by the aforementioned temporary committee of the Bar Association to present a proposed draft constitution for the transitional period, which would abolish the basic constitutional document that had formed the foundation of the ruling coalition before the coup. The draft contains many provisions, but two stand out. First, it calls for the annulment of decisions issued before, during, or after 25 October 2021, including regional and international agreements (this is a direct reference to the Sudan-Russia agreement). The second notable aspect concerns the crime of the sit-in dispersal (June 2019) and the issue of immunities for holders of constitutional positions. The draft subtly addresses the sensitive and fundamental issue of the “dispersal of the sit-in at the army headquarters” by proposing the formation of a new national committee (surpassing the previous committee headed by lawyer Nabil Adib) tasked with investigating all crimes committed during the armed conflict in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. It also calls for reforming the national committee responsible for investigating the violations and crimes committed on 3 June 2019 (the crimes during the sit-in dispersal). Regarding immunities, the draft stipulates that no legal actions may be taken against high-ranking officials in constitutional or military positions regarding any legal violations committed before the signing of the transitional constitution. The draft constitution also made a significant amendment to the composition and powers of the Sovereign Council, making its presidency rotational and including among its tasks the authority to grant “comprehensive and conditional pardons and the dropping of penalties.” Thus, it was not surprising that General Hemedti was the first to warmly welcome this draft without reviewing its other provisions, as these provisions provided him and his forces with sufficient legal immunity. They also open the door for him to potentially become the head of the Sovereign Council (as the presidency would become rotational) and place him in a position where he can “grant pardons and drop penalties” if and when circumstances change and the sit-in case reaches the courts. The presence of the Quartet ambassadors at the event represents strong support for General Hemedti and a confirmation of the commitment to the deal previously made with him.[5]

On the other hand, the military component (Al-Burhan’s wing) found itself in a difficult position, as it could not openly oppose a document known to have the backing of the Quartet Mechanism. Therefore, it resorted to the approach of proposing “amendments.” Two amendments were submitted: one related to immunities and the other to the investigation procedures concerning the sit-in dispersal. Regarding the sit-in dispersal, they proposed that: “The leadership of the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) should commit to assisting and not objecting to or obstructing the following: expediting the completion of the investigation into the June 2019 sit-in dispersal, identifying those criminally responsible, forming a Transitional Justice Commission, and designing a comprehensive process involving the participation of the victims’ families to ensure truth-telling, justice for victims, comprehensive reconciliation, and institutional reform to prevent the recurrence of past crimes.” This clause was added by the armed forces, and obviously it would have posed no significant risk to them. Though on the other hand, it was really a heavy and bitter pill for General Hemedti and his partners in the Quartet to swallow. The other clause, which could potentially derail both the draft and the entire deal, was included in the second amendment proposed by the military component under the section on immunities. Instead of merely stating, as the draft did, that “no legal action may be taken against high-ranking officials in the constitutional or military positions regarding any legal violations committed before the signing of the transitional constitution,” the amendment added: “unless the action or omission constituting the violation involved a physical assault ordered directly by the top leadership, either individually or as a group.”[6] In other words, there would be no immunity for the top constitutional and military leadership if the investigation proved their involvement in the crime of the sit-in dispersal. These amendments were undoubtedly shocking to General Hemedti, as they undermined the commitment made to him by the Quartet Mechanism. This led to a complete discarding and shelfing aside both the lawyers’ draft and their committee.. It was later confirmed that the lawyers’ committee had been in fact dissolved and had no legal standing or genuine representation of Sudanese lawyers. Furthermore, it also emerged that the draft presented in their name was merely a translation of a document probably prepared by an American organization. [7]

[1] BBC Arabic, 24 July 2022

[2] BBC Arabic, 1 August 2022

[3] Sudan Tribune Newspaper (27 November 2022)):

[4] The Sudanese Communist Party withdrew from the Forces of Freedom and Change (the ruling coalition at the time) on 7 November 2020, considering the FFC’s partnership with the military to be a “blood partnership” that would not lead to achieving the demands of the Sudanese revolution. See Madar newspaper, 30 September 2021.

[5] Al Jazeera Net, 15 September 2022

[6]For further details about these amendments, see: Voice of Beirut International (SBI), 15 November 2022. www.sawtbeirut/world-news 2022

[7] This organization is known as the Public International Law & Policy Group, and its team includes members of the Forces of Freedom and Change. It provides its legal services to those who wish to do so. See their website: www.publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org