Wrestling and the Army

Rashid Abdel Rahim
The Minister of Defence, Lieutenant General Hassan Kabron, attended freestyle wrestling competitions in the Haj Yousif area and announced his support for the sport.
This visit took place on the very same day that rebel forces entered the city of Al-Kurmuk.
The city’s sudden fall was puzzling, and the public received no clear briefing or explanation.
General Kabron holds the position of Minister of Defence—the ministry responsible for overseeing the army within the government. Yet instead of addressing the most pressing issue, he turned to something of lesser importance that neither falls within his mandate nor his official duties. Rather, it is an activity closely associated with his community, which has long organised and developed wrestling competitions in Haj Yousif, even opening them to the world and attracting champions from Japan.
While the minister’s visit to Haj Yousif may be meaningful in its own right, the more critical issue lies elsewhere.
Public attention to the war has waned, and discourse around the liberation of the rest of Sudan has largely fallen silent.
Military operations have become limited to repelling attacks, rather than reclaiming territory and strategic positions.
The armed forces have conducted battles with strength, discipline, and professionalism, demonstrating courage and determination.
However, leadership of the popular resistance has changed across the country, and as a result, we no longer hear of mobilisation efforts or preparations to liberate territory.
The fall of Al-Kurmuk signals the opening of a new front in the war—one backed by a state and additional external support for the rebellion—while we appear distracted. The Minister of Defence attends wrestling events, while President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan builds his popularity through public iftar gatherings.
Warnings of threats from the eastern front had been clear, with information circulating widely. Yet the government did not act, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued its routine activities, showing no significant engagement with Ethiopia or the international community.
Some argue that this inertia and silence regarding the resolution of the war are the result of external interventions—interventions that squander opportunities for progress and may ultimately hand the country over to the rebellion and its allies, both foreign and domestic.
If the rebellion expands its areas of control, this will not be the end. There are those in Sudan who will not allow the country to surrender, nor will they allow its defeat, whether political or military.
What is happening today may open the door to renewed war—this time, more intense and more violent. However, it will not take place in Khartoum or Jebel Moya. The capabilities, privileges, and advantages once enjoyed by the Rapid Support Forces are now a thing of the past.
Any future resistance to rebellion—whether a continuation of the current conflict or a new uprising—will become a general national cause and a popular decision that will not wait for orders from any individual or authority. And the rebellion will not be able to reach Khartoum, seize the Presidential Palace, the Council of Ministers, or Friendship Hall.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=12348