U.S. Terrorism Designations and the War in Sudan: Why Were the Islamic Movement and Al-Bara Brigade Classified Now?

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud
The decision announced by the U.S. State Department to designate the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the Al-Bara bin Malik Brigade as terrorist entities was not merely a routine legal measure in the context of the Sudanese war. Rather, it represents a political and security development that warrants careful analysis beyond the surface of the decision to its broader background and context. In international practice, such decisions are rarely issued as purely technical steps; they usually emerge at the intersection of security concerns, political perspectives, and geopolitical calculations shaping how major powers view conflict zones.
In Sudan’s case specifically, the decision came at a highly sensitive regional moment, where the trajectory of the internal war intersects with broader transformations occurring in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. In recent years, this region has become one of the most important arenas of international competition due to its strategic position along global trade routes and the growing significance of its ports and maritime corridors in global security and economic calculations. In such volatile geopolitical environments, major powers are highly sensitive to armed formations operating outside the formal state framework, especially in countries experiencing prolonged conflicts.
From this perspective, one of the primary objectives behind the American decision can be understood as encouraging a restructuring of the military landscape in Sudan, ensuring that the national army becomes the sole institutional authority controlling organised force. Experiences across the world have shown that the proliferation of armed groups—even within the same camp—can, over time, weaken the state’s military structure and undermine its monopoly over weapons. This pattern has been clearly observed in the Sahel region, particularly in countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, where the spread of armed groups outside regular armies weakened the state and complicated the security landscape for years.
However, interpreting the decision purely from a security standpoint does not provide a complete picture. International designations of this type often carry political dimensions that extend beyond immediate military considerations. Global experience shows that legal and political tools are frequently used to reshape the political landscape in countries undergoing wars or major transformations. This occurred, for example, in Iraq after 2003, when the political sphere was entirely restructured following the dissolution of the Baath Party and the exclusion of its organisational structure from the new system. A similar process unfolded in Afghanistan after 2001, when a new political system was built while excluding the Taliban, which had previously held de facto power.
Within this framework, the decision can also be seen as part of a broader trend within some Western circles to reshape the political arena in Sudan in ways that reduce the influence of ideologically structured organisations—particularly those categorised in Western discourse under “political Islam.” For these circles, the issue is not solely the military structure but also the nature of the political actors expected to participate in the post-war phase.
The decision cannot be separated either from historical political legacies that continue to influence how certain Western capitals interpret developments in Sudan. In earlier periods, relations between Khartoum and several Western countries were marked by sharp tensions that led to long-term sanctions and Sudan’s inclusion on terrorism-related lists for years. Although Sudan’s internal reality has changed significantly since then, that political memory still shapes how some Western actors interpret developments involving Islamic movements in Sudan.
At the same time, the decision appears to carry a clear degree of politicisation, which often characterises such issues. Various interpretations and analyses surrounding it have sometimes gone beyond verified facts and entered the realm of political estimation rather than conclusive field evidence. Some analyses have even attempted to link these forces with regional actors, including claims about alleged training in Iran—claims that have not been supported by clear, documented evidence, making them closer to analytical exaggerations often accompanying such designation decisions in unstable environments.
Modern history provides well-known examples of how intelligence assessments underpinning major decisions may not always be fully accurate. The Iraq War in 2003—based on reports that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, later proven nonexistent—remains a well-known example of how intelligence analysis can sometimes be influenced by the political environment surrounding decision-making.
Nevertheless, the debate surrounding the decision should not obscure a fundamental reality: the current war has placed the Sudanese state before the challenge of rebuilding its military and political systems simultaneously. From early on, it was clear that the international environment had become less tolerant of armed formations operating outside regular armies, even if they fight alongside the state. From this angle, the scenario that led to this decision was not entirely unexpected.
In a previous article, I highlighted the importance of integrating supporting forces into the national army as a key step toward preventing the internationalisation of the Sudanese conflict. In this regard, the recent announcement by Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta, Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces, concerning the integration of supporting forces into the army carries clear strategic significance. It directly addresses one of the international community’s main concerns: the presence of multiple armed formations outside the institutional framework of the national military.
Had such steps been taken earlier and proactively, they might have reduced the likelihood of decisions of this kind—or at least minimised their political consequences. However, the present moment still offers Sudan an opportunity to reorganise its internal structures in ways that limit external actors’ ability to impose their own interpretations of the conflict.
The war Sudan is fighting today is fundamentally a state-versus-armed-rebellion conflict, not an open ideological confrontation. The more successfully the state reinforces this reality—by unifying its military structure and reorganising the political sphere on broad national foundations—the smaller the space becomes for premature or biased external interpretations.
This leads to the central point: it is not enough merely to reject or condemn the decision. What is required is understanding the context that produced it, closing the gaps that enabled it, and working to build a more cohesive national framework—one in which the state is the sole authority over arms. Politics becomes a legitimate arena for national competition rather than an additional burden on Sudan’s larger struggle to preserve its unity and survival.

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