The Sudanese Army Presses the Accelerator—While Hemedti “Loosens the Reins”

Adel Al-Rifaai Aboulhassan
In war, battles are not decided by speeches but by realities on the ground. The battlefield is the true measure of who holds the initiative, who dictates the course of events, and who sets the tempo of the conflict.
This is the significance of the Sudanese expression “abnas”, which refers to pressing the accelerator pedal to increase speed. Figuratively, it signifies raising the operational tempo, accelerating military activity, and maintaining sustained momentum towards achieving strategic objectives.
By contrast, “loosening the reins” is an expression used to denote releasing restraints and allowing freedom of movement. In Hemedti’s first address following the defeat of his forces in North Kordofan, he spoke of “loosening the reins” as a message to the militia and its foreign fighters, intended to demonstrate that they still retained the ability to take the initiative.
According to the author, however, events on the ground contradict that narrative.
From the outset of the conflict, the rebellion was never constrained in its use of force. Instead, it employed extensive and overwhelming violence, directing it not only against the Sudanese Armed Forces but also against civilians. The militia, the author argues, used lethal weapons and indiscriminate force against unarmed civilians without distinction between children and adults, women and men, or the healthy and the sick.
These accounts are not merely anecdotal, the author maintains, but have been documented by reports and testimony from various international, humanitarian, and human rights organisations. Those reports describe killings, intimidation, abuses, and the use of force in residential areas, while also documenting the widespread breakdown of public security and attempts to impose a new reality by force and undermine state institutions.
Against this backdrop, the rhetoric of “loosening the reins” takes on a different meaning.
It does not signify the beginning of the use of force, since force has been employed since the rebellion first began. Rather, the author interprets it as an attempt to project continued freedom of action, bolster the morale of the militia and its foreign fighters, and reassure their supporters that they remain capable of influencing events.
Meanwhile, the battlefield has undergone a significant shift as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have moved to regain the initiative and accelerate operations across several fronts.
The recapture of Umm Sayala and the surrounding areas along the strategic export road linking Omdurman and El Obeid represented an important operational development because this corridor had served as a critical axis for movement, supply, and observation.
Its significance lay not merely in its geographical position but also in its operational role. It functioned as an area for manoeuvre and reconnaissance, a base from which patrols and ambushes were launched, and a route through which supply and logistics lines passed. As such, it played a central role in the militia’s ability to manoeuvre and sustain its operations.
The recapture of these areas therefore represented more than a geographical advance. It fundamentally altered the dynamics of movement, because the loss of strategically important positions also meant losing the ability to observe, conduct reconnaissance, manoeuvre rapidly, and dictate the terms of battle.
Military science has long recognised that holding the initiative is one of the decisive factors in achieving superiority. The side that determines the timing and direction of operations compels its opponent to react rather than act.
This, the author argues, is the stage of “abnas” for the Sudanese Armed Forces: increasing the tempo of operations, intensifying movement across multiple fronts, and exploiting the current battlefield situation before the opposing force can regroup or regain its ability to manoeuvre.
The present phase is therefore about converting initiative into tangible results and transforming tactical advances into strategic gains. Victory depends not merely on controlling territory but on maintaining control of the battle’s tempo and preserving operational momentum.
In this context, the rhetoric of “loosening the reins” does not alter what the author regards as the fundamental reality: that military strength is measured by conditions on the battlefield, and that the side holding the initiative possesses the greater ability to shape the course of events.
Maintaining that initiative, the author contends, requires sustaining a high operational tempo across all fronts, capitalising on the setbacks suffered by the rebellion, and denying it any opportunity to reorganise its ranks or recover its freedom of movement and manoeuvre.
In warfare, preserving momentum is often decisive, because allowing an adversary time to regain its balance and rebuild its capabilities can recreate a prolonged war of attrition. Turning battlefield superiority into lasting strategic outcomes therefore constitutes the central challenge of the next phase.
The Sudanese Army’s “abnas”, in the author’s view, is not simply about moving faster. It symbolises possession of the initiative—and the side that holds the initiative is the one best placed to determine the course of events.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=16428