The Separatist Roots of the Rapid Support Forces’ Rebellion Israel and the Project to Partition Sudan

By: Al-Sadiq Al-Razigi

Following the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) capture of the city of El-Fasher, the capital of Darfur in western Sudan, at the end of last October, and after this vast region — the size of France — entered a dark tunnel and an uncertain future, separatist voices began to rise from within the ranks of the RSF rebels. Slogans calling for the entrenchment of a new reality were raised, particularly after the announcement of what is known as the “Tasis Government”, a parallel administration that enjoys no external recognition.
Sudanese actors representing diverse intellectual and political backgrounds fear that new fractures may emerge within Sudan’s territorial integrity, carving away another part of the country — a second separation following the secession of South Sudan in 2011.
The RSF has ridden swiftly upon the saddle of separatist calls. The dust of the chaotic scene has clouded its vision as it marches towards implementing a plan to divide Sudan. Despite its complete lack of any political programme, the militia appears like a lost parrot wandering in the forests of politics, repeating old separatist slogans and protest phrases that have circulated across Sudanese space since independence on 1 January 1956.
Ideas, tendencies and separatist rhetoric, as well as protest discourse, began surfacing in Darfur from the late 1950s onwards, shaped by the political activity of Darfuri students and university graduates at the time and into the early 1960s. This unfolded alongside the historical legacy of Darfur’s former independence, which ended in 1916. Darfur had remained under the rule of Sultan Ali Dinar, who preserved the sultanate and supported the Axis powers during the First World War — a stance that prompted the invading colonial army to overthrow his rule and reincorporate the region into the borders of the Sudanese state, where it had originally belonged since the era of the Khedivate and the rule of the Muhammad Ali dynasty in Egypt.
Another factor that reinforced the rise of separatist currents was the status of certain regions in western Darfur — notably the Masalit Sultanate, centred in the city of Geneina — which for nearly a century after the colonial occupation remained an “autonomous district” under the authority of the British governor-general and later the head of state in periods of national rule, pursuant to an agreement signed in 1898. This special status continued until the early years of President Omar al-Bashir’s rule, when it was abolished.
At different periods, certain political elites from Darfur worked persistently — backed by Western circles — to adopt a separatist, regional and emotive protest discourse.
Their first move after national independence was an attempt to mobilise former soldiers and military personnel from Darfur to join two regionally-based protest movements:
The Red Flame Movement (active publicly between 1956 and 1958), and
The SONI Movement, founded in 1962.
Neither movement achieved anything of real significance, despite their embrace of armed struggle and military action. However, they mobilised the region’s political elite, especially university graduates and political party members, who sought to recruit military officers and soldiers from Darfur. They even planned a military coup in 1964, but later abandoned it for reasons later recounted by one of its key figures, Dr Ali Hassan Taj Al-Din — a member of the Sovereignty Council during the Third Democratic Period (1985–1989). In a meeting of Darfurians at the Officers’ Club in Khartoum in 2006, he recalled:
“We had planned the coup, and shortly before execution, we realised we did not have the necessary cadres to run the state — particularly doctors, engineers, senior staff and administrators — so we abandoned the idea.”
The Darfuri political elite substituted armed action with protest-driven political activity and adopted a regionalist approach similar to that of the southern Sudanese movement, the Beja Congress in eastern Sudan, and the Komolo organisation in the Nuba Mountains. This led to the announcement of the Darfur Renaissance Front, established by graduates, student leaders and prominent political figures, most notably:
Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige, leader of the parliamentary opposition in the late 1960s and later Governor of Darfur under President Jaafar Nimeiri;
the well-known Islamist leader Dr Ali al-Haj Mohammed;
and others.
But the Front’s influence waned after the May 1969 coup, remaining dormant until revived in 1985 by Professor Abdullah Adam Khatir, only to fade away once more.
Throughout these periods, the educated elite from Darfur’s Arab tribes — tribes with deep social connections into Sub-Saharan Africa — were the least involved in protest politics and armed mobilisation. Despite their wide presence, these Arab tribes remained largely on the margins of such movements from the late 1950s to the mid-1980s.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=9485