The Riyadh–Islamabad Agreement: The Beginning of Shaken Trust between the Gulf and the US

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud

The recent Israeli strike in the heart of Doha was not merely a passing military operation; it was a political and security shock that rattled the entire Gulf. The Qatari capital, which hosts the largest US military base in the Middle East and is considered a close partner of Washington, was not spared its sanctity. This raised a bitter question: if the US umbrella could not deter an attack on its closest ally, who can guarantee protection for the rest of the Gulf capitals?

Against this backdrop came the signing of the joint defence agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, stipulating that any attack on one party would be considered an attack on the other. The timing was anything but neutral; coming directly after the Doha strike, it gave the agreement a meaning that transcends bilateral cooperation and conveyed a broader strategic message. Bringing a major nuclear power such as Pakistan into the Gulf deterrence equation grants Riyadh a new card of strength and confirms that Gulf capitals are now seriously considering diversifying their defence umbrellas rather than relying solely on Washington.

History, both recent and distant, shows that Gulf anxiety is well-founded. Washington has a habit of withdrawing its cover from allies in times of crisis: in Sudan it abandoned Jaafar Nimeiri in 1985 despite his extensive intelligence cooperation; in Tunisia in 2011 it left Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to his fate despite being a security partner; and earlier, in 1956, it forced Britain, France and Israel to withdraw from Suez when it judged its own interests required it. In the last decade, it withdrew from northern Syria in 2019, leaving the Kurds to their destiny, and the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan reinforced the image: the US does not act out of loyalty to allies but according to its shifting priorities.

The current Trump administration has deepened this impression. It has given absolute priority to Israel, repeatedly using its veto to shield its actions in Gaza, and has shown no readiness to pressure it even when its operations extended to the territory of an Arab ally hosting US forces. Moreover, it has reduced the concept of protection to arms deals and financial gains, with no firm strategic commitment. This transactional approach has reinforced Gulf conviction that unilateral dependence on Washington is no longer a safe option.

Yet thinking beyond the US does not mean a rupture with it. Washington still possesses indispensable military and intelligence capabilities. The novelty is that the Gulf is no longer willing to bet on a single umbrella. There is a clear trend towards building a “security basket” with multiple layers: continuing cooperation with the United States in armaments, training and intelligence; strengthening bilateral understandings such as the Riyadh–Islamabad agreement; developing joint Gulf defence frameworks; and opening up, within calculated limits, to major Asian powers such as India, Turkey and China.

The near future presents several scenarios for the Gulf. The most likely is continued cooperation with Washington, but with a stronger dose of caution, through new defence agreements and joint air-defence projects. We may witness a managed distancing if Israeli attacks on Gulf territories recur amid the US’s silence. However, should Washington redefine its commitments more firmly and rein in Tel Aviv’s overreach, a partial reversal in the course of security diversification may occur. What is certain is that the era of absolute reliance on the US is over, and that Gulf states are now more conscious of the necessity of charting their own security map.

The Riyadh–Islamabad agreement is therefore not merely a defensive document; it is a sign of an emerging shift in Gulf thinking: from blind trust in the US umbrella that has proven fragile, to a new security approach based on diversification, hedging, and readiness for a world that no longer recognises old certainties.

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