The National Umma Party Connection with the RSF: From Hostility to Strategic Alliance

By Dr. Mohammed Othman Awadallah

The relationship between the National Umma Party and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has undergone four distinct phases:

Complete hostility.

Flirtation.

Normalization.

Strategic interests.

As we explained in our first article, the historical relationship between the National Umma Party and militias, in general, reached the point of directly supervising the arming of tribes and passing the Popular Defense Law during the first and second readings under Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government in the third democracy. This article will focus on the four phases of the relationship between the National Umma Party and the RSF.
1. Phase of Complete Hostility:
The animosity between the two sides peaked during the Bashir government when Imam Sadiq al-Mahdi was imprisoned after being interrogated by the State Security Prosecution following a press conference in May 2014. In the meeting, he criticised the RSF and accused them of committing crimes in Darfur. Hemedti responded that the courts and judiciary were between him and Sadiq al-Mahdi.
2. Flirtation Phase:
This phase was initiated by Sadiq al-Mahdi himself after the fall of Bashir’s government. Al-Mahdi transitioned from accusing the RSF to praising their patriotism, concern for the country’s interests, rebellion against Bashir, and alignment with the transitional period. He described them as a force that would bring democracy. He ended his flirtation by inviting Hemedti to join the National Umma Party to ensure a political future after shedding his military uniform. In an interview with Al-Ghad TV on 9 August 2019, these statements highlighted the pragmatic nature of al-Mahdi and the successive administrations of the National Umma Party, demonstrating their readiness to cooperate with militias and leverage their influence for the party’s benefit.
3. Normalisation Phase:
Hemedti responded positively by sending a delegation from the RSF to the National Umma Party headquarters during the party’s last political event during the preparation for the Framework Agreement. The RSF delegation donated several vehicles and funds amounting to 100 billion Sudanese pounds ($2m) at the time. This donation, reminiscent of a popular “Qonat” celebration, involved an RSF woman announcing the donations while a crowd of RSF members enthusiastically displayed the funds. This public display marked the official announcement and inauguration of the complete normalisation phase, characterised by mutual political bribes and the intertwining of interests, laying the groundwork for strategic relations involving party, tribal, militia, and state power.
Sadiq al-Mahdi’s announcement that the RSF were an essential part of the revolution provided the moral justification for transforming the RSF from a militia that needed to be dissolved into a fundamental component of the transitional governments, on equal footing with other elements, especially the National Umma Party. The primary mechanism for maintaining this partnership was ensuring the RSF’s full integration into the distribution of ministerial portfolios and all major leadership positions in the state. This opened the door for Hemedti to build his own empire through various positions he personally held, including chairing the Economic Emergency Committee with Dr Hamdok as his deputy (noting that the Finance Minister was from the National Umma Party), chairing the Peace Committee, controlling several ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, owning several banks, holding positions in the upper management of the Central Bank of Sudan, and appointing several prosecutors affiliated with the RSF.
Furthermore, this empire expanded with an official agreement with Finance Minister Dr. Ibrahim El-Badawi (from the National Umma Party) in December 2019. This agreement granted the RSF a monopoly over the gold trade (300 kilograms per day) and the importation of strategic state needs such as wheat and oil, exempting them from all export revenues. This agreement was confirmed in a press conference by Dr El-Badawi at the Suna News Agency on March 5, 2020.
To ensure the public accepted this controversial agreement, senior figures in the National Umma Party (Salah Manaa and Arwa Al-Sadiq) launched a fierce campaign against state economic institutions and national companies, such as army companies and investment companies like Zain Telecom. This prompted these companies to file complaints against Salah Manaa. Meanwhile, through the Finance Minister, the government launched a media campaign praising the RSF companies’ patriotism and legitimacy.
Thus, the relationship between the National Umma Party and the RSF continued along this path of mutual interests, protection, and propaganda despite the government’s failure, political pitfalls during the transitional period, and widespread public protests against professional misconduct related to this relationship and the use of the judiciary to intimidate its critics. This is exemplified by a series of articles by journalist Dr. Mazamil Abu Al-Qasim about the flaws in the Al-Fakhar Company contracts and Zain Telecom’s recourse to the judiciary.
This relationship reached a strategic stage under international supervision by the Quartet Group and Hemedti’s famous statement, “We follow the embassies,” which helped this relationship withstand all its challenges, including the war. The alliance between the two parties persisted despite its moral, legal, social, and ethical burdens.
4. Phase of Strategic Relationship:
The Framework Agreement outlines how the state will be managed through two arms: the military, represented by the RSF, and the civilian, with the National Umma Party being the largest civilian party. This agreement served their interests and united them more than others. Therefore, they jointly promoted the idea and imposed it on others when attacked by leftist forces and when they withdrew, calling it a “blood partnership.” National Umma Party leader Al-Sadiq Al-Sadiq confirmed that they alone were “engineering the political process, determining its parties, and assigning roles.” At the same time, his sister, Dr Mariam, defended their reliance on foreign experts to draft the constitution.
Following the scandal of political forces seeking assistance from foreign embassies, especially the UAE, and when the war broke out, National Umma Party President Major General Fadlallah Barma Nasser found refuge in the UAE, moving there with his family. Thus, events unfolded in line with this strategic relationship.
The Strategic Relationship in Wartime:
The strategic relationship manifested clearly in all its forms—political, economic, media, and security—culminating in direct participation in the war, recruiting citizens into the RSF ranks, and sharing social, moral, and legal responsibility for war crimes in several states. National Umma Party cadres alone bore responsibility for assisting the RSF in forming civil administrations in areas under RSF control, as detailed below:
According to a report by Sama Channel, Taha Hussein and Al-Quni Dagalo offered financial incentives to the National Umma Party, resulting in the party’s Secretary-General, Al-Wathiq Al-Barir, joining the rebel militia delegation in Uganda in exchange for a financial deal.

Public opinion suggests that Hemedti and National Umma Party leader Salah Manaa engaged in significant financial transactions through Manaa’s offices in exchange for a media campaign supporting the militia.

3.      It is no coincidence that both Sadiq Al-Mahdi and the RSF have been involved in gold smuggling through Addis Ababa Airport in Ethiopia, where Hemedti has considerable influence. Sadiq Al-Sadiq and Al-Wathiq were arrested at Addis Ababa Airport on charges of gold smuggling and were released on a personal guarantee from Hamdok. Sadiq Al-Sadiq oversees the party’s investments and economic affairs. He is the main representative of the National Umma Party in the RSF’s political wing, coordinating their activities as the Secretary-General.
4.      Zainab Sadiq Al-Mahdi, wife of Al-Barir, justified the occupation of citizens’ homes by the Janjaweed and blamed the army, calling for a unilateral ceasefire against the Janjaweed. This bizarre justification for crimes prohibited by international law was widely condemned by Sudanese public opinion, leading to accusations of criminal involvement in the militia’s crimes. (Interview with Zainab Sadiq by journalist Saad Al-Kabli in November 2023).
5.      Let’s discuss in this part the relationships of the Umma Party with the RSF in several states:
·       Historical leaders of the National Umma Party in White Nile, Gezira, and Sennar states have openly supported the RSF in public rallies circulated widely on social media. The National Umma Party did not disassociate itself from these positions or expel these leaders, indicating alignment with the party’s central leadership and the Addis Ababa agreement calling for citizens to coexist with and support the RSF through joint civil administrations. This participation was not due to personal or tribal motives or militia inducements but aligned with the party’s general policy.
–          White Nile Sates: Yahya and Muntasir from the Habbani family in White Nile publicly supported the militia, overseeing the recruitment and training of young people in the state and promoting this idea socially in all towns and villages. The RSF appointed National Umma Party leader Sadiq Sanada as the commissioner of Al-Qutaynah locality and another party leader, Mohamed Khorshid, as his advisor.
–          Gezira State: The involvement of National Umma Party leaders with the RSF was significantly greater than in other states. The RSF formed a civil administration headed by National Umma Party leader Dr. Ahmed Mohamed Al-Bashir, with 31 members, mainly from the National Umma Party, nominated to the RSF by Secretary-General Al-Wathiq Al-Barir. Another party leader, Dr Siddiq Othman Ahmed, headed the executive office. Several pro-Hemedti omdas were appointed in the native administration, all supported by direct political and media coverage from National Umma Party leaders.
–          West Kordofan State: Information indicates that most first-line leaders of the National Umma Party in the state openly joined the RSF, announced their support, and participated in its operations. They led media and political campaigns, military mobilisation, and failed campaigns to capture Babanuosa, causing the fall of Al-Fula, and held their meetings in the Salam neighbourhood. Notable leaders include 1) Hassan Sheikh Al-Din, President of the National Umma Party in the state; 2) Lawyer Mohamed Ibrahim Al-Ahmar, National Umma Party leader and head of Taqaddam in Al-Mujlad; 3) Hamad Khater Jumaa, the second-in-command of the National Umma Party; 4) Mohamed Abu Ain Bashtina, member of the National Umma Party executive office and RSF advisory board; 5) Leader Kadat. 6) Lawyer Hamed Abu Jabr; and 7) Ministry of Finance employee Habab Daku.
Conclusion:
The relationship between the National Umma Party and the RSF is unique and different from its relationships with other forces, regardless of past accusations. The party has been accused of taking large sums of money and vehicles from the National Congress Party and engaging in investment partnerships. Imam Sadiq formed a political partnership with the regime by appointing Prince Abdulrahman Al-Sadiq as a presidential advisor to Bashir. The party was also accused of receiving money from Gaddafi and, at times, from Israel in the early 1960s. However, the relationship with the RSF has deepened and diversified to a strategic, almost existential level, involving shared money, gold, trade, politics, and shared responsibility for war crimes. It is also characterised by complete subservience to external directives, fully managing and funding them and dictating every detail.
This relationship is a ticking time bomb that has reached the point of explosion within the party and its base. No leader in either the National Umma Party or the RSF can organise any solo or joint activity within Sudan due to public outrage over this relationship. Internally, the party is on the verge of explosion within the headquarters and the Imam’s household. The party is now divided into two factions due to this relationship alone. One faction is led by President Barma and Secretary-General Al-Wathiq, supported by his wife, the Imam’s daughter, and Al-Sadiq, married to Al-Wathiq’s sister. This faction aims to leverage the militia’s weaponry to gain future power, supported by external forces and protected by the militia’s arms. The other faction is led by Vice President Major General Ismail and Acting President Mohamed Al-Douma, along with the Presidential Office Wing and Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Ghali and his wife, Rabah Al-Sadiq. Meanwhile, Dr. Mariam stands confused, unable to hold back her tears in any statement, declaring her regret and taking responsibility. As for Prince Abdulrahman, he expressed his position on the front lines of the war, saying, “If your brother stands with the militia, he becomes your enemy.”