The Great Lakes Summit… The Path to Internationalising the Militia’s Terrorism

By: Muhannad Awad Mahmoud

The ninth summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) convened in Kinshasa under the title: “Enhancing Peace, Security, and Stability in the Great Lakes Region.”

This title alone makes clear that the summit was not convened to issue general statements or protocol formulations, but to confront direct threats undermining regional stability. Choosing such a title signals that the region is indeed facing real security disruptions requiring collective intervention, and that security can no longer be understood within the borders of each state in isolation, but rather as an interconnected whole sharing the same risks.

Against this backdrop, the inclusion of the Sudanese war under this theme is remarkable — it places Sudan’s conflict within the framework of collective security, rather than as a local crisis to be left to internal dynamics.

The summit proceeded with an explicit agenda to address cross-border security threats that threaten the stability of the entire region. The region is experiencing an intricate overlap of conflicts, armed movements, and networks smuggling gold and weapons — creating an environment where crises must be addressed collectively, not through isolated national approaches.

Within this context, Sudan emerged as one of the most prominent issues. Sudanese diplomacy succeeded in securing the first official regional recognition, designating the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia as a “terrorist organisation” posing a threat to collective security — a qualitative shift that reframes the Sudanese war within regional security architectures and provides Khartoum with unprecedented political and legal support since the outbreak of the conflict.

The Sudanese delegation, headed by Lieutenant-General Engineer Ibrahim Jaber Ibrahim, played a central role in achieving this breakthrough. In the closed session, the delegation delivered a detailed presentation outlining the atrocities committed by the militia in El-Fashir and elsewhere. It linked these crimes to smuggling networks stretching from western Sudan to Libya, Chad, and Niger, demonstrating how these networks have become part of a regional ecosystem that fuels war economies and enables flows of fighters and weapons inseparable from the broader security landscape of the Great Lakes and the Sahel. This analytical framing made the terrorist designation a logical component of the summit agenda and fully aligned with its goal of strengthening collective security.

Accordingly, the summit adopted the recommendations of the ministerial council, defence ministers, and security agencies — including the RSF terrorist designation. It instructed the Executive Secretariat to mobilise support within the African Union and the UN Security Council to condemn the militia’s atrocities. It also adopted new regulations governing the trade in gold and precious minerals to prevent their exploitation in financing armed groups. This linkage between violence and the parallel economy reflects a growing regional understanding that gold smuggling has become one of the key arteries sustaining regional destabilisation.

The significance of this decision becomes even clearer when placed within the historical context of the Great Lakes system. The ICGLR has previously played decisive roles, with its recommendations evolving into binding international decisions.

For example:

In the 2013 Congo crisis, when the M23 movement captured large parts of North Kivu near Rwanda, emergency ministerial meetings in Kampala and Bujumbura produced recommendations later adopted by the African Union and finally endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 2098, which created the Force Intervention Brigade — the first offensive peacekeeping mandate in UN history.

In the 2015–2016 Burundi crisis, sparked by President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term (seen as a breach of the Arusha Agreement), the ICGLR issued recommendations on civilian protection and curbing violence. These were taken up by the African Union and served as the basis for Security Council Resolution 2279, which compelled extensive cooperation from the Burundian government.

During the 2008–2009 Rwanda–Congo (CNDP) crisis, the Nairobi and Goma summits led to disarmament agreements, partial integration of fighters into the Congolese army, and joint operations against the Hutu FDLR militia. UN expert panels later used these documents as reference points in restructuring peacekeeping mandates in the DRC.

These precedents show that ICGLR decisions often evolve into fully-fledged international processes — meaning that classifying the RSF as a terrorist organisation is not an end in itself, but the first step in a trajectory that could lead to sanctions, border monitoring measures, asset freezes, or even accountability mechanisms within African and international structures.

Sudan now has an opportunity to amplify the impact of this decision by activating parallel regional systems.

IGAD has extensive experience in managing Horn of Africa crises.

COMESA possesses economic tools capable of disrupting illicit financing networks.

SADC has significant military and political weight, demonstrated in its operations in Congo and Mozambique.

ECOWAS remains the strictest in collective sanctions, with a record of imposing full economic blockades within hours — as seen in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Its regional protocols allow it to freeze assets, close borders, suspend membership, and it is the only African bloc with an operational intervention force (ECOMOG), deployed previously in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. This makes ECOWAS uniquely capable of turning political stances into effective deterrent measures.

In addition to these regional blocs, Sudan has a powerful intelligence platform in the African Committee of Intelligence and Security Services (CISSA), of which it is a founding member. This gives Khartoum the ability to submit a professional, detailed dossier on the RSF’s cross-border networks. CISSA also enables Sudan to advocate for the militia’s inclusion on lists of common regional security threats — lists that SADC and ECOWAS often rely on, even though Sudan is not a member. These organisations usually act based on African Union submissions, security briefings, special missions, and input from influential member states — all factors that allow Sudan to exercise direct influence despite the current suspension of its AU membership.

The Great Lakes Summit has reshaped the African perception of the Sudanese conflict. The war is no longer seen as an internal matter but as a regional threat intertwined with gold trafficking, smuggling routes, and the movement of armed groups. By successfully imposing its narrative on such a weighty regional platform, Sudan now possesses a political and legal foundation upon which a long-term process can be built — one that will recalibrate regional power dynamics, pave the way for international accountability, dry up the militia’s financial networks, and restore Sudan’s rightful role as a central actor in shaping regional security rather than merely reacting to events.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=8865