The Dual Victory: A Strategy for Managing Conflict Through Diplomacy and the Battlefield

By Dr Al-Haytham Al-Kindi Yousif
Sudan is facing the greatest test in its modern history today. It is engaged in what the author describes as an existential struggle to dismantle the rebellion on the ground, while simultaneously confronting an intensifying campaign of external pressure aimed at constraining its will and altering the course of the war through diplomatic channels and other forms of what is often termed soft power, following the failure of attempts to achieve those objectives through coercive means.
We are therefore witnessing an increase in international initiatives and Western pressure, accompanied by sanctions and proposals for political settlements that place the constitutionally recognised military establishment on an equal footing with the rebel militia. This raises a fundamental question: How can the state respond to external pressure without sacrificing its military gains or losing its popular support at home?
The instruments of pressure directed at the state’s leadership have taken many forms. They range from economic sanctions—such as the European Union’s decision to halt imports of Sudanese gold—to allegations that the Sudanese Armed Forces have used chemical weapons, and extend to what the author views as the application of double standards in describing the conflict. According to this perspective, some international actors insist on treating the Sudanese Armed Forces, as the state’s constitutional military institution, as equivalent to an armed militia accused of committing widespread violations and abuses against civilians.
These actors are also said to exploit the humanitarian situation as a means of political pressure to impose an unequal ceasefire that would allow the rebel militia time to regroup and reposition itself.
Particularly noteworthy, the author argues, is the growing threat of sanctions that target senior leaders or restrict their freedom of movement, thereby reducing the state’s room for manoeuvre and weakening its ability to manage the war and protect the country from both militia attacks and external ambitions.
The greatest mistake the military camp could make, in the author’s view, would be to become subordinate to external pressure and yield to foreign demands at the expense of the national will, which it believes is supported by broad public backing.
The Sudanese people are not mere spectators. Rather, they constitute the strategic rear and popular support upon which the armed forces have drawn their resilience. The author points to the recapture of many areas from the militia through the combined efforts of the army and popular support.
Any settlement imposed by external actors that fails to ensure the complete dismantling of the militia and the end of its military and political presence would, the author contends, be seen domestically as a betrayal of the sacrifices of those killed in the conflict and of Sudan’s sovereignty. Such an outcome could create a rift between the people and their military institution.
Accordingly, the author argues that the appropriate strategy should be based upon the principle of a dual victory—winning the diplomatic battle abroad without sacrificing the military campaign at home.
To achieve this, Sudan should adopt a balanced strategy built upon four principal pillars.
1. Flexible Engagement Without Compromising Fundamental Principles
Engagement with international initiatives should be characterised by intelligent diplomacy. Sudan should welcome efforts to end the war and protect civilians, but only subject to conditions that prevent the militia from playing any future military or political role.
In practical terms, this would mean ensuring that the militia cannot return, in any form, to its pre-war position. This would require the surrender of its weapons, the assembly of its forces in agreed locations for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes, and the prosecution of those responsible for violations.
2. Diversifying International Partnerships
The leadership should avoid dependence upon any single regional or international bloc. Instead, it should build balanced strategic partnerships with major powers such as China and Russia, alongside regional states that respect Sudan’s sovereignty, thereby reducing the impact of external pressure exercised through any one centre of influence.
3. Strengthening the National Base and Promoting Unity
The domestic front should be reinforced by involving patriotic political forces, young people and the Popular Resistance in developing a clear political vision for the post-war period.
A united national front, the author argues, would strengthen the state’s negotiating position in the face of external pressure.
4. The Battle of Information and Diplomatic Narrative
Equal importance should be attached to the media and diplomatic front.
The author argues that Sudan should actively challenge allegations that the Sudanese Armed Forces have used chemical weapons, while documenting and presenting evidence of crimes and abuses committed by the militia to the international community.
He also calls for exposing regional actors alleged to have supported the militia with funding, weapons and mercenaries, with the aim of redirecting international pressure away from the army and towards those accused of supporting the rebellion.
In the present circumstances, the author concludes, national will is ultimately decisive.
The war, he argues, will not be decided by military force alone. It will also depend upon the ability to withstand sustained international pressure. Experience has shown, he maintains, that states which remain committed to their sovereignty and draw legitimacy from popular support are ultimately able to impose their own political realities upon the international community.
In the author’s view, the Sudanese state—supported by its armed forces and the Popular Resistance—is capable of overcoming the challenge of external pressure, provided that its guiding principle remains the will of the Sudanese people.
External actors may possess instruments of pressure, but, the author concludes, only the people within the country possess the right to determine its future and secure victory.
Translator’s note: This article is an opinion piece. References to the conflict, international actors, the Sudanese Armed Forces, the militia, and allegations concerning chemical weapons reflect the views and interpretations of the author and should not be understood as established fact or as an endorsement by the translator.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=16120