The Camouflaged Eastern Front… How the RSF Militia Is Reconfiguring Its Threat Through Ethiopia Towards the Heart of the Blue Nile

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud
The eastern front of the war in Sudan is developing rapidly, requiring precise intelligence analysis, especially after detecting distinct movements near the Sudanese–Ethiopian border. Available information indicates that Blue Nile has entered a new phase of threat due to intensified rebel militia activity inside Ethiopian territory. Over recent months, the border areas—particularly within Benishangul–Gumuz Region—have become an enabling environment for training, assembly, and supply camps. The region’s dense forests, rugged terrain, and distance from central control provide armed groups with significant freedom of movement.
Reports suggest that three militia-linked camps were previously located inside Ethiopia’s Harari Region—a relatively stable administrative area with a more structured civil and security presence. However, the region’s open topography and proximity to Ethiopia’s centres of power made it less suitable for the type of activity the militia required. The camps are said to have been gradually relocated to Benishangul–Gumuz, which offers wider geographic cover, direct proximity to the Sudanese border, and minimal central oversight. Further information indicates that fighters who trained at these sites have recently been issued a unified military uniform, signalling the completion of their preparation and their readiness for operational deployment.
Benishangul–Gumuz is the most sensitive Ethiopian region from Sudan’s perspective. It faces Blue Nile State, hosts the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, and contains wide marginal areas where armed groups and cross-border ethnic networks with long histories of activity converge. This environment enables the militia to establish small and medium-sized camps housing hundreds of fighters and operating in light- to medium-mobility formations using 4×4 vehicles, motorbikes, small arms, short-range rocket systems, and local reconnaissance teams that know the terrain intimately.
Field assessments indicate that the danger posed by these camps lies not only in their manpower but in their positioning near the main administrative centres of the Blue Nile—within an operational distance from which they could threaten Damazin, Roseires, Kurmuk, and vital supply routes. These camps operate through a blend of front-line command linked directly to the militia’s leadership in Darfur and local partners inside Benishangul–Gumuz who ensure movement, concealment, and resupply, supported by logistical cells that provide fuel, ammunition, rations, and vehicle mobility.
The threat deepens when considering the possibility of this axis linking with supply routes from South Sudan through the Lou Nuer areas of Upper Nile and Jonglei—regions long known for cross-border armed activity. Connecting the Upper Nile–Blue Nile–Sennar axis with the Benishangul–Gumuz–Ethiopian border axis would give the militia manoeuvring room between two fronts, allowing flanking routes that strain the army’s deployment and force distribution.
Potential militia operations on this front may include rapid raids, roadside ambushes, attacks on supply lines, attempts to isolate Blue Nile from Sudan’s interior, and the use of indirect fire such as mortars and short-range rockets. However, the most dangerous development is the potential deployment of drones to strike targets inside Damazin, Roseires, Kurmuk, or along major roads. The region’s open terrain enhances drone stealth and penetration capabilities, and any attack on vital facilities—or the vicinity of the Roseires Dam—could cause strategic disruption far beyond the material impact.
This situation necessitates deploying short- and medium-range air-defence systems in Blue Nile State to protect administrative centres and critical infrastructure and to prevent drone incursions. Damazin and Roseires are not simply border towns; they are operational hubs for dams, power generation, and regional administration. Striking them would hit the backbone of the state.
Ethiopia, despite its official declarations of neutrality in the Sudanese conflict, faces a reality that starkly contradicts its political statements. Benishangul–Gumuz faces significant security challenges, and hosting cross-border activity is not new to the region. The presence of such camps so close to the Sudanese border constitutes a direct threat—whether with the knowledge of the Ethiopian government or due to a security vacuum in the region.
Intelligence assessments suggest that relocating these camps from Harar to Benishangul–Gumuz represents a deliberate step toward establishing a long-term operational rear base capable of sustaining a prolonged eastern front. If the militia succeeds in transforming this presence into a permanent operational platform, Sudan will face a front applying pressure on dams, energy facilities, and administrative centres—drawing army resources into a long, exhausting confrontation.
This places responsibility on the civilian government to act with a level of dynamism equal to the military challenge and not leave the army to fight alone in a battle that directly affects the country’s water and energy security. There is an urgent need for intensified diplomatic engagement with Ethiopia to halt cross-border militant activity, alongside financial, political, and military support to deploy air defences and secure key cities through coordinated protection plans. The armed forces remain the only entity capable of shutting down this front and denying the militia any foothold—but they require political and administrative cover commensurate with the scale of the threat.
The eastern front is no longer a peripheral extension of the war; it is a newly emerging axis of threat aimed at the heart of Blue Nile. If not closed immediately, it may become the most sensitive theatre of confrontation in the coming period.

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