Sudanhorizon Interviews Pro. Hassan Makki: What Happened in Khartoum Is Weird, and May Take Years to be Comprehended

Prof. Hassan Makki, renowned for his extraordinary ability to analyze political and historical transformations, has been caught off guard this time. Neither the time nor the place is familiar anymore. Once found in his usual demeanour at his office at the International University of Africa—where he spent the better part of his life—he now finds himself far from it, forced to leave and having lost cherished things, just like many others. Yet, he has not abandoned his right to life or to understanding the chaotic Sudanese scene, even finding moments to critique its absurdity.

In this interview, conducted by Azmi Abdel-Razek for Sudanhorizon, Prof. Makki reflects on the war, its impact on the state, society, and the Islamic Movement, and on himself personally in what he describes as dreams of recovery. Here’s what he had to say:

Q: I won’t ask where you have been displaced to, but what does the experience of displacement mean to a researcher, academic, political thinker, and a man of your age?

In my youth, I loved to travel and explore. When I was twenty, I went on a pilgrimage with my father and grandmother, and I visited more than 50 countries and hundreds of cities. So, when this war came, I had no intention of leaving Sudan. I even declined numerous external invitations. But ultimately, I left Sudan—forced, not willingly.

Q: Where were you when the war began?

I was in the midst of the fire. My family and I stayed for about 38 days at the International University of Africa. Eventually, all the students and staff left, and the area became desolate. It fell under the control of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who entrenched themselves in the university and surrounded it with heavily armed vehicles. This forced me to leave.

Q: Where did you go afterwards?

I went to Shendi, where I stayed for about three months with a kind family. Afterwards, I joined the rest of my children in Britain. For the first time, I felt truly far from Sudan, confined by walls and ice. The experience was harsh because it was imposed on me.

Q: How do you expect this war to end, and how long will it last?

In my opinion, the war with the RSF has essentially ended. The RSF is now a fragmented entity with no central leadership. What remains are isolated groups with guns, and these will persist. But without a doubt, the state has prevailed.

Q: How can the war be over when fighting, death and displacement continue?

The nature of the conflict has shifted. It is now a war with gangs and tribal factions, which may take some time to resolve. I believe that Khartoum and the Gezira region will be liberated in the coming weeks, leaving only isolated pockets in Darfur and areas linked to the Janjaweed.

Q: How did you conclude that the RSF’s power is diminishing?

The RSF is losing international support, especially after the U.S. Congress’s recent recommendations and global condemnations. More importantly, it has lost legitimacy in the minds and hearts of the Sudanese people. It is now like fleeting bubbles, no longer a viable entity. The focus may shift to something new.

Q: What do you think will happen to Hemedti (RSF leader)?

If he is alive, he should surrender or engage in dialogue to salvage what remains of his forces. I believe he might choose that path. If he is dead, then we face a significant predicament.

Q: Why would his death be a significant predicament?

Because no one within the RSF can unify its scattered factions. The war with the state concluded with the state’s victory, which was a triumph of historical inevitability. Now, all Sudanese people understand that life cannot coexist with the RSF.

Q: Do you mean that the Sudan of 1956 is still intact?

Those who refer to the Sudan of 1956 often associate it with figures like Ismail Al-Azhari, Abboud, and Ali Al-Mirghani. But in reality, it encompasses cultural and historical elements like musician Karouma, athlete Sadiq Manzoul, novelist Tayeb Salih, the leftists, the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Barai Mohammed Dafallah, the Gezira Scheme, the Graduates’ Congress, and the Quranic schools in Darfur integrating with modern Sudan. It is the Sudanese Armed Forces, the civil service, and Sudan’s contribution to founding the African Football Confederation. Essentially, it is the enduring Sudanese identity that inherited an ancient civilization.

Q: Is what Sudanese people are experiencing today a continuation of past conflicts?

What is happening in this war is indeed strange. I don’t believe there has ever been a contemporary war in which a capital city was emptied of its residents, as in Khartoum. The city was looted and repopulated by other groups.

Even during World War II, when Russian forces took Berlin, the chaos lasted only three days before things returned to some semblance of normalcy, and Berlin was divided. What happened in Khartoum is unprecedented. It may take years to comprehend fully and uncover the scale of the crimes committed there. Khartoum alone holds secrets of horrific crimes and enigmatic events.

Q: Why Do You Think Sudan Has Been Targeted in This Way, and Why Is the Scale of the Tragedy Being Downplayed?

The global media has portrayed Islam and the Islamic movement as something predatory. I believe the aim is to undermine the Sudanese model to prevent its replication in the Arab world. There’s a fear of a successful Sunni model, especially as there is already a relatively successful but isolated Shiite model. As a result, they overlook the massive crime happening in Sudan—arguably the crime of the century.

For instance, while the world focuses on Palestine, the number of those killed in Geneina alone exceeds 15,000. Civilian and combatant deaths in Sudan likely number in the hundreds of thousands, not to mention the waves of displacement and refugees.

Q: As someone interested in history, what historical era are we in now? Why have some discovered that the Mahdist revolution wasn’t as idealistic, particularly during the reign of Khalifa Abdallahi al-Ta’ishi?

The late Dafalla Al-Haj Yousif once called me, saying a prominent Ansar leader was angry because I said that Sudan’s saviour was Kitchener. This is not a new revelation; the Mahdist period, especially under Khalifa al-Ta’ishi, was marked by tragedies and atrocities. It was not the saviour of the Sudanese people. This is why people in northern Sudan welcomed the Anglo-Egyptian invasion, calling it the “Anglo-Egyptian Liberation.” The first to embrace this liberation was Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, who took control of Kassala in 1897 on behalf of the Ottoman-Egyptian state.

Q: But isn’t there also controversy surrounding the so-called Ottoman-Egyptian state?

Indeed, the Ottoman-Egyptian experience in Sudan was oppressive. Sudan has endured five difficult historical phases:

Identity-based killings marked the oppressive period of the Defterdar.

The Mahdist period, in both its early and later phases.

The looting and destruction after the Battle of Karari.

The era of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) was marked by widespread chaos.

This is why people fled from these phases—because life takes precedence over everything else.

Q: Do you think the army’s strategy in this war is sufficient to achieve victory?

The backbone of the Sudanese army is the military college, which remains strong, as does the officer training school. However, a major problem is that many Sudanese people have abandoned military service due to low salaries and other factors that have been evident since the southern war. The military academy has always needed civilian support. Under Abboud’s rule, this was provided by peacekeeping forces, and during Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government, they were called “al-Marahil.”

The weakest link in the army has always been the infantry. This led the NCP (National Congress Party) to establish the Popular Defense Forces. Trust existed, but in its final days, the NCP relied heavily on the RSF and tribal fighters, much like Sadiq al-Mahdi did.

International powers saw the shared tribal alliances as a threat to French interests, so they strengthened the RSF. Meanwhile, leftists harboured grievances against the Sudanese army, associating it with military regimes from Abboud to Nimeiri, who ousted Communist leaders Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub and Shafi Ahmad al-Sheikh. They saw the RSF as a potential ally, aligning with international forces to position the RSF as an alternative to the army.

Q: Are you saying that leftists and international forces planned the coup?

Yes, they planned the failed coup. Usually, coups collapse when they fail, but this one relied on a parallel army, which prolonged it into a full-fledged war. Many of those involved in this war are young members of the Ansar movement. In Darfur, the RSF has significant support bases with external ties.

Q: Where has the state disappeared to? It seems almost absent.

Sudan is indeed in a moment of weakness, which has been evident since the days of fuel shortages and the chaos in Khartoum and Darfur. While the war has caused destruction, some cities have prospered, developing airports and industries. Agriculture in northern Sudan has expanded due to dam-related developments, turning previously barren lands into sources of fish, vegetables, and wheat for other regions.

Q: Did the Islamic movement end with the fall of the NCP?

I don’t think the Islamic movement has ended. On the contrary, there is a spiritual revival across Sudanese society. While the movement may lack formal organization, its influence remains evident. For example, look at social media on Fridays: people remind each other to pray, recite the Qur’an, and fast on the “white days” (mid-month). This wasn’t as common before.

Q: What are you trying to say?

Sudanese society is becoming more religious. Even with the Islamic movement present in the 1960s, religiosity was minimal. Congregational prayers were rare in places like the University of Khartoum, and mosques were sparsely attended by youth. Now, it’s the norm for young men and women to pray.

Q: But isn’t there a lack of an active Islamic movement in society and the state after Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi’s death?

Many believe Turabi created the Islamic movement, but it predates him. Turabi’s era was one of remarkable growth and influence but also of deviations. However, the movement remains deeply rooted in Sudanese society, permeating it in ways that no organization can fully contain. Whether it’s the National Congress Party, the Popular Congress Party, or the Islamic movement led by Ali Karti, they all have supporters. The movement is dormant, waiting for new leadership—perhaps collective leadership—to emerge after the war. Sudan’s civilizational orientation, however, is already determined.

Q: How do you assess the role of the “Taqaddam” coalition and Dr. Abdalla Hamdok in this conflict?

I feel that Taqaddam and similar entities are like bubbles that will eventually burst. A leader who lives far from his people belittles their suffering and cannot condemn atrocities that have no place in their hearts. People want life and know the RSF can’t govern even a village, let alone Sudanese society. Taqaddam is backed by shadowy organizations, possibly Masonic or otherwise. If people want to understand the history of its key figures, they can trace their activities at the University of Khartoum.

Even the recent protests against them in Britain revealed their true nature: they are nothing but bubbles that cannot be relied upon.