Sudan War, the Untold Story

By: Ramadan Ahmed

For many people outside Sudan, fully grasping the situation can be challenging. This is often due to the influence of international media, which can sometimes spread misinformation driven by ulterior motives. However, it’s our responsibility as part of the international community to help people understand and address the complexities of the Sudanese conflict. International powers are relentlessly seeking to set foot on Sudan’s soil, taking advantage of the current fragile situation.
The prevailing rhetoric is that:
1. There are two parties to the conflict.
2. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).
3. The parties to the conflict are committing atrocities against civilians.
4. The government of Sudan is a military coup, and thus it is illegal.
5. The Coordinating body of civilian and democratic forces (known as “Taqaddum”, previously known as the Freedom and Change Alliance “FCA”) represents the civilian component in the Sudanese political scene.
These allegations, and others, have overshadowed the situation in Sudan and led to confusion. It’s essential that we refute these allegations and clear the dust so that people outside the country can have a clear and accurate understanding of what’s going on there.

First, there are no two parties to the conflict. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are essentially the same as the Janjaweed militias that the Sudanese government has used and continues to use in its attempts to combat anti-government insurgencies during the war in Darfur. The RSF was officially formed in August 2013 after being restructured and placed under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). This restructuring followed the reactivation of the Janjaweed militias to fight rebel groups in the Darfur region, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile State in the wake of joint attacks by the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebels in North and South Kordofan in April 2013.
Given this brief background, the RSF are part of the Armed Forces. What they did was rebellion, and what any national army in the position of the Sudan national army could do was put off the rebellion by all means. Should there be any need for negotiations, they must focus on disarmament and integration into the national army, paving the way for a peaceful resolution.
However, the turn of events clearly shows that some overseas powers are keen to use the RSF as a functional group to achieve their vested interests, which the national army would not otherwise be able to achieve. This interprets the United States’s insistence on holding talks in Geneva between the “two parties” to pave the way for a political solution, given that the RSF are in no way a political force.

Secondly, The RSF are not fighting the national army. Instead, they are attacking towns and villages, looting civilian properties at gunpoint and committing rape crimes. The RSF has caused mass evictions of people from their homes, where millions of displaced people are living under miserable conditions, with no food supplies or aid of any kind allowed. In other words, the RSF avoids places where the government army is stationed and attacks civilian areas.
Thirdly, there is a difference between civilian casualties resulting from inaccurate airstrikes by the armed forces and deliberate, indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas. The RSF hides in civilian homes and takes civilians as human shields. The RSF imposes blockades on cities in Kordofan and Darfur states where civilians are on the brink of starvation.
Fourthly, the allegation that the government of Sudan is a military coup and thus illegal is incorrect. It is known that the government of Bashir was ousted in a popular mass demonstration in April 2020. The Security Committee of Bashir’s government took over and shared government with the Freedom and Change Alliance (FCA), a civilian block representing a range of political forces pursuant to the Constitutional Document. As per this Document, the military would preside over the Transitional Sovereignty Council for a year, and civilians would do the same. By the time the civilians turned to take over the presidency of the Sovereignty Council, many political forces that had forced the FCA defected from it. The number of political forces that remained with the FCA was not enough for the FCA to hold the presidency of the Sovereignty Council, given that the FCA had failed to solve so many political, economic and social problems. In fact, it poured more salt into the wound, and thus, if they took over the presidency of the Sovereignty Council, it would have led to a disastrous result. The military, powered by its constitution at times of national security threat, had to dissolve the FCA government and call for new arrangements for the transitional period. This is what the FCA has been calling “the 15th October Military Coup”. There are two facts here to be considered:
One is that the FCA government resulted from an internal understanding between the FCA and the army, which means it was neither an elected government nor endorsed by the Sudanese people in any way. The other is that the Constitutional Document lacked the element of “constitution”, as it was just an agreement between the two. Therefore, calling the dissolution of the FCA government a coup d’état is nonsense.
Fifthly, the allegation that the Coordinating body of civilian and democratic forces (known as “Taqaddum”, previously known as the Freedom and Change Alliance “FCA”) represents the civilian component in the Sudanese political scene is baseless. It is worth noting that the FCA hijacked the revolution and chased away all the key activities that had inspired it, whose main objectives were “freedom, peace and justice”. The FCA members never implemented any of the slogans of the revolution. They mastered listening to the dictations of the Western embassies in Khartoum, mainly the United States, British and French Embassies.
In any revolution where no major political party is in charge, people take to the streets out of frustration, but ultimately, those who are organised are likely to steal the scene. The case of Sudan is no exception.
How did the RSF Dominate the Scene, and Why?
When General Bashir’s government collapsed following the demonstrations that had started on 19 December 2019 to 15 April 2020, the FCA took control. However, political polarisation dominated the scene because the FCA failed to introduce a political discourse that would have encouraged justice, freedom, and peace. There was an apparent political vacuum, and the RSF jumped in, intensified personnel recruitment, smuggled huge amounts of gold out of the country, and bought highly sophisticated military equipment. Within three years, the RSF personnel rose from 20,000 soldiers in 2020 to more than 120,000 in 2023.
It was obvious that plans were underway to dissolve the national army and replace it with the RSF. This was more done than said, and the FCA was busy with the idea of restructuring the army and security agencies! The straw that broke the camel’s back was a document prepared by the FCA named the “Framework Agreement” (FA) for power sharing, which gives the RSF 10 years to integrate into the army. Given the speedy pace of the RSF growth, ten years would be enough to incorporate the military into the RSF instead of vice-versa.
The Framework Agreement was a proposal of the FCA, but RSF swallowed it gluttonously. The army only then realised the trick and declined to sign the FA, insisting that RSF’s integration must be two years with specific schedules instead of ten years.
With the army declining the signing of the Framework Agreement, the RSF and its allies, in and outside the country, resorted to plan “B”, a coup d’état. General Hemedti, the first man in the RSF, made it clear on the first day of the war that he would catch or kill General Al-Burhan, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese armed forces.
It sounds like the Sudanese army managed to stand its ground; as General Al Burhan escaped death, the coup failed and turned into an all-out war.
Where Does the UAE Fit?
The UAE has been the primary buyer of the gold smuggled out of Sudan by the RSF. For that reason, the UAE capitalised on the success of the RSF’s coup, given that the UAE is also the main supporter of the FCA.
The UAE-funded rebellion in Sudan has extended for 16 months and claimed over 30,000 deaths, no less than 10 million displaced persons and economic losses of no less than $120 billion.
In summary, the FCA, RSF, and UAE are only tools similar to those used in Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and others. This explains why the RSF’s gross human rights violations are internationally condemned with a soft voice, indicating that Sudan is facing the curse of natural resources. Attempts to connect the Sudanese national armed forces with the said violations are in no way an attempt to lessen the burden on the RSF, to find a way to say the parties to the war are both committing human rights violations.
Needless to say, the national army in any country is legally responsible for maintaining law and order in the absence of government or in times of national crisis. Sudan’s armed forces are no exception.