Sudan–Russia Agreements: What Lies Above Ground and What is Hidden Beneath

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud
The recent Sudanese–Russian deal is not just a set of papers signed in a protocol hall; it is a pivotal moment that redraws the lines of balance on the Red Sea coast and deep within the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. Sudan—long an open arena for intersecting external influences—has now chosen to become a player, not a pawn, and to leverage its location and resources to carve out a rare margin of negotiating independence.
Economically, Khartoum now has a rare opportunity to restructure its revenue system. The protocols covering trade, infrastructure, energy, and mining contain the potential to generate cash flows through long-term purchase contracts and advance financing for resources—an arrangement that could alleviate pressure on foreign currency and provide relative stability in an environment marked by uncertainty. Yet these benefits hinge on the nature of the contracts. The key question is this: are we dealing with clear operational partnerships with transparent terms and returns, or with murky formulas that exchange infrastructure for access rights and military presence? The more precise and safeguarded the framework, protected by strict financial governance, the lower the sovereign risks and the higher the economic return.
Politically, the strategic port on the Red Sea goes far beyond a logistics project; it is a message at the very heart of the international struggle over sea lanes. Granting Moscow a long-term maritime foothold simply means that traditional powers no longer monopolise the balance of influence in the Red Sea, and that Sudan now possesses a pressure card enabling it to engage Western capitals from the position of negotiator, not recipient.
Militarily, these agreements will have a direct impact on the situation on the ground in Sudan. For the military leadership, seeing strategic partnerships of this magnitude with Russia will make negotiations appear less viable, reinforcing its insistence on decisive victory against the terrorist rebellion. The implied message to the Sudanese people in general, and to the people of Darfur in particular, is clear: be patient, for victory is on the way. The agreements raise public expectations that the state is determined to close the chapter of rebellion once and for all—not at negotiating tables, but by cementing legitimacy through force of arms.
From a security and defence perspective, Russia’s entry, given its investment weight, also entails its military weight. Moscow will, naturally, protect its interests and projects in ports, mining and energy, opening the door to an arms race that cannot be balanced: Russia is a producer and exporter of weapons, while the terrorist Rapid Support Forces militia remains limited in capability, dependent on smuggling and brokers. This imbalance will tip the scales in favour of the Sudanese army and strengthen its hand. It is worth recalling that military cooperation between Khartoum and Moscow is not new. Russia stood by Sudan throughout the years of unilateral US sanctions, supplying weapons and technologies despite the pressure. Today, the scene is repeated but with a qualitative shift: Sudan’s gold, minerals and energy resources are now central, acting as additional incentives that make cooperation broader, deeper and more impactful.
Here, a fundamental question arises: is the Central Bank of Sudan’s decision to ban gold exports and monopolise them for itself linked to these agreements? Will Sudan’s gold flow to Russia—whether through direct export or as collateral for projects? If the answer is yes, the bank’s decisions acquire a new strategic dimension: gold ceases to be merely a trade commodity or domestic monetary tool, becoming instead a sovereign currency channelled into international alliances. In that light, it is understandable that Khartoum sought, through this decision, to seize control of its most vital resource and deploy it in its major partnerships—so that what lies above ground in terms of investments and ports integrates with what lies beneath in terms of gold and minerals, within a single equation that redefines Sudan’s position on the global map.
Regionally, these agreements will echo across the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia—struggling to secure a seaport—will read Sudan’s repositioning with Russia as a move reshaping the balance on the Red Sea. Eritrea, long eager to present itself as an alternative base, will realise that its competition has become far tougher with Russia’s growing weight in Port Sudan. Djibouti—home to American, French and Chinese bases—will face a new equation, with Sudan gaining strategic standing that grants it parallel weight in the calculus of the world’s most vital maritime corridor. In this sense, it is not only Sudan’s position that is transformed, but the entire map of influence across the region.
The deal, then, has three dimensions: gold and energy as economic resources; the Red Sea as a geographic passage; and Russia as a partner seeking warm waters. If properly harnessed—through precise governance and diversified partnerships—this triad could become a lever for Sudan’s sovereign decision-making. If mismanaged, however, it could open the door to a new dependency in which both resource and passage are consumed. The lingering question remains: can Khartoum turn these agreements into instruments of negotiating power that preserve its sovereignty, or will the outcome be a deal that grants Moscow what lies both beneath and above the ground, while Western pressure persists and Sudan’s internal fragility deepens?

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