Sudan and GERD: A Policy of Cautious Observation between Cairo and Addis Ababa

Dr Ammar Abdelrahman

 

Introduction

With the near completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the beginning of its official operation, the region is entering a new phase of water and political tensions. While Egypt clings to its rejectionist stance and Ethiopia presses ahead with imposing facts on the ground, Sudan finds itself in an extremely sensitive position, pulled between competing regional and international interests, and compelled to adopt a finely balanced policy.

Sudan has the potential to turn the challenges posed by the GERD into a platform for redefining its regional role and to establish a strategy of balance that safeguards its water rights and enhances its national security, without sliding into costly and futile conflicts.

Limited Understandings, Not Full Agreements

Over recent years, dealings between Sudan and Ethiopia have been limited to technical cooperation arrangements, such as data exchange and the establishment of joint committees, without rising to the level of binding agreements. The only officially documented agreement remains the Tripartite Declaration of Principles (Khartoum, March 2015), signed by then-Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.

This declaration explicitly committed the parties to “principles of cooperation, respect for sovereignty, and equitable and reasonable utilisation of water resources,” but it did not contain technical or legal details establishing binding rules on filling and operation. Accordingly, Sudan did not enter into bilateral negotiations with Ethiopia beyond the technical framework, keeping its options open within the limits of technical monitoring.

Minimum Actions to Protect Sudan’s National Interest

The debate over whether these arrangements constitute mere technical understandings or full agreements can only be settled by reference to the actual text and its official title. For example, documents exchanged between Khartoum and Addis Ababa in 2012–2014 bore titles such as “Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Cooperation and Data Exchange,” and were not called “agreements.”

What is certain is that these were not personal or individual initiatives but institutional acts carried out in the name of the Sudanese state as part of its official duties. Thus, it is misplaced to reduce the matter to individuals or blame a minister or official; the correct formulation is: the state signed, the state endorsed, the state ratified.

Assessing the wisdom of these decisions is legitimate and necessary, but such evaluation must take place within an institutional and national framework that places Sudan’s national interest above all else.

Sudan between Egyptian and Ethiopian Pressures

Ethiopia regards the dam as a sovereign project for development, electricity generation, and flood control. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has stated more than once that “the Renaissance Dam is a matter of life or death for the Ethiopian people” (speech to the Ethiopian Parliament, 2020).

Egypt considers the dam a direct threat to its water security, as it depends on the Nile for 97% of its needs. In his address to the UN General Assembly (September 2019), President Sisi stressed that “the Nile is a matter of existence for Egypt.”

Sudan, weighed down by its internal crises, currently lacks the capacity to confront either side, which pushes it towards a policy of cautious balance between its two powerful neighbours.

The Observer’s Option

Under these circumstances, Sudan’s realistic option is to remain a cautious observer, limiting itself to registering observations or issuing official statements, without entering into a direct confrontation it cannot sustain.

Former Sudanese Minister of Irrigation, Yasser Abbas, expressed this stance in 2021 when he said: “We are not against the Renaissance Dam, but we demand a binding legal agreement that guarantees Sudan’s rights and the safety of its water facilities.” This statement accurately summarises Sudan’s position: a basic acceptance of the project, coupled with insistence on legal guarantees.

A Reading of Egyptian Discourse

Meanwhile, the political and media discourse emanating from Cairo regarding the dam often appears more directed at Egyptian public opinion than at producing actionable strategies. This leaves Sudan in a difficult equation: how to protect its national interests without becoming merely a tool in Egyptian political calculations.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations for Sudan

Sudan’s geographic and political location between Cairo and Addis Ababa makes it the party most vulnerable to pressure, but at the same time, the one most capable of turning the crisis into an opportunity for regional cooperation. Achieving this, however, requires moving beyond the policy of “cautious observation” to adopt a long-term strategic vision rooted in Sudanese national interests, and to view the GERD as a platform for integration and cooperation rather than a permanent source of tension and threat.

To this end, Sudan can adopt a package of practical measures representing the minimum protection of its national interests:

Establish a permanent national unit for managing the GERD file and future cooperation in the Nile Basin, reporting directly to the Council of Ministers of Sudan, and including legal, technical, and diplomatic experts to ensure continuity beyond governmental changes.

Engage actively in joint committees, including:

The Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters (Sudan–Egypt), established in 1959 and still holding regular meetings between Khartoum and Cairo.

The Sudanese–Ethiopian Joint Technical Advisory Committee, established in 1991 with periodic meetings between Khartoum and Addis Ababa.

Strengthening the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO) in Addis Ababa, under the Nile Basin Initiative, comprising Sudan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Egypt (noting that Egypt has suspended its participation).

Continue cooperation and coordination with Nile Basin Initiative structures, including:

The Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme (NELSAP) Coordination Unit in Kigali, Rwanda (established 1999).

The Regional Secretariat of the Nile Basin Initiative in Entebbe, Uganda (established 1999).

With emphasis on preserving Sudan’s independence of decision and avoiding one-sided alignment.

Involve Sudanese universities and research centres in providing technical studies and future scenarios on the dam’s impacts, ensuring that political decisions are based on solid scientific knowledge.

Adopt multi-track diplomacy (official, popular, and academic) that enables Sudan to play the role of a positive mediator rather than remaining a passive recipient of pressures.

Through this approach, Sudan can transform the challenges of the GERD into a platform for redefining its regional role and build a strategy of balance that safeguards its water rights and strengthens its national security, without sliding into costly and futile conflicts.

Researcher in Transboundary Water Management

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=7482