Localising the Sudanese Dialogue (1–2)

Obaid Ahmed Al-Murawih

It may be fair to describe the Sudanese–Sudanese dialogue as the “missing obligation”. Ever since the then-ruling National Congress Party abandoned the spirit of the outcomes of the National Dialogue (the “Wathba” process) concluded at Friendship Hall in 2016, and neglected some of its most important recommendations, the country has never truly “recovered”. Instead of the tug-of-war between Sudanese political forces remaining confined between Friendship Hall (2016) and the Corinthia Hotel in Khartoum (2022), it has moved on to neighbouring capitals such as Cairo and Addis Ababa – and there are fears it may travel even further afield to Geneva or even Washington!
In his recent address to the UN General Assembly, the Transitional Prime Minister, Dr Kamal Idris, announced that his government “will embark on an inclusive Sudanese–Sudanese national dialogue involving all political and societal forces so that we can lay the foundations for free and fair elections”. He added that his government had “committed to facilitating all necessary procedures for Sudanese in the diaspora to return and take part in this important dialogue”.
Upon his return yesterday to Port Sudan, the Prime Minister told the media that the issue of “national recovery” and the Sudanese–Sudanese dialogue would be top priorities for his government, which means that he and his advisers now have a clearer idea of what they intend to do.
The Sudanese–Sudanese dialogue is not an end in itself; rather, it is meant to “produce solutions” that will help Sudanese move from the state of abduction in which their country has been trapped since 2019, towards a localisation of solutions that allows them to express their will and shape their future freely – away from external agendas. For no matter how “close” outsiders may seem, they ultimately seek their own interests, which are not necessarily identical to ours, and may at times be in direct contradiction.
Dialogue is a tool for managing our differences peacefully. Its purpose, quite simply, is for Sudanese – both elites and ordinary people – to participate in shaping the country’s future: how to achieve peace, stability and development, and how to manage governance and rotate power. If this is the case, then the first requirement for the success of such dialogue is that participation must be open to all, and that the phrase “except for” must be eliminated from its vocabulary. And by this I do not mean only “except for the National Congress Party”, but also “except for Samoud” – for so long as Samoud has chosen a different path from Ta’sees, has declared its belief in not using the gun as a tool to impose political agendas, and wishes to take part, then it should not be excluded.
Since trust between Sudanese political and societal forces is shaky in part and absent in others, the role of external actors should be limited to complementing the requirements of dialogue. They should have no role in setting the agenda or in managing discussions, but only in providing logistical support and observation, so that the hesitant and the fearful may be reassured that their safety will be guaranteed throughout the dialogue, and that they will be free to return to the diaspora whenever they wish.
As for the agenda of the comprehensive dialogue, it could include – among other things – devising and agreeing upon a holistic plan for transitional justice, guided by Sudanese societal traditions in dispute resolution and informed by international experiences and programmes from countries emerging from conflict and civil war, as well as the practices of UN and African Union institutions. It could also address the issue of social peace, which has been shaken by the behaviour of militias during the war, with the aim of establishing a citizenship-based society founded on equality in rights and duties. Moreover, it should involve serious and early preparation to create a healthy climate in which free and fair elections can be held, enabling the Sudanese people to choose their representatives who will then draft the country’s permanent constitution.
To be continued…

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