From Switzerland to Rome: Washington Tests the Keys to Peace in Sudan

Muhannad Awad Mahmoud

On 25 August 2025 I published an article entitled “Washington between Relief and Accountability — Does the United States Hold the Keys to Peace in Sudan?”, in which I posed a fundamental question: can Washington move beyond humanitarian aid to exert real pressure that leads to a sustainable peace in Sudan, or will it remain trapped in humanitarian rhetoric that conceals calculations of influence and interest. Today, after a series of intensive diplomatic moves from Cairo to Rome, the answer is beginning to take shape — albeit the picture remains too complex to be reduced to the Quartet’s intentions or promises.

The four-party alliance of the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt has now become the most prominent framework for attempts to resolve the war in Sudan. This new formula has replaced the older version that included Britain, underscoring that the centres of gravity in the Sudan dossier have shifted more toward Arab regionalism than toward the West. The Quartet’s September statement set out a roadmap beginning with a three-month humanitarian truce, followed by a permanent ceasefire, and then a nine-month political transition, together with a pledge to respect Sudan’s unity and sovereignty. But the proposal did not pass without internal division: some saw it as a realistic step toward settlement, while others described it as a disguised intervention lacking guarantees and hiding an intention to internationalise the crisis.

In Cairo, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met to discuss developments in Sudan, reaffirming their commitment to Sudan’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The official statement from the Egyptian presidency said that President el-Sisi reiterated his country’s steadfast support for Sudan and rejected any attempts to threaten its national cohesion or to create parallel entities to the state, stressing the importance of preserving its national institutions. The two sides also affirmed the importance of activating the Quartet as the most capable framework for supporting efforts to halt the war and launch a Sudanese political process that preserves the country’s unity and stability. The meeting also addressed joint coordination on regional issues, foremost among them the Nile waters file, where al-Burhan stressed the unity of stance and interests between Sudan and Egypt and the need to continue mutual consultations on all matters relating to the security of the Nile Valley and the region.

Meanwhile, in Rome, a trilateral meeting was held among the US President’s Senior Adviser on African Affairs, Messaad Boulos; Chadian President Mohamed Idriss Déby; and Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Walid al-Khurayji. The meeting aimed to coordinate efforts to secure the western borders and prevent flows of weapons and refugees. That meeting served as an implicit declaration of expanding the Quartet’s scope to include Sudan’s immediate neighbourhood, thereby enshrining the concept of “regional guarantees” as a prerequisite for the success of any agreement.

But none of these meetings can have real meaning so long as the city of El Fasher remains under siege. El Fasher is not merely a devastated city; it is a mirror reflecting the credibility of every initiative. Water and electricity are cut off, humanitarian supplies are scarce, and aerial and artillery bombardment are indiscriminately hitting civilians. Therefore, lifting the siege of El Fasher must be the first test of any international intentions. Any agreement that does not translate into genuine rescue on the ground will remain ink on paper — another entry in the ledger of postponed promises.

Washington is attempting to balance a difficult scale: it seeks to present itself as a force for peace and relief, while also wanting to retain instruments of pressure and accountability against parties accused of serious violations. Since Messaad Boulos was appointed special envoy, US policy has shifted from a position of “reluctant observer” to that of an “active mediator”, drawing on his successful experience in the Congo and Rwanda. Nevertheless, Washington still oscillates between two contradictory objectives: reducing the humanitarian catastrophe and imposing political and legal accountability on militia leaders and their backers. This duality will have a limited impact unless words are translated into clear field actions.

Egypt, by contrast, appears best placed to act as an actual guarantor by virtue of geography, history and intertwined relations. Cairo has the ability to secure the northern and western borders and to open safe humanitarian corridors to Darfur, and its trust among the Sudanese leadership makes it the most acceptable party to manage any security arrangements. If this role is used wisely, Egypt could be the safety valve that prevents Sudan’s disintegration and provides a model of Arab integration in support of its stability, rather than a multiplicity of patrons with conflicting interests.

On that basis, Sudan’s acceptance of any Quartet initiative should be conditional and built on clear foundations: first, the immediate lifting of the siege of El Fasher; second, a phased ceasefire beginning with a humanitarian truce and ending with the restructuring of the forces; third, the establishment of a joint monitoring room in Cairo including representatives of Sudan, the Quartet and IGAD; fourth, the creation of a transparent compensation and reconstruction fund whose disbursements are tied to compliance with the peace; and fifth, the formation of a transitional task-government of no more than nine months focused on services, relief and preparations for elections, alongside an independent transitional justice track that prevents impunity.

These conditions are not merely political demands but the only guarantee that Sudan will not become a permanent humanitarian dossier managed from abroad. Acceptance of a plan by Khartoum without clear conditions would make it merely a recipient of others’ dictates, whereas asserting its will would restore it to the role of an active state that holds the strings of its own fate.

Returning to the question I posed in my previous article — does Washington hold the keys to peace in Sudan? — The answer today is neither a simple yes nor a simple no. The United States possesses the strongest political and financial tools, but it does not alone hold the keys to the locked doors; those keys are distributed among Cairo, Riyadh, N’Djamena and the will of the Sudanese people themselves. Washington can open the door if it chooses to, but it will not be able to walk through it unless others follow, first and foremost, Sudan itself.

The present moment provides a rare opportunity to reframe the whole equation: peace built on the ground, not on statements; Arab guarantees rather than international tutelage; justice rooted in facts, not rhetoric. If Sudan makes good use of this moment, the Quartet could transform from a forced initiative into an equitable partnership, relief into politics, and accountability into a guarantor of peace rather than a punishment of peace itself.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=8155