Ethiopia and Eritrea… A Struggle on the Threshold of the Future

 

By Dr Mohamed Hasab Al-Rasoul
The coasts of East Africa have become an increasingly important theatre for regional and international geostrategic competition, given their location on the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, and their direct connection to the Bab al-Mandab Strait—one of the most vital maritime passages for global trade and energy supplies.

This location has transformed the region into a meeting point for the economic, military, and security interests of major powers, including the United States, China, and Russia, as well as other significant actors such as France and rising powers like Turkey. It is also entangled with Israeli concerns and ambitions, and with the interests of other states such as the United Arab Emirates.

Within this contest, the Eritrean port of Assab has emerged as one of the most significant geographical anchor points of strategic value—especially for Ethiopia and its regional and international partners—as Addis Ababa persistently seeks to enhance its strategic balance in the region and to amplify its regional status, rooted in imperial history and ambitions. Its claims to this port have fuelled tensions with Eritrea.

Historical background of the maritime dispute

Ethiopia emerged as a landlocked state, but on 15 November 1962 it annexed Eritrea under international and Western pressure, turning the latter into part of the Ethiopian Empire. This gave Ethiopia strategic access to the Red Sea through Eritrea’s ports, Assab and Massawa. Since then, Ethiopia has viewed the Red Sea as a natural extension of its borders. However, Eritrea’s independence in 1993 stripped Ethiopia of this privilege, returning it to its historical status as a landlocked state with no coastline.

After Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia continued to use its ports until the outbreak of war between the two neighbours (1998–2000). It was then forced to reroute its exports and imports through Sudanese ports, and later through Djibouti, after failing to secure sovereign access to the Sudanese coast.

Although a peace agreement was signed between Addis Ababa and Asmara under Algerian mediation at the end of 2000, relations remained tense until the 2018 agreement between Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki opened a new horizon. Asmara supported Addis Ababa militarily and even allied with it in the Tigray War (2020–2022). But the alliance quickly dissipated amid the complexity of regional and international dynamics, bringing the ports issue back to the fore and turning Assab into the centre of a renewed dispute.

War begins with words

Recent remarks by Ethiopian officials have intensified tensions. Abiy Ahmed declared on state television: “The Red Sea was part of Ethiopia 30 years ago. A mistake was made yesterday, and it will be corrected tomorrow.” Major General Teshome Gemishu, Director of International Relations at the Ministry of Defence, said: “Ethiopia has a historical right to access the Red Sea and to own Assab Port… This is a matter of national existence.” Similarly, State Minister of Finance Eyob Tekalign stressed: “Ethiopia is ready to stand firmly against anyone who opposes its national interests.”

Eritrea responded sharply. Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel described Ethiopia’s statements as “reckless and a return to the drums of war, a contemptible distortion of Eritrean history.” Meanwhile, Ambassador Sophia Tesfamariam stated: “No press release, demographic statistic, or historical arrogance grants a state the right to another state’s coastline.”

The Ethiopian government faces mounting internal challenges and is using this rhetoric to rally domestic support and divert attention from its crises. The demand for a seaport, like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, serves as a tool to reproduce political legitimacy eroded by ethnic and political conflicts and by dire economic conditions. Yet this escalation opens the door to new risks, threatening militarisation and a return to war. As the Arab proverb says: “War begins with words.”

Military mobilisation on both sides

Press reports indicate that the Ethiopian government has established a special military-security mechanism for planning and mobilisation, and has begun moving units towards the shared border. In response, Eritrea has reinforced its southern military presence and built fortifications along its coast.

Eritrean concerns

Eritrea regards Ethiopia’s demand for Assab as a direct threat to its sovereignty and independence—hard-won after a long struggle. The port symbolises sovereignty and serves as a strategic asset that has granted Eritrea a unique advantage over landlocked Ethiopia.

Asmara fears that granting Ethiopia permanent access to the sea would revive Ethiopian influence over its territory, undermine the balance between them, and turn any Ethiopian presence in Assab into a platform for military, security, and political pressure. Eritrea also worries about losing vital economic and political resources—especially if Ethiopia’s claim gains support from major powers.

Dimensions and drivers of the dispute

There are 49 landlocked states in the world, including 16 in Africa, 14 in Asia, 15 in Europe, and two each in South America and other continents. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea laid down principles for addressing the needs of landlocked states—but these did not include seizing another state’s territory or asserting sovereignty over a neighbour’s port.

Ethiopia’s renewed claims to Assab have arisen against the backdrop of developments in the Red Sea, with Yemen entering into an open-ended conflict in support of Gaza. They also follow French encouragement and backing for Ethiopia to build a naval base in the Red Sea, beginning with an agreement signed on 14 March 2019. France has since trained two batches of Ethiopian army officers in naval operations this year.

Thus, Ethiopia’s manoeuvres are not solely driven by its own calculations. External actors also play a key role, and this is not limited to France. Addis Ababa has many regional and international partners united by shared interests that align with the strategic orientations of the Western alliance concerning Israel’s security and ambitions in East Africa.

Prospects of the crisis and the future of the dispute

Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea have reached a critical point, with military preparations escalating on both sides. This has opened the door to several scenarios of escalation—military, security, and political—pushing the crisis into a dangerous phase. Three possible outcomes emerge:

Limited war: Localised clashes or specialised military operations aimed at giving Ethiopia control over Assab. This is a plausible scenario that could inflame the crisis and destabilise the region.

Full-scale war: The most dangerous scenario, recalling the 1998–2000 war that left around 70,000 dead and many more wounded. Such a conflict would have catastrophic consequences for both countries and for the wider Horn of Africa, deepening instability in Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan. This outcome is possible, but less likely.

Settlement: A widely desired scenario, but one requiring proactive regional or international mediation. Yet obstacles abound, notably the regional and international divisions over the dispute. Any mediation will likely be framed within broader negotiations over the Horn of Africa. Another challenge is Ethiopia’s insistence on sovereignty over the port, rather than merely securing trade access.

War is not inevitable, but it remains a realistic possibility if threats and mobilisation continue unchecked by mediation. A preventive initiative is needed to defuse tensions and clear the atmosphere. Without it, the first scenario of limited conflict could unfold, to be followed by mediation as in the third scenario—producing a combination of both.

Assab Port is not merely a maritime facility; it is a symbol of a broader conflict—over geography, sovereignty, and historical memory. For Ethiopians, it represents a deferred dream and a lost outlet. For Eritreans, it is a line of defence for their sovereignty. Between the dream and the rejection lies a complex regional reality shaped by the calculations of local, regional, and global powers.

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