Elections in Sudan: Between Means and Ends, and the Search for an Authentic Democratic Model

Dr Ismaeel Sati
Introduction: On the Central Question
Amid Sudan’s intractable political crisis, an urgent question arises: will shortening the transitional period and holding free and fair elections be the magic solution that sets things right and resolves the country’s accumulated problems?
Many people proceed from the assumption that merely holding elections will produce a government capable of addressing Sudan’s crises, as though the ballot box alone can reorder the Sudanese house.
However, this simplified view overlooks a more fundamental question: what kind of democracy are we talking about? Is it a democracy that respects the will of the voters, whatever the outcome, or is it a selective democracy – brandished when it serves certain political aims, and buried when it produces unwelcome results?
Sudanese and regional experience alike suggest that local elites, backed by certain regional and international circles, suffer from glaring double standards in their approach to democracy.
1. The Historical Experience of Elections in Sudan: Continuity of Elite Dominance Across Eras
In Sudan’s political history, elections have been a neutral tool in form, but not in practice: at times a means for accountability and peaceful transfer of power; at other times a mechanism for entrenching the dominance of ruling elites – whether civilian or military.
Since the first parliamentary elections in 1953, urban, educated elites have dominated the political scene through deliberately designed electoral systems that drew constituencies, set voter qualifications, and defined rules of representation in ways far from neutral. Elections thus became an instrument of political engineering to ensure the continued control of these elites and the exclusion of marginalised regions. This pattern persisted across successive democratic periods, in which elections became a mere cover for elite-level bargains between party leaders.
We can trace the continuity of this pattern across Sudan’s successive political eras, both civilian and military, as follows:
In the civilian periods:
Post-independence period (1953–1958):
The first electoral experiences were dominated by urban elites represented in the Umma Party and the National Unionist Party. Emerging political forces in the peripheries were marginalised by deliberately constructed electoral systems that curtailed representation in neglected areas.
The Second Democracy (1965–1969):
Traditional parties again dominated the scene through tribal and sectarian alliances, while modern political forces faced systematic repression and marginalisation under various pretexts. This hollowed out the genuinely competitive nature of elections. One stark manifestation of sectarian party dominance was the notorious saying circulated among voters that party leaders could guarantee victory in their constituencies “even if they nominated a goat”, a crude expression of replacing political criteria with absolute loyalty to the ‘sayyid’ (sect leader).
The Third Democracy (1986–1989):
The problem of distorting the popular will became especially pronounced through post-election coalitions that mutilated the outcome of the ballot box. Governments were formed through elite-level horse-trading between the “two sayyids”, far removed from the voters’ actual choices.
In the military periods:
Nimeiri’s regime (1971–1985):
Referendums and elections were used as decorative tools to confer legitimacy on the regime’s policies, while real opposition was completely marginalised.
The Ingaz (Salvation) regime (1989–2019):
The electoral process was designed through highly refined “electoral engineering” to guarantee the dominance of the National Congress Party, with systematic marginalisation of the opposition except to the extent allowed. State resources were used to finance pro-regime campaigns.
2. Selective Democracy: When the West Chooses Secularism Over Democracy
The prevailing liberal discourse assumes that Western democracy is the ideal model for political transition. Yet reality reveals stark double standards in dealing with the outcomes of elections.
In practice, as some thinkers point out, Western democracy often becomes “merely a game for serving Western interests”. The real choice facing Western decision-makers is not between democracy and dictatorship, but between secularism and democracy – and at this junction, the West invariably chooses secularism.
This double standard is most evident in the response to Islamists coming to power via elections. While the principle of respecting the popular will is publicly upheld, positions shift dramatically when the ballot box brings an Islamist government to power. French scholar Olivier Roy summarises this contradiction by noting that the West “prefers an authoritarian dictatorial regime to the arrival of Islamists in power”. In other words, what troubles the West is not the violation of democratic principles, but the nature of the force that gains power.
3. Societal Polarisation: The Bleeding Wound That Precedes – and Threatens – Elections
Before discussing the usefulness of upcoming elections in Sudan, we must first diagnose a deeply fractured social reality. Sudan today suffers from acute polarisation that has gone beyond political elites to penetrate the very fabric of society – something clearly reflected in repeated scenes on the streets, in the media, and on social networks.
This polarisation is not merely a product of the current war; it is an extension of a long-standing historical struggle, as some analysts note, stretching back decades over the identity of the state and the nature of its system of governance.
Its manifestations can be seen in entrenched binary divides dominating the scene: demonstrations in support of the military institution versus marches marking the December 2018/2019 uprising; a sharply split media discourse, with each side colouring reality to serve its own narrative. Years of conflict have eroded the “grey zone” where people might otherwise meet, and positions have been reduced to a crude “with us or against us”: for or against the army, for or against the street movement, for or against secularism, for or against Islamism – in a vicious circle of mutual accusations that deepens the rift.
More dangerously, this polarisation is no longer confined to grand political disputes; it has seeped into everyday social and humanitarian issues, threatening national cohesion at its core. A fundamentally human issue like the return of displaced persons and refugees to their homes – humanitarian, social, and economic in essence – has turned into yet another arena for conflict.
Some regard any positive talk about the return of security and normal life as an endorsement of the current system and thus reject it; others see any hesitation over return as hostility to the homeland and a questioning of sacrifices made. This excessive politicisation of basic survival issues impedes sound individual and family decision-making and makes it impossible to build a constructive national dialogue. We must not forget that this societal division has been – and still is – the primary objective of the country’s enemies in the first place.
In such a context, calling for swift elections without addressing this deep social rupture is a recipe for certain failure. How can ballot boxes produce stable political legitimacy when they are placed in a society suffering from sharp binary polarisation, fuelled by competing narratives in which each side believes the other threatens its very existence and hard-won gains?
Between these two poles, a middle group – though limited in influence at present – is seeking common ground and building bridges for dialogue. This group believes the only way out is to break the cycle of polarisation and to forge a new national cohesion based on mutual recognition of rights. Yet its voice often fades, as it faces accusations from both sides: “soft” or “treacherous” in the eyes of one camp; “naïve” or “aligned with the old regime” in the eyes of the other. This systematic distortion of its intentions makes it hesitant to play the role of effective mediator, opening further space for extremist rhetoric and deepening the crisis of trust – which is the greatest challenge facing any future electoral process.
Thus, elections in this climate will not serve as a tool for resolving disputes; they may well be the spark that ignites violence, turning political competition into an existential struggle. Paving the way for any credible electoral process requires serious steps to mend the social rift and to create spaces for genuine national dialogue that transcends the logic of labelling and accusation and redefines the homeland as a shared space for all.
4. Regional Lessons: When the Ballot Box “Chooses Wrong”!
Regional experiences provide stark examples of these double standards:
Algeria (1991):
When the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the first round of parliamentary elections, the army staged a coup and cancelled the democratic process, under an international cover largely sympathetic to that move.
Palestine (2006):
Hamas won the legislative elections, entering into a political and then security confrontation with Fatah and the PLO. This led to a sharp split in governance between the West Bank and Gaza, and a suffocating siege on the Strip, further complicating the situation and contributing to the path that eventually led to the events of 7 October 2023 and their aftermath.
In all these cases, the results were not rejected because the elections lacked integrity, but because they produced the “wrong winner”. This reveals that, for some local and global elites, calls for democracy are conditional on its outcomes. If the results serve their interests, they are hailed as “the genius of the people”; but if they do not, they are denounced as “tyranny of the majority” or “a threat to democracy itself”!
5. Sudan and the Islamists: Exclusion or Inclusion?
In the Sudanese context, the struggle is sometimes framed as a battle between “secular democratic forces” and “authoritarian Islamist forces”. This simplification ignores the fact that the Sudanese Islamic movement has enjoyed considerable political influence among both educated sectors and various marginalised communities. It also ignores the fact that excluding a political current with a broad popular base, under the pretext of “protecting democracy”, is itself an undemocratic act.
The real debate Sudan needs is not about whether Islamists should be excluded, but about how they can be incorporated into a genuinely pluralistic political process with guarantees for all. The question is: how can we build an authentic Sudanese democracy that accepts all components of the population and treats Islamists as part of the political equation, not an enemy to be eradicated?
6. Towards an Authentic and Inclusive Sudanese Democracy
On the basis of all that has been said, calling for swift elections as a magic solution is a blueprint for yet another failure unless built on sound foundations.
What is required is:
• Agreement on the rules of the game:
From ideological conflict to a unifying social covenant.
Building a stable path towards elections requires moving beyond the abstract tug-of-war between “secular” and “Islamic” models of the state – a fault-line that has long been one of the roots of Sudan’s crises. It is not enough simply to call for an agreement among all parties; the danger lies in making the constitution itself a battlefield if it clearly aligns with one ideology at the expense of another, thereby reproducing past crises.
A practical way out lies in formulating “supra-constitutional principles” to be put to a referendum and agreed upon by all components, then incorporated into the heart of the forthcoming constitution. These principles are constitutional rules with exceptional protection: they cannot be easily amended or abolished, and they define the nature and identity of the state on inclusive bases.
• Building neutral institutions:
Reforming state institutions – especially the electoral commission, the judiciary, and the security services – to guarantee their full neutrality.
• Rejecting double standards:
Sudanese elites of all stripes must free themselves from exclusionary narratives backed by outside forces and adopt a genuinely inclusive national vision.
• Democracy as a culture:
Embedding a culture of accepting the other and resorting to the ballot box, with the understanding that democracy means respecting the opinion of the majority even when we disagree with it.
And Finally, What Is the Real Test?
Elections in Sudan will only be a solution if they represent the visible tip of an iceberg of genuine, comprehensive democratic transformation. The real test for democracy in Sudan will not be the ability of elites to win elections, but their ability to accept losing them – and to accept that forces they disagree with may reach power.
An authentic Sudanese democracy is one that safeguards the dignity of every citizen, accommodates the full range of the people’s political spectrum, and frees itself from the tutelage of both local and international double standards. Only then can elections become a means of construction rather than destruction, and of unity rather than division.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=9774