The Narrative of War and the Prospects of Peace (4/7): External Initiatives and Interventions in Sudanese Affairs

Taj al-Din Banaga
Following the outbreak of the December Revolution, foreign involvement in the Sudanese scene became both visible and intense. The General Command headquarters and the sit-in area were transformed into hubs of diplomatic activity, while Khartoum became a stage for rapid movements by resident embassies and special envoys. This intervention took place either through diplomatic missions or via international envoys who arrived in Sudan in unprecedented numbers during that period.
One of the most prominent of these interventions was the launch of political initiatives, foremost among them the African Union initiative, whose team was headed by Professor “Wadd Labad”. Ethiopia later joined this effort, represented by the Special Envoy of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Ambassador Mahmoud Dirir. This mechanism evolved into a principal platform for communication and negotiation between the military component—which announced its assumption of power following the fall of the Salvation Regime in April 2019—and the civilian component represented by the Forces of Freedom and Change.
In a subsequent development, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America joined the African Union–Ethiopia mechanism, forming what became known as the “Quartet Mechanism”, comprising the African Union, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. This mechanism played a key role in managing the negotiation process that culminated in the signing of the Constitutional Document in August 2019, which governed the transitional period.
The Juba Peace Agreement
However, the Constitutional Document did not include the Revolutionary Front, which had been excluded from the first phase of negotiations. This prompted it to turn outward to the Republic of South Sudan. As a result, Juba entered the scene as a mediator between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and the Revolutionary Front, which comprised armed movements from Darfur and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (the Two Areas of Blue Nile and South Kordofan), along with other revolutionary forces.
The Juba negotiations subsequently evolved into five tracks: the Darfur track, the Two Areas track, the Central track, the Northern track, and the Eastern track, with the participation of approximately 15 factions, movements, and alliances. The negotiation marathon continued until it was crowned with the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement for Sudan in October 2020. This led to amendments to the Constitutional Document and the formation of a tripartite partnership comprising the military component (now represented in the Sovereignty Council), the Forces of Freedom and Change, and the peace movements that signed the agreement.
This partnership lasted for roughly one year before disputes erupted among its components. During this phase, foreign embassies, international organisations, and special envoys played significant roles in relations among the parties. In this context, the role of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), headed by Volker Perthes, became particularly prominent, especially as tensions escalated between the Sudanese Armed Forces on the one hand and the forces that adopted the Framework Agreement project on the other.
International efforts focused on promoting the Framework Agreement, using a combination of promises and pressure, mediated by external actors, to push the Sudanese parties towards signing. Within this context, Volker Perthes visited El Geneina and met with the leadership of the Rapid Support Forces, who had been based there for months. This step reflected an international perception that treated the army and the Rapid Support Forces as two parallel institutions, each possessing independent legitimacy and requiring separate signatures—an approach that ran counter to established norms and to the provisions of the Constitutional Document, which defined the regular forces as comprising the armed forces, the Rapid Support Forces, the police, and the intelligence service.
The Framework Agreement was signed under these circumstances and complexities, despite the structural imbalances and fundamental flaws that accompanied it. Contentious issues and unresolved matters were deferred for later handling through specialised technical workshops under the supervision of international mediators. The Sudanese Armed Forces, however, viewed this as a clear bias on the part of some mediators in favour of the Rapid Support Forces and as an attempt to impose their vision, particularly with regard to the Security and Military Sector Reform workshop, which was among the main reasons for the failure of the Framework Agreement and, subsequently, the outbreak of war.
After the War
With the outbreak of the war, it appeared that wide segments of the international community, alongside a number of neighbouring countries (excluding Egypt, Eritrea, and a few others), were inclined to support the position of the Rapid Support Forces, whether directly or indirectly.
After the Rapid Support Forces failed to seize power swiftly and as the scope of the war expanded from Khartoum to several Sudanese states, their field operations continued, accompanied by external backing in the form of military, logistical, and media support, as well as the official reception of their leaders in certain capitals.
The scene began to shift, however, as the army mobilised the Sudanese people, popular resistance emerged, and the armed forces regained the initiative and liberated areas one after another, culminating in the liberation of the capital, Khartoum. At that point, external support shifted from military and political support to a focus on humanitarian work through relief organisations, the designation of corridors, and the organisation of aid flows to those affected by the war.
At the same time, international and regional organisations concerned with political settlement became active, including the African Union, the League of Arab States, the United Nations, and the European Union. This activity took the form of individual, bilateral, trilateral, quartet, and quintet initiatives, manifested in conferences and workshops targeting various political forces, as part of efforts to design a new political process to coincide with attempts to halt the war.
European institutions also organised a number of conferences in Switzerland, Cairo, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Kampala, Kuala Lumpur, and other world capitals, in repeated attempts to re-engineer Sudan’s political process.
Despite Sudan’s suspension from the African Union, the Union continued its efforts and initiatives to bring political forces closer together and link the political track to negotiations to end the war and establish a democratic transition.
In parallel, many countries—particularly European and Western states—continued to dispatch special envoys to Sudan, including the United States, Britain, Switzerland, Germany, and Italy, under the pretext of helping end the war, achieve peace, and support a sustainable democratic path.
Most recently, the International Quartet initiative emerged, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates—a state accused by the Sudanese government before international courts of being a principal partner in the war. This accusation effectively buried the initiative at birth, paving the way for the re-emergence of the Saudi–American bilateral initiative, which is now hoped to contribute serious steps forward, particularly after Egypt announced its support. In parallel, the Quintet initiative also emerged to design the political process, comprising the African Union, IGAD, the League of Arab States, the United Nations, and the European Union, which continues to feel its way along an arduous path.
In conclusion, the outcome of all these interventions has been the formation of an extremely complex political landscape, dominated by foreign presence through multiple, overlapping initiatives. This reflected a state of fragmentation and international competition over Sudan’s internal affairs, a reality that was clearly mirrored in both local and international media discourse, further complicating the situation.
To be continued…

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=9993