A Reading of the UAE’s Responses to the US’s “Dismissiveness”

Sudanhorizon – Mohamed Osman Adam
Until the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) rebels launched their attack and entered El-Fasher in late October, the United Arab Emirates had been on the offensive against what it had previously called the “Port Sudan administration”. It consistently denied its involvement in supplying the RSF militia with weapons, basing its defence on its membership in the Quartet and on claims that it was merely assisting Sudanese civilians trapped in the war.
All UAE statements and attacks on the Sudanese army and government were delivered sharply and confidently, with no concern for consequences—buoyed by the support it enjoyed from the US presidency and, naturally, from Israel.
But now, these arguments—rooted in repeated Emirati assertions—have begun to erode and collapse. The turning point came when the UAE Embassy in Washington issued a lengthy statement revealing a significant shift. The UAE was no longer attacking the army or the “Sudanese administration”, nor was it addressing them directly. Its primary concern had become speaking to its allies and partners: the United States and European states. These allies appeared—at least publicly—to be withholding the unconditional support the UAE was accustomed to receiving.
Under pressure from public opinion, Congress, and mounting evidence, Western governments began reassessing the situation. Yes, they acknowledged the vital contributions the UAE makes to their economies, but they also recognised the moral cost and the long-term strategic consequences, particularly for Sudan—where the war has failed to deliver the swift outcomes Abu Dhabi had hoped for.
This raises a critical question:
If the UAE is driven by investment opportunities, Sudan’s wealth, and the allure of geopolitical repositioning, the West also needs those same gains—so why leave them to the UAE alone?
And if the UAE claims to be combating violent extremism, the West is equally invested in eliminating it. Furthermore, the chaos that would follow Sudan’s fragmentation would inevitably fuel illegal migration into Europe and facilitate extremist infiltration into the EU and beyond.
Thus, whatever short-term benefit the West gains from turning a blind eye to the UAE’s actions, it is nonetheless in their interest—however temporarily—to curb Abu Dhabi’s unchecked expansion in Sudan and the region. In the long run, the people of Kordofan, Darfur, Blue Nile, Sennar, and Gedaref—regions that produce the prized gum arabic coveted by France, Japan, China, and the US—will not forget the positions France and its allies took regarding those who committed massacres against them. Governments rise and fall, but nations remember.
Shifts Reflected in Official Statements
When the US administration imposed new sanctions on Colombian companies, officials deliberately avoided connecting these entities to the UAE or explaining how they were linked to it—even though they stated that some of these companies were based in the Emirates. They neither condemned the UAE nor asked it for an explanation—at least not publicly. So what did Washington do?
Before announcing the sanctions, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio phoned the Egyptian foreign minister to discuss the issue. According to the State Department, they discussed regional peace efforts—including Sudan.
Rubio then called his Saudi counterpart, raising the same topics, including Sudan’s peace process. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are members of the Quartet. But one member was conspicuously absent from public engagement: the UAE. The message could not have been clearer.
There was no statement from the UAE supporting the US—its powerful ally and fellow Quartet member—after the sanctions were announced. No comment at all, at least none made public.
Days after the sanctions, US lawmakers launched a fierce and unprecedented attack on the UAE, with several members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee calling for direct punitive measures.
In a hearing on the humanitarian situation in Sudan, Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal stated that Sudan is facing one of the worst humanitarian crises ever witnessed. She criticised both the current and previous administrations for their inadequate response, noting that hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians are on the brink of famine and that the war has devastated the country.
She added:
“I am calling for urgent humanitarian aid as we continue working toward long-term political and diplomatic solutions to this crisis.”
She further underscored the UAE’s role in funding one of the armed parties and called for leveraging American influence—including halting arms sales to the UAE—to stop Abu Dhabi from continuing its support.
Another member, Chris Smith, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, stated in his opening remarks during a hearing titled “Stopping the Bloodshed: The US Response to Crimes Against Humanity in Sudan”:
“We must be fully aware of the external actors fuelling this conflict. On Tuesday, the Treasury Department sanctioned a cross-border network, led by Colombian actors, involving hundreds of ex-Colombian soldiers who travelled to Sudan to fight alongside the RSF since 2024.”
He added:
“The illicit trade of Sudanese gold, smuggled by the RSF through the UAE, directly finances Hemedti’s war machine. We cannot ignore the role of the UAE in supplying arms used to kill innocent Sudanese civilians. At the same time, we see Russia seeking naval access to Port Sudan, and reports of Iranian drones bolstering the Sudanese Armed Forces. Sudan has become a battleground for foreign powers while its people suffer as collateral damage.”
After being ignored publicly by the US administration, rebuked by Congress, and scrutinised by the media, the UAE launched a public relations campaign. It issued a long, explanatory—if somewhat defensive—statement clearly responding to Washington’s displeasure. The statement, published by the UAE Embassy in Washington, was plainly directed at the American public and policymakers.
In its 14-paragraph statement, the embassy tried to re-establish its narrative of a “war between two generals”, claiming that the UAE condemns atrocities—without, of course, acknowledging that the RSF is responsible for those atrocities, as internationally documented.
It has become clear that the UAE now faces a burden greater than its capacity on the Sudanese, regional, and international fronts. Its immediate dilemma is how to manage public and political opinion in the United States—and how to work with the US administration to find an honourable exit from the “failure” and disaster Sudan has placed it in.
Where matters may go from here is uncertain, but signs point to a troubling descent into a difficult-to-predict abyss.

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