Between Sea and Border: the Horn of Africa at Stake

Muhanad Awad Mahmoud
The Horn of Africa is currently moving to the rhythm of accelerating tensions that are reshaping regional balances. Geographic calculations are converging with ambitions of influence, and old fault lines between Ethiopia and Eritrea are resurfacing. What appears on the surface to be a dispute over maritime access is, in reality, part of a broader landscape reflecting a struggle over will, sovereignty, and identity—threatening to turn the region into a new arena of confrontation along the shores of the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s persistent push to secure a seaport—whether through the rhetoric of “historic rights” or complex arrangements with actors such as Somaliland—signals ambitions that go far beyond trade and economic needs. It is gradually morphing into a project aimed at redefining Ethiopia’s geopolitical role.
Conversely, Asmara views any Ethiopian expansion towards Assab as a direct threat to its sovereignty and strategic position, relying on a long legacy of border conflict and deep concerns over shifting power dynamics in its immediate neighbourhood.
At the heart of this complex landscape lies a third and highly sensitive factor: Tigray. The agreement that ended the war there failed to create stable and sustainable arrangements. Issues of borders, withdrawals, justice, and displaced populations remain unresolved, while internal fractures within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front have created openings that could be exploited in any regional escalation. This political and security vacuum leaves the region vulnerable to instrumentalisation—either as leverage or as a battleground for proxy confrontation—adding yet another layer of complexity. Any military slide between Addis Ababa and Asmara could easily spill over into fragile, porous geographical lines.
The risks deepen further given the fragile humanitarian situation in northern Ethiopia, where the scars of war intersect with shrinking access to international aid and collapsing basic services. In such an environment, any security shock becomes an immediate trigger for expanded displacement and chaos. Local administrative systems are weak, logistical networks are strained, and non-state actors—from smuggling networks to armed groups—stand ready to fill any emerging void. And because the Red Sea and its vital maritime routes form the natural extension of this geography, any disruption in Ethiopian–Eritrean relations would inevitably impact port security, humanitarian corridors, and maritime supply chains—at a time when the international waterway is already congested with competing regional and global powers.
Despite the bleak picture, war is not an inevitable fate. The window for containment still exists, though it is narrowing by the day. Preserving this window requires a carefully calibrated effort to restore political and security balance between the parties—through reviving the commitments of the Pretoria Agreement, linking international support to clear mechanisms of implementation under independent monitoring, and launching a realistic maritime negotiation track that satisfies Ethiopia’s developmental needs without infringing on Eritrean sovereignty. It also demands that the African Union and IGAD step in to fill the diplomatic vacuum before external powers fill it with alternative arrangements.
Within this shifting regional landscape, Sudan’s restoration of full membership in the African Union appears not merely desirable but strategically essential. Sudan’s absence from Africa’s decision-making structures limits its ability to act as a stabilising force in Horn of Africa affairs. It deprives the region of a pivotal geographic actor whose influence stretches from the Ethiopian highlands to the Red Sea coast. With its geographic weight, historical depth, and cross-border social connections, Sudan is naturally positioned to serve as a mediator and advance initiatives to realign regional priorities amid increasing internationalisation and great-power competition over the Red Sea. But such roles cannot be effectively played while Sudan’s membership remains suspended in the very institution designed to manage continental conflicts and collective security. Restoring Sudan’s full membership is therefore not symbolic—it is fundamental to enabling Khartoum to defend its interests, shape emerging security arrangements in the Horn of Africa, and ensure that regional files are not managed in its absence or from outside the continent.
Sudan emerges in the current moment as a central actor directly affected by developments in the Horn of Africa, yet also capable—if it seizes the moment—of turning current tensions into an opportunity to rebuild its natural regional role. With its shared border with Ethiopia, strategic position on the Red Sea, and long experience managing Horn of Africa dynamics, Sudan’s role should not be confined to observing events from a distance. It must engage along three parallel tracks:
Conducting direct, low-tension dialogue with both Addis Ababa and Asmara to safeguard against conflict expansion towards its eastern border;
Active engagement with the African Union and IGAD, presenting Sudan as a stabilising actor rather than an arena for polarisation;
Opening indirect negotiation channels that secure Khartoum’s central role in maritime security and border stability, particularly given the transformative shifts along the Red Sea corridor.
Yet this role demands that the Sudanese government address clear vulnerabilities that external powers might exploit if left unattended. These include the need to unify Sudan’s diplomatic messaging, strengthen security control along the eastern border, and prevent any informal activities that could be used as pretexts for internationalising the border issue. Sudan must also build constructive partnerships with key regional actors in its natural sphere—such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti—to create a protective umbrella that prevents external parties from imposing strategic arrangements that jeopardise Sudan’s land and maritime security.
The current moment in the Horn of Africa is not simply a passing wave of tension—it is a profound test of the region’s ability to avert a broader strategic slide with far-reaching consequences for the entire north-eastern quadrant of the continent. Sudan, with its geographical position and strategic sensitivity, stands before a rare opportunity to transform itself from a passive recipient of regional shocks into an active shaper of outcomes—provided it manages the moment with calm, measured, and balanced tools that place Khartoum at the heart of emerging regional arrangements rather than on their margins.

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