“The Humanitarian Catastrophe in Sudan: A Pretext for International Intervention and More”

By Mahmoud Hussein Serry

The war in Sudan has produced a humanitarian catastrophe that no rational observer can deny, ignore, or downplay. Regardless of who is responsible for this tragedy, the “international community” directs blame towards both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), placing them on equal footing. This comes despite the horrific atrocities, terrorist acts, brutalities, and heinous crimes committed by the rebel RSF. Yet the international community insists that the Sudanese Armed Forces bear the primary, constitutional, moral, and ethical responsibility to protect civilians, according to law, constitution, and custom.

Despite the SAF’s keenness, concern, and firm commitment to avoid targeting civilian areas seized and fortified by the RSF—who used unarmed civilians as human shields, and occupied all civilian facilities such as hospitals, schools, government buildings, mosques, and churches, converting them into military bases—violations, injuries, and civilian deaths have nonetheless occurred. This is despite the Sudanese Army’s strenuous efforts to avoid such incidents in a war that has turned into urban warfare waged in and against cities and civilians.

The heaviest burden of this ongoing war is the humanitarian cost—an unprecedented humanitarian crisis and catastrophe.

After two and a half years of war, no one can deny that it has caused the internal displacement of nine million people, making Sudan home to the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. Over three million people have fled to neighbouring countries, and illegal migration networks have expanded. International reports estimate that around two-thirds of Sudan’s population is now in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, and that 71% of the population has fallen into poverty.

According to international assessments, more than 16 million Sudanese children require immediate humanitarian support. Acute food insecurity has reached historic levels, with confirmed cases of famine in several parts of the country—especially in areas controlled by the RSF, where cities with hundreds of thousands of trapped civilians are besieged, placing millions at risk of death by starvation. At the same time, disease outbreaks are worsening, compounded by climate shocks.

International monitors expect hundreds of thousands of deaths from the war, with hundreds of thousands more wounded or maimed due to landmines, in addition to thousands of enforced disappearances and cases of systematic torture on an ethnic basis.

Women, girls, and children are among the most affected. The war has generated a parallel conflict marked by sexual violence, rape, the use of child soldiers, and gender-based violence. Regional and international organisations are still investigating this highly sensitive file, and if the findings are released, the consequences for Sudan will be severe, far-reaching, and catastrophic.

International reports indicate that over 90% of Sudan’s school-age children—around 19 million—are receiving no education, as many schools have been destroyed or turned into military bases and shelters for displaced people. More than 80% of hospitals in conflict zones are non-functional due to attacks, looting, and a lack of staff.

From all this, we conclude that the humanitarian cost of the war is enormous, raising an important question: Who will pay this humanitarian bill?

Will it be the rebel RSF?

Will the international community punish the armed forces and their leaders?

Will the humanitarian burden be shared equally between the SAF and RSF?

Will the humanitarian catastrophe be used to pressure both sides into concessions, compromises, ceasefires, and a peace agreement?

Or is the true aim behind leveraging the humanitarian tragedy something far greater—driving Sudan towards division, fragmentation, and partition?

In all cases, the international community has shown negligence and reluctance in fulfilling its humanitarian role, failing to enforce UN resolutions or the Jeddah Agreement, and applying blatant double standards compared to the cases of Ukraine and Gaza. Periodically, we see statements that equate the RSF and the army in human rights violations and in causing the humanitarian crisis, constantly applying the flawed approach of treating the national army and a rebel paramilitary force as equals. Yet the difference between them is stark: the Sudanese Armed Forces are a constitutional state institution fighting a paramilitary group that has rebelled against the state, the law, and state institutions.

The international community’s failure is further demonstrated in its inability to deliver on financial pledges for humanitarian aid made at the Paris and London conferences. While the United States speaks of providing USD 255 million, the EU USD 213 million, the World Bank USD 85 million, and the UK USD 100 million—alongside other donors—actual disbursements on the ground amount to no more than 25% of these commitments. These countries justify their failure by citing the need to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers and their facilities in Sudan before delivering emergency aid.

International bodies continue to accuse the Sudanese government at global forums of imposing travel restrictions on humanitarian agencies and refusing to grant travel permits beyond Port Sudan and between states. Donor states and international organisations demand immediate, unrestricted safe corridors for aid workers, guarantees for movement by land and air, and expedited visa procedures to scale up operations. They also pressure the government to ease customs restrictions on operational supplies, issuing statements that call for safe access without armed escorts—claiming that such escorts compromise safety, neutrality, and independence.

These conditions for delivering pledges are unrealistic and constitute an attempt to twist the government’s arm—using humanitarian access as a tool of pressure to force acceptance of ceasefires under the guise of relief operations. In reality, such corridors would provide opportunities for the rebels to receive weapons and logistical support through humanitarian channels for use against the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, the international community continues producing statements, convening international meetings, and publishing reports alleging Sudan’s “deliberate obstruction of aid”—all with the aim of accusing the government of weaponising hunger to block humanitarian access.

Reports of aid looting, its sale on the black market, and the controversy surrounding the Sudanese government’s expulsion of World Food Programme staff in late October 2025—despite clear government explanations that those staff had engaged in misconduct including “celebrating the fall of El Fasher” and communicating with the RSF, in addition to discriminatory aid distribution—are weaponised by the international community to portray Sudan as uncooperative, indifferent to its citizens’ wellbeing, and unconcerned by the humanitarian catastrophe.

From the pattern of statements, reports, diplomatic pressure, and meetings—where the Sudan humanitarian crisis takes centre stage—it is clear that the international community’s objective has shifted from delivering neutral, impartial, and independent humanitarian assistance with the host state’s consent, to imposing humanitarian intervention: shaping global public opinion and pushing for international resolutions that pave the way for the use of military force by a coalition of states to address large-scale human rights violations.

Thus, the Sudanese government, the Sudanese Armed Forces, and Sudan’s friendly nations must remain vigilant and aware.

The “international community”—particularly the West—is attempting to internationalise Sudan’s humanitarian issue and transform it into a “legitimising ideology” for powerful states, especially the United States, to impose influence and pursue their own geopolitical interests.

The mixed motives behind foreign calls for humanitarian intervention in Sudan—despite their apparent legitimacy—are not purely humanitarian; many are driven by private and self-interested agendas.

Insistence on humanitarian intervention without pursuing a peaceful solution to the conflict reflects a strategic agenda that undermines any genuine desire to end atrocities.

The international community refuses to abandon double standards, which are especially glaring in Sudan’s case. In Sudan, some countries loudly demand a ceasefire and urge both sides to stop violence and protect civilians; yet in Gaza and Ukraine, these very countries give Israel and Ukraine a “blank cheque” to escalate, ignoring blatant violations of international humanitarian law by Israeli and Ukrainian forces. Likewise, they prioritise Israel’s and Ukraine’s right to self-defence and protection of their citizens, while denying Sudan’s government the same right and accusing the Sudanese Army of political and tribal bias.

The core problem is that the international community operates from a fundamentally flawed understanding of who bears responsibility for protecting civilians in Sudan, securing the borders, and maintaining national security. There are also misconceptions about who has the legal authority to invite foreign forces into Sudan, and ultimately, with whom UN officials should engage to address the crisis and coordinate humanitarian operations.

The real motives behind calls for humanitarian intervention—despite Sudan’s dire humanitarian situation—are to introduce external mechanisms for accountability that could lead to the deployment of international forces in the country.

The Sudanese government must develop a clear action plan for managing the humanitarian crisis—one that involves coordination among all relevant stakeholders, backed by accurate data and unambiguous requests. The government has so far failed to manage this file in a manner that safeguards Sudan’s sovereignty and communicates to the international community the true nature of what is happening.

Sudanese institutions working in isolation must instead coordinate across ministries, commissions, and states. The government must also strengthen its media messaging on RSF atrocities in order to increase international pressure and push for the RSF’s designation as a terrorist organisation—removing the pretexts for calls to negotiate with the rebels, share power, or divide resources.

It is equally important to shield national volunteer initiatives from international exploitation and the surge of foreign funding that seeks to politicise humanitarian efforts—turning emergency rooms, resistance committees, and youth initiatives from community-support mechanisms into political entities issuing statements and reports that international organisations use to justify intervention.

Western narratives about a “dire humanitarian situation” are primarily aimed at sending weapons across borders to feed the rebels under the guise of humanitarian corridors. This is evident in the international community’s rejection of the many border crossings offered by the government for aid delivery and its insistence on routes controlled by the RSF.

The feverish push for humanitarian intervention and the mounting pressure under the pretext of aid access is not driven by a sincere desire to help Sudanese people overcome hardship, but by an effort to create further chaos—to fish in troubled waters.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=8728