The EU and Sudan: What Can Bridge the Gap and Pave the Way for Cooperation?

Sudanhorizon – Diplomatic Editor

Reports indicate that the European Union’s envoy to the Horn of Africa is preparing to visit Sudan. On her agenda is a meeting with senior officials in Port Sudan, led by Prime Minister Dr. Kamal Idris.

Diplomatic sources also suggest that the EU is planning to appoint a new ambassador to Sudan. The name being circulated is that of German diplomat Wolfram Vetter, who is expected to succeed Irish diplomat Aidan O’Hara, the EU’s ambassador to Sudan from 2022 to 2025.

The nominated German diplomat has a professional career that includes postings in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, the African Union, and Burundi, as well as service at the German Foreign Ministry headquarters and in the German parliament.

Positive Signs

There is no doubt that the fields of cooperation between Sudan and the EU are vast—political, economic, developmental, security, and humanitarian. Equally, there is no doubt that the “diplomatic relationship” between the two sides has fallen short of the ambitions of either party for more than three decades. The reasons are primarily political, related to EU positions and those of its influential member states regarding developments in Sudan.

With the appointment of a new ambassador at this sensitive moment, and the departure of the current one, there now appears to be an opportunity for understanding between Brussels and Khartoum. The new ambassador may play an influential role in laying new foundations by working to improve relations between Sudan and the 27 European countries.

This article seeks to raise a key question: Is there hope for improved relations between Sudan and the EU? And are ambassadors capable of driving real change, or are they simply instruments for carrying out the policies and interests of their home countries in Sudan?

The Outgoing Ambassador’s Legacy

Irish diplomat Aidan O’Hara served nearly four years as the EU’s ambassador to Sudan, representing this influential continental bloc. He had a golden opportunity to, together with fellow ambassadors of member states, steer Sudan toward peace, justice, and democracy. Instead, he became engaged, along with some colleagues, in narrow activities that undermined the transitional period and contributed to the war Sudan is experiencing today.

In this report, we reviewed his professional record in Sudan-EU relations through Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives, European embassies, media coverage, and EU press statements. Our findings reveal that O’Hara left behind a heavy legacy that will only make his successor’s task more difficult.

The “Framework Agreement Ambassador”

It is fair to call O’Hara the “Ambassador of the Framework Agreement.” From the moment he presented his credentials in September 2022, he poured his diplomatic and political efforts, and EU support, into backing the framework agreement that pushed Sudan to the boiling point and ignited the war.

O’Hara was visibly present at almost every seminar organized by Volker Perthes’ UN mission, actively participating alongside other European ambassadors. The peak came at the infamous seminar on security sector reform and the integration of the Rapid Support Forces, which triggered the chain of events leading to the outbreak of war in April 2023.

His activity patterns showed he was meeting only with political factions supportive of the framework agreement, marginalizing and isolating other political, military, and security actors. He refused to meet them, effectively excluding them from access to European institutions, and neglected to hear opposing views within Sudan.

Turning a Blind Eye to Abuses

O’Hara not only openly aligned himself with certain political groups and insisted on pushing “solutions” crafted by Volker’s mission but also turned a blind eye to clear abuses by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

On 18 April 2023, just four days into the war, RSF militias attacked the home of the Dean of European Ambassadors in Khartoum, physically assaulting him. Yet O’Hara remained silent. A video circulated at the time even showed a European diplomat thanking the RSF, calling it “a professional army.” The EU issued a short statement that deliberately avoided naming the RSF as the perpetrators.

Ambiguous Positions

These developments were reflected in the EU’s broader stance on Sudan. Under O’Hara, EU statements continued to describe the war as a “conflict between two generals” or “a power struggle against civilian democratic forces.” The EU claimed neutrality while focusing heavily on amplifying the humanitarian crisis, yet consistently failed to address atrocities against civilians or crimes committed by the RSF and foreign mercenaries.

Even after the Tasis coalition announced its plan to form a parallel government, O’Hara refused to issue a statement condemning the threat to Sudan’s unity. He was reluctant to criticize RSF crimes, perhaps because of the EU’s prior financial and military support to the RSF under the justification of combating irregular migration.

Withdrawal of Recognition

For the first time in 40 years of political, developmental, humanitarian, cultural, and security cooperation, the EU delegation to Sudan shut its doors during O’Hara’s tenure. Operations were relocated to Belgium. He rejected efforts to reopen the mission from Port Sudan and instead lobbied to move it to Kenya, under pressure from civilian groups.

During this time, the EU organized conferences in Paris, Helsinki, London, Berlin, and Geneva in support of civilian groups, hosting figures from Hamdok’s government and providing platforms for the Forces of Freedom and Change. Yet internal divisions and narrow party rivalries derailed these initiatives, squandering millions of euros intended for “supporting democratic transition in Sudan.” European ambassadors’ insistence on sidelining major political and ideological groups from both Sudan’s left and right also doomed these efforts.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Achievements

Despite these EU shortcomings and the push to relocate embassies to Kenya and Ethiopia (closer to the civilian coalition and the RSF leadership), Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supported by Sudan’s allies and pragmatic voices in Europe—managed to relocate the EU delegation’s work to Cairo. This placed the mission closer to the majority of Sudan’s political and civilian forces that had moved northward.

Observers note that both the EU envoy to the Horn of Africa and O’Hara worked persistently to create alternative platforms in Geneva and Paris to undermine U.S., Saudi, and Egyptian mediation efforts. These initiatives delayed implementation of the Jeddah Agreement, supported by Sudan’s army and Transitional Sovereign Council.

Sanctions as a Tool

Over the past four years, O’Hara, drawing on his legal background, focused heavily on advocating for international sanctions on Sudan. Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Yousif described these measures as politically motivated gestures that had little real impact on the situation in Sudan. They reflected displeasure rather than providing effective tools for change.

Humanitarian Intervention

In May 2025, the EU awarded the Emergency Response Rooms Network in Sudan a prize for what it called their “efforts in providing humanitarian assistance and defending civilian rights during the crisis.” Ambassador O’Hara personally handed over the award.

For the past three years, the EU has worked to magnify the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. While the crisis is undeniable, the EU’s amplification was used as leverage to pressure Sudan’s army into halting the war and negotiating with the RSF.

Critics argue that the EU and its funded civil society organizations politicized humanitarian issues, edging toward the narrative of invoking UN Chapter VII to send international forces to “protect civilians.” Observers point to the EU’s stance on Gaza as proof of double standards in its application of international humanitarian law.

Future Policy

As usual, Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is expected to formally welcome the new EU ambassador, German diplomat Wolfram Vetter. He will likely meet Sudanese officials starting with State Minister of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Omar Sediq.

The coming period will reveal whether the EU genuinely seeks fruitful cooperation with Sudan, or whether it remains constrained by political biases in favor of factions that lack real popular weight or future prospects in Sudanese governance.

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