Al-Burhan’s Meeting in Zurich… The US Knocks on Sudan’s Door

By Muhannad Awad Mahmoud
In what is perhaps the clearest step yet towards direct United States involvement in the Sudanese crisis, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, met with Massad Boulos, Senior Adviser on African Affairs in President Donald Trump’s administration, in Zurich, Switzerland. The three-hour meeting, arranged through special Qatari mediation, was not merely a passing diplomatic event; it appeared to mark a genuine turning point in Washington’s approach to the war in Sudan, revealing a strategic shift in how the United States perceives the balance of power inside the country — and perhaps across the wider region.
The very personality of Massad Boulos lent weight to the encounter. He is not merely a diplomat, but a well-connected figure with direct links to the Trump family, being the father of Michael Boulos, husband of President Trump’s daughter. Appointed in March 2025 as Senior Adviser to the US President on African Affairs, Boulos quickly made his mark on the international stage through his central role in resolving one of the continent’s most intractable disputes — the conflict between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.
In April, just weeks after his appointment, he led a tour of Kinshasa, Kigali, Nairobi, and Kampala aimed at defusing escalating tensions in eastern Congo, where Rwandan forces had been backing armed groups, most notably the “M23” movement. With clear Qatari backing, Boulos succeeded in securing a Declaration of Principles, later signed in Washington under the auspices of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, culminating in a comprehensive peace agreement in June 2025. This accord provided for a phased withdrawal of Rwandan troops and the establishment of a joint US–African monitoring mechanism.
This diplomatic success bolstered Boulos’s reputation as a mediator favouring smart, interest-driven diplomacy over direct military or security intervention. The Congo–Rwanda agreement included binding commitments for US investors and companies to enter mineral-rich regions — rich in cobalt, lithium, and tantalum — under transparent and regulated terms that would contribute to economic reconstruction. This step is widely viewed as Washington’s strategic response to China’s growing influence in African mineral resources, while also promoting cooperation in energy, infrastructure, mineral supply chains, public health, and tourism — all under a clear, internationally recognised timetable. From the American perspective, Sudan may well be the next candidate for applying this model.
The meeting with al-Burhan did not come from a sudden US impulse but was the result of a tactical shift that began weeks earlier, when Washington decided to abandon work within the traditional “Quad” framework (comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States) in favour of direct engagement with Sudan’s warring parties. President Trump stated this openly on 9 July 2025 during his meeting with five African leaders — the presidents of Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mauritania, Gabon, and Liberia — making clear that the US would act unilaterally to end the war in Sudan if regional actors failed to deliver an effective solution. The first step in this approach seems to have been an invitation for al-Burhan to meet personally with Massad Boulos, away from the media, in a high-level diplomatic arrangement overseen by Doha.
Qatar’s role here is far from trivial. The Qatari capital has long been a hub for mediating regional conflicts — from Darfur, to Afghanistan, to East Africa. Its warm relations with Sudan, combined with its strategic alliance with Washington — including hosting the largest US military base in the Middle East and cooperating on sensitive issues such as energy security and counter-terrorism — made it an ideal venue for arranging such a high-stakes meeting. It remains unclear whether Doha initiated the proposal or if Washington enlisted its help to implement the plan, but the meeting was certainly American in desire and Sudanese in calculated consent.
Al-Burhan, in this meeting, did not present himself as a weakened party seeking a truce but as a leader with the upper hand on the ground. According to reports, he stated that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) “will not be part of any transitional government”, stressing the need to disband them and hold their leaders accountable for crimes and violations. Such blunt language sends a powerful message — not only to Boulos, but to the entire international community — that no political settlement is possible without upholding state authority and the principle of accountability. Al-Burhan was also careful to limit discussions to the war and mechanisms for ending it, avoiding other contentious Sudanese-US issues such as sanctions or economic matters. This reflects a deliberate political awareness and an understanding of the importance of strategic focus at a critical negotiation moment.
Meanwhile, the United Nations Security Council issued a statement rejecting recognition of any parallel government or unrecognised de facto authority in Sudan — a move seen as a diplomatic blow to RSF attempts to establish alternative legitimacy in areas under its control. While there is no conclusive evidence that the United States directly pushed for this decision, the timing of Washington’s direct engagement alongside the Security Council’s stance suggests at least an indirect influence, or a tacit alignment of vision.
So, what does America really want from this meeting? Is it merely seeking to end the war for humanitarian reasons, or does it view the Sudanese army, under al-Burhan, as a potential future partner? The signs point to the latter. After repeated failed attempts to impose new realities through irregular armed groups — and with the army proving its cohesion, resilience, and even battlefield gains — Washington seems to have recalculated, recognising the Sudanese military institution as the real guarantor of the country’s stability. This does not necessarily mean it will back an exclusively military solution, but it may now be more inclined to engage with an army that has both legitimacy and control, rather than relying on factions whose reputations have collapsed domestically and internationally.
The success of this US initiative, bearing Massad Boulos’s imprint, will depend on a delicate balance between the army’s battlefield strength and its political flexibility, and on Washington’s ability to translate its understandings with al-Burhan into tangible changes on the ground. Either the Zurich meeting will mark the start of a new path towards a genuine, stable peace — or it will join the long list of initiatives that failed to match the complexity of Sudan’s reality. What is certain for now is that America is no longer watching from the sidelines; it has entered the heart of the struggle — this time armed with diplomacy, and with a mediator whose name is new to the Sudanese scene, but who carries in his portfolio a successful peace track record from Congo and Rwanda… and perhaps, in time, from Sudan as well.

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