Congratulations from Chad’s Kaka Versus Libya’s Haftar Support… What is Happening in Sudan’s western Flank?

Khartoum – Sudanhorizon

Some of the congratulations exchanged during this year’s Eid al-Adha seemed like a thick curtain eclipsing the smoke of battles and the movement of troops.

At the time Chadian President Muhammet Debe (Kaka) was sending a congratulatory cable to Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan on the occasion of Eid al-Adha, the Libyan sands were shaking under the wheels of military vehicles heading east, crossing the triangular border between Libya, Chad, and Sudan, and heading towards the far north of Darfur, in a renewed attempt to reposition the terrorist Rapid Support Forces militia. Between the greeting and the crossing, the dimensions of invisible alliances emerge, trying to establish a new reality on Sudan’s western borders, using agents without a cause and transitory support to sovereignty.

Haftar: A regular army and intertwined militia threads

The movements of Marshal Khalifa Haftar could not be understood without recalling the composition of his military force and his political project. The man who controls eastern Libya manages a force of more than 70,000 troops, comprising regular units alongside tribal militias and mercenaries.

His influence expands from Benghazi, Tobruk, to Sabha, with a clear extension towards southern Libya, especially in the Kufra and Marzuq areas. Haftar relies on a mixture of Russian and Chinese armored vehicles, old Soviet aircrafts, and light to medium weapons, alongside intelligence and logistical support from multiple regional actors. However, Haftar’s real power is not limited to his official forces but extends to militias such as:

– The Desert Brigade (which includes fighters from the Tuareg and Toubou)

– The Tariq bin Ziyad Battalion known for its brutality in remote areas

– And groups of mercenaries hailing from Chad, Niger, and Mali, which he sends for irregular operations and mobility in overlapping areas of influence.

Haftar’s support for militias: strategic maneuvers or indirect entrapment?

The terrorist Rapid Support Forces militia, which is waging a fierce war against the Sudanese state, has been seeking external military support for months to compensate for its successive losses, having suffered painful blows in Khartoum and its outskirts, expulsion from the states of Sinar and Al-Jazirah, and receiving painful blows in its strongholds in Darfur. The militia found in Khalifa Haftar what it was looking for, as he provided it with a land corridor through southern Libya, to gather mercenaries, sneak weapons, and reposition its exhausted fighters. It is clear that Haftar received a request, or an order, from his regional backers to do so. Sources that spoke to Sudanhorizon’ estimate the field presence of the militia within Libya to be between 800 and 1200 members, a significant proportion of whom are mercenaries (Chadians, Nigerians, and remnants of the Tuareg from northern Mali), alongside a small number of exhausted Sudanese elements. Their armament does not exceed Russian rifles (Kalashnikovs), PKM machines, and a limited number of 4X4 trucks equipped with Dushka, with no Airforce cover or advanced defensive capabilities. These elements are spread in the vicinity of Kufra and Sebha, in a tribal environment that does not provide a stable cover or field legitimacy.

– Weaknesses that can be exploited militarily

Despite this mobilization, the points of weakness are greater than the apparent areas of strength:

– The mercenaries lack ideology and motivation to fight.

– The desert supply routes are exposed, making them easy to monitor and target from the air.

– The absence of a social incubators in northern Darfur deprives them of any real extension.

– The lack of central control makes each unit in the field an isolated island.

The Sudanese army, with its organized strength and precise knowledge of the nature of the terrains and society, is capable of exploiting these shortcomings to deliver focused strikes that would cut off supplies, dismantle concentrations, and thwart plans at minimal cost.

– The likely destination: Darfur, not the Northern State

Despite rumors about these forces heading to the Northern State, the geographical and military indicators clearly suggest that the real target remains Darfur, particularly the axes of Kabkabiya, Kutum, and Zalengei, in a desperate attempt by the militia to regain lost influence. The Northern State, due to its geographic nature and demographic environment, does not provide any nurturing or logistical supply lines for these groups, making an attack there a costly endeavor with no reward.

– Rapid Support Forces: Leadership confusion and erosion of structure

Since their defeat in Omdurman and Khartoum, the Rapid Support Forces militias have been in a state of confusion and complete loss of direction. Their main lines have been cut off, their units have disbanded, their morale has plunged, and the circle of internal rebellion has begun to expand. Their leadership has failed to compensate for personnel shortages, resorting to mercenaries, which has increased field fragility. They no longer have a political project nor the ability to control the scene which makes it today a burden even on those who support it.

– The response should not be solely with weapons… but through multi-faceted pressure

The current battle transcends the geography of bullets. What is now required is parallel political and intelligence work that includes:

– Targeting the militias supporting Haftar inside Libya with the aim of changing their positions regarding what is happening in Sudan.

– Opening a media and diplomatic front to expose Haftar’s involvement in destabilizing Sudan.

– Neutralizing the mercenaries through communication with their home countries or through means of field influence. With this integration of the field, politics, and society, a formidable wall can be built, against which neither the alliances of mercenaries nor the illusions of warlords can withstand.

In conclusion, what is happening on the western flank of Sudan is not just a military movement, but a real test of the Sudanese state’s ability to protect its borders and deter anyone who would dare use its soil as a transit ground for destructive projects. The Sudanese army today is not only defending geography, but also the identity of a nation, the future of a community, and the will of a people who refuse to be hostages to foreign agents.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=5961