Excluding the National Congress Party and Repeating Failed Experiments: A Recurring Cycle of Failure and Violence

Dr Al-Haytham Al-Kindi Yousif
In his celebrated ode Wadda’a Hurayrah (Farewell to Hurayrah), the renowned pre-Islamic poet Al-A’sha, often known as the Bard of the Arabs, composed a verse that aptly reflects the repeated attempts by successive governments in our country to exclude their political rivals, without achieving any meaningful result:
Like a mountain goat butting against a rock in the hope of weakening it;
It harmed not the rock, but only broke its own horn.
It is as though our political leaders have never absorbed the lesson of political exclusion or understood the consequences it inevitably produces.
What was the outcome when the Sudanese Communist Party was excluded during Sudan’s first democratic period? What did the National Front do in 1976 after President Jaafar Nimeiri marginalised it while his regime followed a leftist orientation? What course did the Islamists take after they were excluded from participation in the final government of Sadiq al-Mahdi during the third democratic period, despite being the country’s third-largest political bloc at the time? What consequences followed the restrictions imposed on political parties during the early years of the National Salvation Government? And what became of the country as a result of the confrontational approach adopted towards Islamist movements during the period of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and the attempts to exclude and persecute them during the Framework Agreement process?
According to the author, the outcome has consistently been political violence, whether in the form of military coups, prolonged armed rebellions against the state, or sudden outbreaks of war.
The recurring pattern of political failure, he argues, has always been the repetition of the same mistakes. It is therefore unwise, at this particular moment, for the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council to speak of a national dialogue from which the National Congress Party (NCP) would be excluded.
The obvious question, the author contends, is this: how can such a process genuinely be described as a national dialogue if what he regards as the country’s largest political constituency is excluded from participation?
He poses a second rhetorical question: what political organisation is more deserving of participation than the National Congress Party, which, in his view, has sacrificed its members in defence of Sudan, its freedom, and its sovereignty?
Leaving aside the party’s name, which he suggests reflects its national character, the author asks who possesses the authority to determine which political forces may participate in such a dialogue, and from where that authority is derived.
He argues that attempts to secure international approval at the expense of Sudan’s internal political balance have repeatedly failed, both in Sudan and elsewhere. Consequently, he believes that such an approach should not be relied upon. Whether the issues are political, military, or economic, he maintains that lasting solutions have always depended upon domestic actors rather than external intervention.
According to the author, the only body entitled to determine who should govern and who should be excluded is the Sudanese people themselves. If a decision must ultimately be made, he argues, the responsibility of the transitional authorities should be to create the conditions necessary for free and fair elections, allowing citizens to determine the genuine political weight and popular support of the country’s parties and political movements.
In his view, neither the interests of the country nor the objectives of what he calls the War of Dignity are served by discussing the exclusion of any political group from future political arrangements. Only those who are found guilty through due judicial process, he argues, should be barred from participation, and that principle should apply equally to all political actors.
The author acknowledges that the National Congress Party committed serious mistakes during its thirty years in power. However, he argues that its achievements were far greater in number and that Sudan continues to benefit from many of the institutions and infrastructure established during that period.
If there is to be a political judgement on that era, he concludes, it should be comprehensive rather than selective, invoking the biblical saying:
“Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.”

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=16752