The Grand Losing Deal: The Sudan’s Case (4-7)

Hemeti Between the Carrot and the Stick

Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

When the Ukrainian war broke out, all Western powers aligned on one side, while Russia’s supporters aligned on the other. The familiar slogan of the Cold War re-emerged: ‘You’re either with us or against us.’ Only weeks had passed since General Hemeti’s ill-fated visit to Moscow. Before he could jump ship from the Russian side, he was urgently summoned to a private meeting with representatives of the anti-Russia ‘Group of Four,’ which was neither absent from the scene nor unaware of Russia’s attempts to penetrate Africa through Sudan. At that meeting, Hemeti was confronted with three highly dangerous files: the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur, the Russian rapprochement, and the ‘dispersal of the sit-in’ (with all its images, equipment, and materials). These files were placed before Hemeti, and the articles related to war crimes and genocide from the International Criminal Court’s statutes were read to him. It was made explicitly clear that his fate now depended on the powers holding these files, and his destiny could be similar to that of Ali Muhammad Ali Kushayb, who faced 31 charges of similar crimes, or Lubanga, the Congolese militia leader. The Group representatives told Hemeti in no uncertain terms that he had two choices: either he could become himself accused of war crimes and genocide (after the Rapid Support Forces are declared a terrorist organization ), thus ending his political career, or he could start a new political chapter that could culminate in him becoming the President of Sudan. If he chose the first option, the meeting would end, and he would have to prepare for trial. However, if he chose the second option (the preferred choice of the group), he would need to implement three specific actions immediately:

First, he should publicly apologize for the 25 October coup in unambiguous terms (which would involve distancing himself from Burhan, the Islamists, and local leaders aligned with them);

Second, he should sever all ties with Russia (and any connections to Turkey, Iran, or their allies in the region); and

Third, he should reconcile with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and throw his full military and economic weight behind the Group’s proposed arrangements and projects (as presented through the FFC).

In exchange for these three steps, the Group of Four would commit to the following: First, the ‘sit-in dispersal’ file would be closed entirely, along with any mention of the International Criminal Court, lawyer Nabil Adeeb’s investigation committee, or the committee of the martyrs’ families, and any similar demands for the disbanding of the Janjaweed, or justice for the dead. Second, Hemeti’s businesses and investments would be left untouched, his military support would be increased, and he would receive political and media coverage (regionally and internationally) until the deal was fully realized.

General Hemeti had no choice but to take the carrot; that is, to accept the ‘deal’ and fully comply with the Group’s decisions (thus returning to the founding platform). Since then, the representatives of major powers and their regional and local allies have realized that their previous efforts in crafting the ‘ideal situational ‘ figure had not been in vain. They moved from secrecy to openness, and their group became known in the press as the ‘International Quartet Mechanism,’ composed of the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This group maintained a firm grip on Sudanese affairs through their Khartoum ambassadors, representatives, or intelligence agencies. They held continuous meetings with certain political activists whom they termed ‘political actors,’ with the ongoing aim of mediating to resolve the political crisis in Sudan through dialogue, completing the ‘political process,’ and finding a solution to end the post-October 25th coup situation. It is self-evident that breaking away from the coup and re-establishing ties with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) was at the top of the expected demands from all the Quartet members. This was due to their substantial investment in the deposed Hamdok government (with its military and political wings) and their well-known fear of political Islam and disdain for Iran. The third demand, concerning severing ties with Russia, is the main driver that may require further explanation. Why is the Quartet so wary of a Russia-Sudan rapprochement spearheaded by Hemeti?

Each of the four countries viewed Russian infiltration into Sudan (especially on the Red Sea) as a direct threat to their interests. Any of these nations sought unmatched influence over the Red Sea coasts, Sudan’s vast agricultural lands, or its precious minerals and could not tolerate a strong, hostile competitor like Russia, Turkey, or Iran. Observers note that the UAE’s primary ambition, in particular, is to become an economic hub linking East Africa and South Asia through what has become known as the ‘port chain strategy’—controlling the ports of southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa. Since it lacks a standing military force, the UAE constantly seeks local fighters (militias) to train and arm, as it did in southern Yemen or Libya and as it continues to do with the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. If Hemeti and his militias were to pivot toward Russia, all the UAE’s investments in these forces would go to waste. By controlling Hemedti and his fighting forces, one could easily control Sudan and its African neighbours. Just as the UAE needs soldiers for its African expansion, also Saudi Arabia is in need of combat forces to act as a buffer between it and the Houthis in southern Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the United States, amidst its war with Russia and support for Ukraine, cannot tolerate seeing General Hemeti funneling tons of gold into Russia’s coffers. There is, of course, nothing more effective at restraining Hemeti’s ambitions and controlling his actions than the threat of the sit-in dispersal file and nothing more motivating than the lure of power. Through fear and enticement, the Quartet was able to secure one of the bloodiest and most dangerous deals in modern Sudanese history, as will become clear in what follows.