The Grand Losing Deal: The Sudan’s Case (2-7)

The Rise of Lieutenant General Hemedti – Was the Group of Four Involved?

Eltigani Abdelgadir Hamid

Translated by: Ramadan Ahmed

It is no secret that ousted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, and his intelligence leaders sought a “situational figure to carry out certain tasks. They picked Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, from the “remote areas” to lead what became known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). On the one hand, President Bashir wanted to fight the rebellious militias in Darfur with a similar militia rather than using the regular armed forces, which had been exhausted by previous wars in the south and east of the country. On the other hand, he wanted to create a buffer between himself and his own regular forces to protect him if things went wrong. When the RSF committed atrocities in Darfur in 2003, they were not disbanded as should have been done, instead it was entrusted with border security and later sent to fight in Yemen as part of the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE (a series of mistakes piled on top of each other). Hemedti was the quintessential “situational ” figure in all these dangerous and erroneous missions. Although the RSF was legally under the command of the armed forces, it became, in practice, Hemedti’s personal force. Naturally, Hemedti began to feel that his accumulated power, which transformed him from a militia leader to a brigadier, then major general, and finally lieutenant general, could qualify him for even greater things. He started exaggerating his role, boasting of his military and political capabilities to his soldiers in the Sudanese dialect he mastered: “We hold the key to this country’s power; we are the masters of decision-making… And anyone who doesn’t fight has no say… When the government forms an army, then it can talk to us. Move forward!”[1] This statement was a clear message to both Bashir’s government and the opposing elites that the path to political power ran through the RSF and that those without an army or the ability to fight had no voice. He wouldn’t have made such a statement unless he was confident that everyone, including the president and the regular forces, needed him. However, he didn’t expect that major regional powers would need him as well. But he realized this when the authority of President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen began to falter, the Houthis seized power, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE started looking for troops to fight for them in Yemen.

It wasn’t lost on observers of the Sudanese political scene that when the Arab coalition forces rushed to support legitimacy in Yemen (led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on March 25, 2015), Sudan would be asked to join these forces. It was also unsurprising that President Bashir, whose government was at its weakest, would join the coalition and send elements of the Sudanese armed forces and the RSF (led by Hemedti and coordinated by Burhan) to participate in the Yemen war, hoping for economic and political support.

However, the Yemen war didn’t open the coffers of the allies for President Bashir as he had hoped. Instead, it whetted their appetite for his overthrow. The war in Yemen made the allies focus on the Sudanese troops and the military resources Sudan possesses, which are unparalleled, not to mention the material resources such as gold, water, livestock, and coastlines. As Bashir’s government began to falter under the weight of the economic crisis and political turmoil, the major powers (the United States and the United Kingdom) and their regional allies (Saudi Arabia and the UAE) voraciously began to carve up the Sudanese file, drawing a map for the post-Bashir era. The two generals—Burhan and Hemedti—were at the top of the proposed leadership list for Sudan, with Hemedti ultimately favoured. Hemedti’s edge over Burhan can be attributed to three key traits: first, he leads a militia that is semi-independent of the regular military forces, allowing him to control and move them in a manner that is not as easily achievable for Burhan; second, Hemedti embodies the quintessential “situational ” leader, an adventurous figure capable of executing the most dangerous tasks without hesitation, unlike the cautious and hesitant Burhan; and third, Hemedti has a previous record of human rights violations (for instance, in Darfur), making him vulnerable to blackmail through that record. With this in mind, the representatives of this group of Four systematically worked to shape the political scene in Sudan, holding meetings and making agreements with some Sudanese political forces and a group of businessmen in Addis Ababa (note the role of the Ethiopian president) and in Khartoum.[2] These understandings laid out arrangements for a transitional period involving a partnership between military leadership (led by Burhan and Hemedti) and civilian leadership led by Dr. Abdalla Hamdok. This plan became known in the literature of the Sudanese Communist Party as the “soft landing” theory[3]. The United States and its regional allies feared the consequences of a popular revolution in Sudan, leading them to limit their intervention to removing Islamists from key military and security positions, creating a fragile military-civilian coalition under their supervision. This coalition would only make superficial changes that would not affect the economic structures tied to their institutions and would remain aligned with regional alliances favourable to them.

When the security committee of the former regime, under immense public pressure, ousted President Bashir and installed his defence minister, Lieutenant General Awad Ibn Auf, as head of a transitional military council, the political street (inflamed with revolution) refused to recognise the council, viewing the “security committee” as merely an extension of Bashir’s government. Hemedti also refused to participate in the council, and the United States declined to recognize it. It was not surprising that Ibn Auf (another “situational ” leader) announced his resignation from leadership just one day after taking the oath. What was unexpected, however, was that he handed power to Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army’s inspector general, rather than to the general commander of the army. On the other hand, it was not surprising that General Burhan took the reigns of power and immediately chose General Hemedti (his partner in the Yemen war) to be his deputy, even though General Hemedti was a member of the ‘Security Committee’ of Al-Bashir’s government, just like General Ibn Auf. This indicates that General Burhan was acting according to some prior ‘understandings.’ This is further confirmed by his sudden appearance among the protesters at the sit-in at the General Command of the Army, speaking with the head of the Sudanese Congress Party, Ibrahim Al-Sheikh. It is also confirmed by the fact that the United States immediately welcomed the transfer of power to their nominees—Burhan and Hemedti—and that Saudi Arabia initially promised to deposit 500 million dollars in the Central Bank of Sudan for the benefit of their nominees. This was further confirmed when Dr Hamdok stated that the withdrawal of Sudanese troops from Yemen was up to the elected government, signalling to the regional partners that things would proceed according to the plan.  [4][5]

However, the politically charged street, fueled by the revolution, was unprepared to accept this deal. The revolutionaries continued to stage a sit-in in front of the General Command, demanding the exclusion of the military component from participating in the transitional government. At this point, it became clear to the Group of Four that the prolonged mass sit-in around the General Command (April-June 2019) was an obstacle that made it impossible to complete the deal. The members of the group consulted and pressured for the ‘dispersal of the sit-in,’ leading to the crime of June 3, 2019, when military forces attacked the sit-in of demonstrators in front of the General Command of the Armed Forces in Khartoum, killing dozens of innocent civilians. Despite the horrific nature of the crime, it did not change anything in the planned strategy. A constitutional document was hastily drafted and signed by both the military and civilian components (August 2019), under which General Burhan became the Chairman of the Sovereign Council and Dr Hamdok became the Prime Minister. Although General Hemedti became the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council, fingers of blame for the crime of dispersing the sit-in continued to point at him, adding to the list of crimes attributed to him and his forces.

As the controversy grew over the identity of the military forces that carried out the attack and the authority that issued the orders, General Shams El Din Kabbashi, a member of the Military Council, was compelled to present the official narrative in a press conference. He stated that the ruling Military Council had agreed with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) to clear the Columbia area without disturbing the sit-in area, and a plan was put in place for this. However, some mistakes were made during the execution, leading to unfortunate events.[6] This official narrative differs from other accounts given by eyewitnesses and some survivors. Most of these accounts point fingers at General Hemedti and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).[7] The most precise and credible among these, mainly to Western governments, was the report by Human Rights Watch, which explicitly stated that the RSF opened fire (in the early hours of June 3, 2019) on unarmed protesters, killing many of them instantly, while also raping, stabbing, beating, and humiliating others, including shaving their heads, among other abuses.[8]

‎‎To address this issue, Prime Minister Dr Abdalla Hamdok formed a committee led by lawyer Nabil Adib to investigate the crime. It is said that the committee heard from over 3,000 witnesses and received more than 150 video recordings. In an interim report submitted to the Prime Minister, the committee revealed that its work was progressing steadily. However, the committee’s chairman repeatedly stated that his committee faced numerous obstacles and explicitly accused ‘government agencies of not cooperating and refusing to hand over the requested video footage from surveillance cameras around the sit-in site.’ As accusations against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) increased, General Hemedti himself was compelled to admit that some of his forces had participated in dispersing the sit-in. While addressing the “Nile Junction Initiative for Sudanese Women” at the Friendship Hall in Khartoum, he disclosed that the investigation committee had identified the main perpetrator and coordinator of the sit-in dispersal and promised to bring them to trial. He also mentioned that 14 military personnel were detained, with five of them having made judicial confessions, saying: ‘Our people are not angels, and our field courts are functioning.'[9] [10]

In any case, the sit-in area was cleared of protesters, and the parties could sign the Constitutional Document in August 2019 and form the ruling coalition. Despite what had happened, General Hemedti became the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereign Council. However, the crime and his previous records remained hanging over his head, just as planned. The Group of Four their allied civilian forces (FFC) kept this case and would wave it in Hemedti’s face whenever they sensed that he might stray from the script. General Hemedti realized that he would be ousted, and his chapter would be closed sooner or later unless this case is closed. This understanding helps explain why relations between him and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) became strained, why he worked tirelessly to obstruct the investigation into the sit-in dispersal, and why he eventually engaged in planning the coup on 25 October 2021.

[1]Hemedti: We are the masters of decision-making, Al-Rakoba electronic newspaper, November 30, 2017. Alrakoba.net/841962,30/11/2017

[2] The Sudanese political circles have been discussing that some of these meetings were held at the home of a well-known businessman in Khartoum, attended by the ambassadors of the Quartet group.

[3] The Sudanese Communist Party adopts what can be called the “Soft Landing Theory,” interpreting through it all the arrangements made by the Forces of Freedom and Change following the fall of the Salvation Government. The essence of this theory is that when the United States realized that the Salvation Government was on the verge of collapse, it sought to prevent a radical popular revolution, which, according to this perspective, was expected to bring about sweeping revolutionary change that could extend beyond Sudan to its regional environment. Based on this, the United States initiated the “soft landing” project, which allows for superficial changes in individuals while maintaining policies, particularly economic policies subject to the conditions of the IMF and World Bank, leading to the erosion of national sovereignty and the continuation of military alliances. Within this framework, the United States and its regional allies pressured the military component (Burhan and Hemedti) to sign a power-sharing agreement (through the Constitutional Document). Additionally, within this framework, the massacre of the sit-in dispersal was orchestrated, aiming to strengthen the authority of the Military Council. The Group of Four pressured both parties, and an agreement was reached at the home of a businessman in Khartoum, attended by diplomats from the U.S., Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, along with representatives of the Military Council and some opposition leaders. (See: Taj Al-Sir Osman Babu, “What Lies Behind the False Accusations Against the Sudanese Communist Party?” Sudanile, February 5, 2023, www.sudanile.com. It is worth noting that this narrative was reaffirmed in a political paper published by the Communist Party on January 23, 2024, on its page and reported by Al-Rakoba newspaper.)

The Security Committee of Al-Bashir’s government (which overthrew him) consisted of the Minister of Defense (Ibn Auf), the Head of Intelligence (Salah Gosh), the Minister of Interior, and the Commander of the Rapid Support Forces (General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti). It is not definitively known why its head (Ibn Auf) relinquished power and handed it over to General Burhan—whether it was due to popular pressure, internal disagreements within the committee, or a combination of both. However, news sources indicated that General Salah Gosh, the Head of the General Intelligence Service, was independently contacting some political forces, represented by the Sudanese Baath Party (led by Mohamed Wada’a), the Umma Party (led by Sadiq Al-Mahdi), Yahya Al-Hussein (from the Sudan Call), and Sadiq Youssef (from the National Consensus Forces). The goal was to form a Military Council and a national government based on the 2005 Constitution, with President Bashir given a symbolic presence without authority. See the interview conducted by Abdul Wahab Hemmat with Yahya Al-Hussein, leader of the Sudanese Baath Party, Al-Rakoba newspaper, October 2, 2019.

[5] BBC Arabic, 13 April 2019. bbc.com/Arabic/middleeast

[6] See Al-Kabashi’s statements in: Alghad Channel 13 June 2019. www.youtube.alghadTV June 13,2019

[7] See for example: Sadiq Youssef, a leader in the Communist Party, attacks Hemeti and the Rapid Support Forces, accusing them of participating in the dispersal of the sit-in (Al-Rakoba News, June 28, 2020).

[8] A summary of the report is available at: www.hrw.org/news2019/11/17

[9] Sudan News Agency (SUNA), 20 June 2019، www.suna-sd.net/posts

[10] See Al Sharq News Channel, a Saudi channel issued from Dubai(asharq news) 29 May 2021,www.asharq.com/politics.91912