Now the Truth Has Come to Light: When Others Speak About Sudan

Sudanhorizon – Mohamed Osman Adam
Observers of the situation in Sudan, and of the proxy war being waged against the Sudanese people, have noted two critically important elements that now dominate the media landscape and coverage of United Arab Emirates involvement in the war in Sudan.
First, no one any longer doubts—or even asks questions about—the UAE’s full involvement in the war in Sudan, and its provision of tangible military support, including weapons, aircraft, drones, and mercenaries, to the Rapid Support Forces militia. Previously, articles would speak of “allegations” and of “the UAE’s denial of any involvement and rejection of those accusations”.
Today, however, dozens of articles from regional and international sources—and from other parts of the world—no longer trouble themselves with adding the ritualistic false denial in the name of balance. No one is trying to save the face of Emirati officials; as the saying goes, “what is obvious needs no exposure”. Regrettably, some Sudanese opposition politicians continue to seek to shoulder the burden of absolving the UAE of any involvement. Thus, they have been left alone to “carry the weight of the disgrace”—a position that is difficult to comprehend. Even at this level, however, two leaders from the Mahdi family, Ahmed al-Mahdi and Abdel Rahman al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, dissociated themselves last week from this stance and submitted a document to the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, al-Burhan, expressing their full and unwavering support for the army, in word and deed alike.
Second, the government has softened its rhetoric regarding the UAE’s hostile stance. Now, as is evident from several articles we summarise below, influential regional, neighbouring, and international actors are stating this position openly—relieving the Sudanese government of the burden of argument and rebuttal. They are not defending Sudan alone, but themselves as well. From the outset of the war, Sudan warned that this proxy war would not stop at its borders. This outlet (Al-Muhaqqiq) published a large body of articles cautioning against what neighbours and more distant actors have now come to recognise as fact.
When neighbouring and distant states realised that words and advice alone might not suffice, they resorted to tougher measures. We have seen Saudi Arabia conduct strikes in Yemen against what it perceives as Emirati attempts to replicate in Yemen what is happening in Sudan. The Egyptians, too, may be driven towards something similar in the south-west of their country, as threats reach their territory and draw closer to dam and water resource areas.
By way of example, Cameron Hudson noted, in a commentary on an article published by Middle East Eye last Saturday, that the region—because of what is unfolding in Sudan at the hands of the militia and its backers—“is sliding towards a serious crisis between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Libya. Haftar is now under pressure from the UAE to continue facilitating arms shipments to Sudan via eastern Libya. Haftar remains hesitant in his position, despite the continued flow of weapons into Sudan. However, he has received a direct warning, as his son Saddam was summoned to Egypt.”
Middle East Eye reported that Egypt and Saudi Arabia had “stepped up pressure on Khalifa Haftar over his role in facilitating Emirati military support to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, warning that the continuation of this support could lead to a dangerous shift in Cairo’s relationship with him.”
It added that this pressure comes within the framework of a broader Egyptian-Saudi effort to cut the flow of weapons, fuel and fighters to the Rapid Support Forces, curb Emirati influence in the region, and prevent further destabilisation along the sensitive border triangle between Egypt, Libya and Sudan.
Earlier this month, Saddam Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar and deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, visited Cairo and met the Egyptian Minister of Defence and several senior military and security officials. Egyptian and Libyan media described the meeting as focusing on military cooperation, though the full purpose of the visit was not disclosed.
Middle East Eye stated explicitly: “Saddam Haftar was officially summoned to Egypt and was not invited for a courtesy visit, following confirmation that the United Arab Emirates had supplied the Rapid Support Forces with weapons, military equipment, man-portable air defence systems and drones, with assistance from the Libyan National Army,” according to a senior Egyptian military source speaking to Middle East Eye.
In Sudan’s immediate neighbourhood, Addis Standard—while seeking to persuade readers that it does not drink from the same cup as its government—published an article on 22 January entitled “From Allies to Rivals: How Saudi-Emirati Competition Is Reshaping the Horn of Africa and Opening Space for Tigray Consolidation”. It stated:
“At the beginning of 2026, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued an explicit, unprecedented public accusation against the United Arab Emirates, a fellow Gulf state and former partner in the Yemen conflict coalition, claiming that Abu Dhabi had undermined its national security. The language used by Riyadh ranks among the most forthright it has ever deployed against the UAE, signalling growing concern within Saudi leadership over Abu Dhabi’s increasingly independent foreign policy.”
It added: “Saudi Arabia’s effective response against the UAE in Yemen and beyond points to the emergence of an open rivalry between the two Gulf powers in the foreseeable future. At the same time, this assertive Saudi engagement may bring an end to the era of confident Emirati dominance over political outcomes in the Horn of Africa. Naturally, with its close ally Israel entrenching its presence in Somaliland, its strong ties with the Ethiopian federal government, and its intervention in Sudan, the UAE will remain an influential geopolitical player in the region. What is changing, however, is that it will no longer be able to single-handedly determine the fate of political actors and developments in the Horn of Africa.”
The alliance formed to confront the UAE has now consolidated, with its members demonstrating tangible security cooperation and effectiveness. According to Middle East Eye, Egypt has shared highly sensitive intelligence with Riyadh and played an active role in Saudi operations against the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemen.
The strengthening of Saudi ties with Turkey, the defence alliance with Pakistan, and the anticipated integration of Egypt into a coordinated security bloc all enhance Riyadh’s standing—and that of its allies—as a cohesive regional power whose influence extends beyond the region.
It is likely that the bolstering of Riyadh’s position, at least in the near term, will deter Emirati-backed actors in the Horn of Africa from pursuing adventurous strategies that rely on Emirati leverage without due regard for the consequences.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=10733