The Debate over Sovereignty and Functional Geography: Could the Mogadishu Earthquake Redefine the Rules of the Game?

Dr Mohamed Hasab Al-Rasoul
In a bold geopolitical move, the Somali government announced on 11 January the cancellation of all its security and economic agreements with the United Arab Emirates. Mogadishu’s decision was not merely a reaction to security violations; it constituted a strategic strike within a broader struggle over the shape of the regional order in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Basin.
This decision stemmed from two principal factors. First, Abu Dhabi’s violation of Somali national sovereignty by covertly transferring Aidarus al-Zubaidi, head of the Southern Transitional Council in southern Yemen. Second, the exploitation of certain maritime and air ports for the benefit of Israel during its war on Gaza, in addition to the Emirati role in facilitating Israeli recognition of Somaliland.
Functional Geography: A Mechanism for Breaching Sovereignty
Before Mogadishu’s latest decision, the Emirati role in Somaliland had become entrenched through the use of what may be termed functional geography. Through this approach, Somali national sovereignty was fragmented by exploiting ports, straits, and military bases in Bosaso, Kismayo, Berbera, and elsewhere, transforming them into instruments serving a regional influence that bypassed the central state—both in concept and in authority.
This influence effectively split Somalia’s sovereign decision-making between a legitimate authority recognised nationally, regionally, and internationally, and local actors linked to external powers seeking a transactional bargain in which sovereignty and territorial unity were exchanged for control over parts of the national territory.
Mogadishu, however, wielded its national and international legitimacy as a sharp weapon against what may be described as geopolitical thuggery. Despite the asymmetry in material power, it succeeded in dismantling the Emirati–Israeli project and disabling an entire network of regional influence with a single strike.
The Tripartite Partnership and the Project of Controlling Strategic Chokepoints
The Emirati–American strategic partnership was reinforced in mid-2024, elevating Abu Dhabi—under its new configuration—into a security proxy for the United States across the Arab and African spheres in general, and in the Red Sea Basin in particular.
This was preceded by a trilateral Emirati–Israeli–American cooperation under the 2020 Abraham Accords. Under that partnership, Washington delegated major and risky roles to Abu Dhabi in the region, including security and military coordination with Tel Aviv to support Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023, drawing on Emirati presence and influence in southern Yemen and northern Somalia.
This trilateral linkage reflects a shift in Israeli military doctrine towards controlling maritime chokepoints and corridors, in order to break the blockade imposed by Sanaa in support of Gaza. Consequently, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Basin have been transformed into arenas of proxy confrontation between Israel and the UAE on one side, and the region’s recognised national governments on the other.
The Ports Game: Dismantling States through Emirati Influence
The UAE has pursued an expansionist strategy based on a network of strategic ports—both maritime and aerial—across Yemen and Africa, supported by ties with political actors and local militias in several states. This model is evident in its backing of Khalifa Haftar in Libya, the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, as well as its relations with secessionist entities in Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland.
The strategy pursues two interconnected objectives: either to dominate states through internal points of influence or to dismantle them where control over a unified entity proves impossible. This endeavour operates within the framework of the Emirati partnership with the United States and Israel, which has turned Abu Dhabi into an advanced military, logistical, and financial partner.
Repercussions: The Counter-Alliance
The activation of this Emirati role in Yemen and Somalia has produced profound geopolitical repercussions, including:
The erosion of Gulf cohesion: The Southern Transitional Council’s Emirati-backed control over Yemen’s Hadramawt province prompted Saudi Arabia to view this as a direct threat to its national security, strategic depth, and Vision 2030, as well as to its major projects and interests in the Red Sea—most notably NEOM—leading Riyadh to intervene militarily to halt this expansion.
The consolidation of counter-alliances: The Emirati role in Somalia and its facilitation of Israeli recognition of Somaliland amplified regional anxieties in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, as well as within the central government in Mogadishu, which viewed such recognition as a blatant violation of its sovereignty and a threat to territorial unity. This dynamic culminated in the emergence of a quadrilateral cooperation framework (Saudi–Somali–Egyptian–Turkish), supported by Qatar and endorsed by Oman, aimed at countering Emirati–Israeli influence in the Red Sea Basin and the Horn of Africa, and at defending the centralised national state as a guarantor of stability against fragmentation-driven remapping projects.
A Geopolitical Earthquake
Somalia’s decision—backed by a regionally supported Saudi stance—has triggered a dramatic retreat of Emirati–Israeli influence across three interconnected fronts.
First, in Yemen, the Southern Transitional Council found itself isolated after losing the territories it had expanded into, as well as the logistical depth previously provided by Abu Dhabi’s presence in Yemen and that which could have been secured in Somaliland—weakening its ability to manoeuvre in Aden, Socotra, and Hadramawt.
Second, in the Horn of Africa, the cancellation of Somali–Emirati port and security cooperation inflicted a strategic loss on Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, disrupted coordination with Ethiopia, and fully restored maritime sovereignty to Mogadishu in alliance with Riyadh, Ankara, and Cairo.
Third, in Sudan, the loss of Somali ports is likely to have a direct impact on the trajectory of the war, as the UAE had relied on these ports to supply the Rapid Support Forces with weapons and mercenaries. This is further reinforced by the advancing roles of Saudi Arabia and Egypt at the expense of Emirati influence in the political arena.
This retreat may not occur without risks. A desperate backlash from Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv is foreseeable, potentially manifesting in attempts to open new fronts within Somalia—between Somaliland, Jubaland, Puntland, and the centre—or in opening a new front in eastern Sudan via Ethiopia, where the UAE has reportedly established a camp with a capacity of 10,000 to train mercenaries recruited from Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Sahel, and even Colombia. Such developments would exacerbate military, political, and humanitarian conditions and pose the gravest threat to Sudan’s national security.
Sovereignty on the Scales: A Historic Test of Dignity
Mogadishu’s historic decision was not merely the cancellation of cooperation agreements; it amounted to a strategic earthquake that reshaped geopolitical equations in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf system. The region now faces an existential test between two models: one that defends the national state—its sovereignty, cohesion, territorial unity, and stability—and another that advances domination, fragmentation, and the chaos serving projects of neo-colonialism.
Somalia’s experience offers two decisive lessons. First, the legitimacy of the national state—however materially weak—remains a potent geopolitical weapon capable of shifting balances. Second, fragmentation strategies based on empowering functional entities tend to generate strong counter-alliances that restore regional equilibrium and positively affect domestic stability, even when great powers such as the United States operate through regional and local proxies.
These lessons confront state leaders with a fateful choice: either to engage in alliances defending national sovereignty, unity, and regional stability, or to submit to new realities that entrench external domination and destructive chaos.
Thus, Mogadishu’s resilience and its regional alliance will not deliver a fleeting tactical victory, but will constitute a historic test defining the nature of the next regional order: will it be an order of sovereignty and stability, or one of domination and disorder? The answer lies in the decisions states take today—and in the lesson Mogadishu has learned and taught: legitimacy is a weapon, unity is a shield, sovereignty is the clearest expression of dignity, and the struggle for sovereignty and dignity admits neither neutrality nor complacency nor delay.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=10686