From Yemen to Sudan: How Are the Region’s Conflicts Managed?

Dr Al-Wathiq Kameer
Regional Intersections
The Middle East and North Africa are witnessing an unprecedented state of entanglement and conflict. Local wars are no longer confined to their geographical borders; their effects now extend into international and regional alliances whose security and economic interests are deeply intertwined. From the intractable war in Yemen, which has produced complex alliances, to the ongoing war in Sudan between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, a picture emerges of an era of multidimensional conflicts, managed through perspectives that transcend traditional state boundaries.
In recent weeks, a widely circulated perception has taken hold that the region stands on the brink of a major regional explosion, driven by a potential confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in light of developments in Yemen, direct Saudi military intervention, the decline in the influence of the Southern Transitional Council, and the absence of its president, Aidarous al-Zubaidi. Within this prevailing understanding, many argue that any sharp escalation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could redraw the regional balance of power, place Saudi Arabia in a position of regional leadership, and open the door to a new alliance comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Eritrea—ultimately serving to end the war in Sudan in favour of the Sudanese army.
In this context, a significant segment of politicians and opinion leaders is betting that Saudi–Emirati tensions could become a direct pressure tool on Abu Dhabi to halt its support for the Rapid Support Forces, on the grounds that such support is one of the main factors prolonging the war. This wager is based on the assumption that any clash or escalation between the two Gulf powers would force the UAE to reconsider its calculations in Sudan, thereby creating a genuine opportunity to end the conflict. Yet this reading, despite its prevalence, collides with a different regional reality. Competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, notwithstanding its apparent intensity, is not managed through direct military confrontation, but rather through the management of political differences within frameworks that contain them and prevent their slide into open conflict—allowing each side to preserve its interests and influence without bearing the cost of a direct clash.
The Regional Context of Interlocking Conflicts
In Yemen, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, and Iran have entered labyrinths of influence and competing interests, rendering the conflict more complex and longer-lasting than expected. With every escalation, the landscape shifts and the scope of international attention expands. Sudan is no exception. The war between the army and the Rapid Support Forces, now extending beyond two years, is not merely an internal conflict; it has become an extension of regional and international intersections carrying clear political and military implications.
Despite Saudi Arabia’s military targeting of the port of Mukalla and the entry of forces supporting legitimacy into Aden, Riyadh was not aiming for a comprehensive military victory. Rather, its objectives were to protect borders, contain threats, and exit a prolonged war of attrition. De-escalation with the Houthis and using them as a bargaining chip rather than a target for decisive defeat reflects this shift. By contrast, the UAE has focused on extending its influence through ports and coastal areas and supporting local actors without direct confrontation—a pattern that is repeated in Sudan through support for the Rapid Support Forces as an instrument of influence rather than a military or ideological choice.
The UAE often justifies its interventions under the banner of combating Islamists, yet realities on the ground reveal that this narrative has lost much of its credibility. It withdrew from fighting the Houthis; there are doubts about indirect communication with them via Oman; and it previously requested the regime of Omar al-Bashir to contribute troops to the coalition in Yemen. This confirms that strategic interest and indirect influence—not ideology—are the primary drivers of these policies.
By contrast, Egypt views Sudan from an entirely different angle. For Cairo, Sudan constitutes direct strategic depth, and any fragmentation of the state or domination by an armed actor outside the state’s framework represents a direct threat to Egyptian national security. Hence, the Egyptian presidency’s statements about “red lines” in Sudan do not imply war or expansionist influence but rather support for maintaining a unified Sudanese state and preserving the army as a central national institution.
Regionally, Turkey plays a visible role within the anticipated alliance with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Eritrea, in an effort to balance Emirati influence. Turkey views Sudan as a potential sphere of influence through economic, political, and strategic investment tools, without seeking direct confrontation with any Gulf party. This approach reflects Turkey’s desire to entrench a sustainable regional presence based on balance rather than confrontation, within a network of flexible alliances that enhance regional stability and protect its interests.
Within this context, the Somali file emerges as one of the arenas of indirect confrontation in East Africa and the Red Sea. The scene has grown more complex following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, a move that deepened regional competition between Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia on one side, and Ethiopia and the UAE on the other. Unlike Abu Dhabi, which has forged close ties with Somaliland, most influential regional actors—including Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—support the Federal Government of Somalia as the legitimate authority. In this light, Mogadishu’s decision to cancel any security agreement with the UAE reflects the scale of escalating tension. It confirms that Somalia has become an integral part of the network of interlocking conflicts stretching from Yemen to Sudan.
In addition, the roles of Iran, Oman, Israel, and Ethiopia intersect. Iran uses the Houthis as a regional bargaining chip; Oman plays the role of mediator; Israel focuses on Red Sea security and preventing the emergence of a permanent threat to maritime navigation. Ethiopia, backed by the UAE and Israel, is not only seeking to secure maritime access but is also acting within a broader struggle intersecting with its sharp disputes with Egypt and Eritrea, particularly over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and regional security arrangements in the Horn of Africa. This dimension renders the Ethiopian role more complex and gives it indirect influence over Sudan as a contact zone for these overlapping balances. At the same time, Russia and China work to protect their strategic interests in the Red Sea and Sudan without directly involving themselves in conflicts, reinforcing the logic of crisis management rather than resolution.
In the same vein, Pakistan’s role stands out as a calculated balancing act. It does not seek escalation or regional military resolution, yet it is not detached from expanding military and political influence. Given its close defence ties with Saudi Arabia and its readiness to conclude military cooperation agreements with Sudan, Pakistan is working to enhance its presence as a reliable security actor without risking an explosion of conflicts. This approach reflects an attempt to combine the regulation of regional competition and the prevention of open confrontations with the consolidation of Pakistan’s position as an influential player in regional security equations—rather than a driver of comprehensive military resolution.
Before turning to the Libyan role, it is necessary to pause at Chad, one of the oldest regional actors with significant influence on the conflict and one that is directly affected by the war in Sudan due to proximity and tribal and border linkages. Chad moves with extreme caution: on the one hand, it fears the spillover of chaos into its territory; on the other, it finds itself part of a regional balance network that includes Libya, the UAE, and France. This position inclines it towards a policy of containing the conflict rather than resolving it, while turning a blind eye to certain cross-border movements—thereby contributing, albeit indirectly, to prolonging the Sudanese crisis within a logic of regional conflict management rather than termination.
Nor can the role of South Sudan be overlooked. It shares long borders with Sudan and a history of tribal and political intertwinement. Internal conflicts there, refugee movements, and the historical relationship of the SPLA directly affect areas such as the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile adjacent to the Ethiopian border. This makes South Sudan part of the regional equation and heightens the need to manage internal and external influence cautiously to avoid the escalation of cross-border crises.
The Libyan experience and the role of General Khalifa Haftar also cannot be ignored. They offer a clear model of interventions based on supporting local actors—military or political—to extend influence without direct confrontation, particularly by the UAE. The simultaneous success and failure of this model impose careful calculations on Egypt, Turkey, and Russia when approaching the Sudanese file, further complicating the scene and confirming that replicating scenarios does not guarantee decisive outcomes.
The Impact of Interlocking Influence on Sudan
Against this backdrop, Sudan becomes a point of convergence for regional and international interests. No party wants a decisive victory for the other, and no one is willing to bear the cost of such a resolution. Thus, the war in Sudan turns into a managed crisis within certain limits—not a conflict to be ended or pushed towards a swift, radical solution. Still, one to be contained, with each actor focusing on protecting its interests and achieving strategic objectives at the lowest possible cost.
Herein lies a fundamental dilemma for Sudanese actors: how to address this volume of intervention without falling into the trap of relying on external forces. The indicators suggest that a realistic approach does not lie in waiting for a regional clash or an overwhelming military resolution, but in pursuing a different path based on: managing internal political differences in a way that preserves state stability; addressing regional powers in the language of interests; rejecting the transformation of Sudan into a proxy battlefield; building a realistic, organised civilian voice; and recognising that reliance on external actors to weaken internal rivals only prolongs the war.
Conclusion
What is unfolding in Yemen—and what reverberates from it into Sudan—reveals a fundamental truth: conflicts in the region are no longer resolved by war alone. Today, influential states are not seeking swift military victories, but rather managing their influence at the lowest possible cost, even if crises drag on. Accordingly, waiting for a regional explosion or a sudden shift in the positions of major powers to end Sudan’s war is an unrealistic gamble. Contemporary regional politics are built on reaching settlements and regulating disagreements, not on direct confrontation. Major powers prefer keeping crises under control rather than risking open wars, while weak and fragile states find themselves suspended between war and peace, as is the case with Sudan. Even military alliances and arms deals, in prevailing practice, do not signal an imminent resolution; they are more often used to manage conflict than to end it.
In this reality, the greatest burden falls on the Sudanese themselves. The country’s future will not be shaped in other capitals, nor through external bets, but through inclusive dialogue without exclusion, the development of a shared vision, and a broad national agreement that places the interests of the state above divisions, reduces opportunities for external interference, and opens a realistic path to ending the war. Without this, Sudan will remain an open arena for others’ conflicts, rather than a state capable of determining its own destiny.

Shortlink: https://sudanhorizon.com/?p=10403